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Developing countries face many socio-economics challenges, such as (i) low level of edu-
cational and poor health attainments of children, (ii) low rate of female labour market par-
ticipation, (iii) lack of access to basic amenities for living among urban slums-dwellers (iv)
discrimination by caste, religion and ethnicity in socio-economic aspects of life and many
more. This thesis empirically investigates some of these challenges in the Indian context.
Chapter 2 revisits the child quantity-quality trade-off model formulated by Becker and Lewis
in 1973 and it empirically examines whether child-quantity is inversely related to child-
quality. I use the 2011 India Human Development Survey dataset, consisting of a nationally
representative survey of Indian households and an instrumental variable approach to control
for an endogenous child-quantity variable (i.e., the number of children born per woman). Us-
ing twins as an instrument for child-quantity, the findings reveal that the negative impacts of
having a large family size on schooling outcomes are relevant to the urban settlement and the
nuclear family setting. These negative impacts on the average schooling outcomes primarily
emerge from families that have five or more children. The impacts on health outcomes are
relevant to the rural settlement and to both the extended and the nuclear family settings. Chap-
ter 3 investigates the impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes. I use the same
dataset and an instrumental variable approach to instrument an endogenous fertility variable.
Using twins and first-born girl as instruments for fertility, the findings reveal that fertility dis-
courages female labour market participation and longer hours of labour supply, particularly
when children are young (under the age of six). Economic variable, such as hourly wage
encourages female labour market participation as well as working for longer hours in the
labour market, irrespective of age categories of dependent children. However, unearned fam-
ily wealth discourages female labour market participation and working for longer hours in the
labour market. Moreover, the female labour participation is higher among the disadvantaged
households, such as Schedule castes and Schedule Tribes. This is because the economic con-
dition of the households is extremely poor and it is particularly so for the similar households
that are living in the slums and are deprived of many government benefits for not possessing
a caste certificate. In Chapter 4, therefore, I examine the impact of the possession of a caste
certificate on the standard of living of socio-economically disadvantaged eligible households
residing in the slums of two Indian cities, namely Mumbai and Kolkata. I use the slum-level
dataset that has been collected as a part of the NOPOOR project in 2013-14, funded by the
European Commission, and an instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity
in the possession of a caste certificate. The state of residence status (i.e., whether an eligible
household is residing within its state of origin) is used as an instrument for the possession of
a caste certificate. The findings reveal that the possession of a caste certificate improves the
standard of living for the eligible households compared to the similar households that do not
possess one, this is relevant for Other Backward Class households. The positive impact of
the possession of a caste certificate on an eligible household’s standard of living is mediated
through the procurement of government jobs by at least one household member.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The United Nations have globally made significant strides to advance the right to education
and to improve access to basic services for sustainable development. Several policies have
evolved over time to meet the goals of economic development and social inclusion in de-
veloped and developing countries. For example, education policies have evolved to provide
universal education in many developing countries. Welfare policies have evolved to make the
European countries most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world. Broader targets (at macro-level) are achieved through closer focus on micro-level
aspects of an economy, such as improving children’s educational attainments, increasing fe-
male labour market participation, promoting equality of opportunity and achieving a higher
standard of living for all. For example, Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) explain that taxation
policies in Europe have been able to increase the number of tax payers and broaden the tax
base of the economy through increase in female labour market participation which has also
contributed to an increase the productivity of a nation. Despite the implementation of such
welfare policies in many countries, both developed and developing countries continue to ex-
perience several challenges in the form of low female labour market participation, gender gap
in wages, poor education and health of children due to a large family size, discriminations
based on ethnicity, religion and caste and many more. It is therefore essential to investigate
some of these challenges and understand the determinants of such outcomes. Such evalua-
tions are very crucial for evidence-based policy making.
India is not the exception to these challenges. Since 1970, the education of children has been
one of the long-term socio-economic development goals of the Government of India. How-
ever, there still exits an enormous gap between school enrolment and educational attainment
of children. Net enrolment rate at upper primary level is far from being satisfactory, and drop-
out rates continue to be a major concern at all levels of education (G.o.I, 2012). There could
be several key factors influencing such low educational attainments of children; these include
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lower educational attainments of parents, child-labour in financially disadvantaged families,
large number of children in a family, caste, religion and the social and cultural norms. By
controlling for these crucial factors, I investigate whether family size (i.e., the number of
surviving children residing with a woman) influences schooling and health outcomes of chil-
dren. Dating back to 1969, studies have found that family size could negatively impact on
children’s educational attainments. In the context of India, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b)
study provides such evidence. Even today, the negative effects of having more siblings on
schooling and health outcomes of children persist in India and is confirmed by Pande (2003b),
Sarin (2004), Asfaw et al. (2010), Kumar and Kugler (2017), Makino (2018), Zimmermann
(2012). This observed negative relationship between the number of children and quality of
children is popularly known as the quantity-quality trade-off theory (Q-Q theory) that has
been originally formulated by Becker (1960). Earlier empirical findings in the Indian context
support the prediction of Becker’s Q-Q theory.
Despite these novel contributions in the Q-Q literature, there are still some gaps in the litera-
ture where I contribute some key features. First, unlike the earlier studies, I have consistently
used all three child-health outcomes, for all age groups of children (1–4 and 5–18), namely
z-scores for weight-for-age, height-for-age and BMI-for-age, in addition to the traditionally
used schooling outcomes (year of education and age-standardised schooling index). Fur-
thermore, I use three additional measures of schooling outcomes, namely school attendance,
delay in school and ratio of actual years of schooling to expected years of schooling. Sec-
ond, unlike Kumar and Kugler (2017), I have used twins to control for the endogeneity in
child-quantity. For a causal analysis, Kumar and Kugler (2017) have used first-born girl as
an instrument for child-quantity. However, the first-born girl may have a direct impact on
siblings’ schooling attainments because an older sister in a family often takes care of the
educational responsibility of her younger siblings. An empirical test in my study supports
this prediction; first-born girl is positively correlated with her siblings’ years of schooling
completion, which weakens the validity of the instrument for the given sample in my study.
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I have used twins instead of a twin-ratio, which has been used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980b). This is because twin-ratio is endogenous by its definition; twin-ratio is defined as
the number of twin births divided by the number of pregnancies per woman and hence, the
denominator remains an endogenous variable. I use an alternative instrument i.e., same gen-
der composition of first two children to examine the robustness of the results. Third, a family
that experiences twin births at the first delivery may have different characteristics which may
influence children’s outcomes differently compared to a family that experiences twin-births
in the latter deliveries. To examine how this kind of heterogeneity across families may influ-
ence children’s schooling outcomes, I study the impact of nth delivery of twins on schooling
outcomes of all previous born children, following the study by Black et al. (2005). Fourth,
I study the impact of siblings on schooling and health outcomes based on a dichotomy be-
tween an extended family and a nuclear family setting. Finally, I have tried to address the
birth spacing concern (i.e., a closer birth spacing between children is likely to have a negative
impact on previous born siblings’ education) by controlling for age gap between the first-
and last-born children. When the age gap is high, the first-born child is likely to take care of
his/her younger siblings’ education; this potentially controls for negative effects of zero birth
spacing of twins. Similarly, contraceptive use by either of the parents is used as an alternative
control variable to examine the robustness of the results.
I have used the 2011 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II) for this study. This is
a nationally representative dataset and covers all 28 states and 5 union territories of India,
excluding 2 union territories, namely Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep. The
primary reason for selecting this dataset over the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) and
National Sample Survey (NSS) is that IHDS has health information on children for all ages
between 0–18 while NFHS has health information for children below the age of 5. NSS does
not have health information. In addition, IHDS-II is a comprehensive dataset that includes
a wide variety of questions relating to socio-economic conditions of the households, such as
educational status, employment, income, consumption expenditure and social capital.
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The empirical findings show that the negative impacts of having a large family size on com-
pleted years of schooling and ERT are relevant to the urban settlement and the nuclear family
setting. The regression models based on different family sizes reveal that these negative
impacts of child-quantity on the schooling outcomes of children primarily emerge from the
families having at least five children. The impacts on the health outcomes are relevant to the
rural settlement and to both the extended and the nuclear family settings.
In Chapter 3, I investigate whether child-quantity also influences female labour market par-
ticipation and hours of labour supply using the 2011 IHDS dataset. The motivation behind
this study emerges from the fact that female labour market participation rate in India has been
37% in 2005 and it has continued to decline gradually thereafter, remaining close to 25% in
2011-12 (see Figure 3.1). The 2011 IHDS dataset also reveals that female labour market
participation rate is 25% (see Table 3.2) while the the average number of surviving children
per woman during 2011-12 has been four. These children were born during the 1990s, when
the live birth per woman was 3.8 (see Appendix Table A2.3). These estimates provide a
scope for further investigation into the research question: whether a large number of chil-
dren per woman, during 2011-12, have negative impacts on female labour market outcomes,
particularly in presence of least one child below the age of six.
There is a vast literature in labour economics over the past 20–30 years questioning why
women are under-represented in the labour market in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Among several factors, an observed fact that women disproportionately assume child-
rearing responsibilities has always been recognised in the labour economics literature (Wald-
fogel, 1998; Piras and Ripani, 2005). The related studies in the past have tried to explore
several factors (such as fertility and unearned family wealth) that discourage female labour
market participation. The studies have also investigated how an incentive, such as a wage rate
influences female time-allocation in different activities, such as housework, market-work and
leisure. This broad division of time into the three types of regular activities is known as the
trichotomy of time allocation in the literature.
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The theoretical study on the trichotomy of time allocation by married women has been mo-
tivated by Gronau (1977). Gronau assumes that, in a developed country setting, a woman
may choose to spend zero hours at home and may allocate her time between market-work
and leisure. I modify this assumption in my work to reflect a more realistic context. I assume
that a woman spares some compulsory minimum amount of time at home such that hours
spent at home is strictly positive, instead of a zero possibility. Hence, I have refined Gronau’s
original proposition on a woman’s equilibrium allocation of hours into house-work, market-
work and leisure by introducing an additional time-constraint: compulsory house-work time
requirement. By incorporating the constraint into the model, I show how the optimal hours
of labour supply in the market may decline below the Gronau-equilibrium hours of labour
supply. Moreover, depending on the relative magnitude of a shift in the constraint (i.e., com-
pulsory house-work time requirement) from its reference point due to an exogenous shock,
for example a fertility shock, there could be a possibility of a sub-optimal solution that may
cause a working woman to exit the labour market. Following the theoretical demonstrations,
I empirically investigate whether the exogenous fertility shock has negative consequences
on female labour market outcomes, namely participation and hours of labour supply in the
market. Due to the endogenous nature of fertility decisions, I have used two instruments
for fertility, namely twin-births (i.e., whether or not a mother has twins), following Bronars
and Grogger (1994) and first-born girl (i.e., whether or not the first-born child is a girl). A
causal analysis in this area of research has not been done earlier in the Indian context. Using
the IHDS-II dataset and twins, the primary findings reveal that fertility discourages female
labour market participation and longer hours of labour supply, particularly when children are
young (below the age of six). The negative impact of young children on female labour mar-
ket participation is evident in the urban area and in the nuclear family setting. The negative
impact of young children on hours of work in the market is relevant to both the types of set-
tlement (urban and rural) and to both the types of family setting (extended and nuclear). In
contrast, school-aged children encourage women’s labour market participation although they
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have null effect on women’s average hours of labour supply. In addition to my primary focus
on the fertility impact, the study examines the impacts of hourly wage and family wealth
on the outcomes; the findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999), which are typically relevant for a developed country context. Culture also
plays a crucial role in determining female labour market outcomes in India, where social
discrimination persists across the caste hierarchy. The caste system in India has two distinct
concepts–the varna system (that divides the ancient Hindu society) and the jati system (that
determines the contemporary social code). The link between varna and jati is discussed in
greater length in Chapter 4. In the contemporary society, the exact number of jati is not
known with certainty but the count is approximately 7,000 (Deshpande, 2013). The need
for the Affirmative Action Programme divides the population in the available national data
(such as the National Sample Survey (NSS)) into four broad groups:(i) Schedule Caste (SC:
who are known as ex-untouchable jatis and several members of this ex-untouchable jatis
self-identify themselves as ‘Dalit’), (ii) Schedule Tribe (ST: This group mostly comprises
of tribal people, but more specifically geographically isolated groups of people. So, some
non-tribal people are also included in this category, particularly those residing in the hills (in-
cludes ‘Himachali Brahmins’)), (iii) Other Backward Class (OBC: a heterogenous collection
of Hindu low caste, some non-Hindu communities, and some tribal communities who are not
included in ST category), (iv) Others or General (the residual of the population that is further
divided into two groups: Brahmins and Forward Class (includes all religions)). SC, ST and
OBC are the disadvantaged groups because they often trail behind in various socio-economic
outcomes, namely consumption, education, health and employment. Empirical findings in
the chapter reveal that the likelihood of female labour market participation is higher (lower)
among SC and ST (Brahmin and Forward Class) women compared to OBC women. This
is reasonable because SC and ST households experience the worst living conditions in the
urban slums and in the rural areas. Affirmative Action (AA) Programme in India intends
to raise the likelihood of representation for the historically oppressed caste (SC) and tribal
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minority (ST) groups through obtaining a government job or getting into academic institu-
tions (school/college). Belonging to the said communities does not automatically enable the
members to benefit from the various central and state AA schemes. Rather, these disadvan-
taged groups are required to have a caste certificate from the government of their native state
domicile. It is therefore crucial to investigate whether the possession of a caste certificate
by the eligible households makes any difference to their living standard compared to similar
eligible households that do not possess one.1 This question is more relevant in a slum-setting,
where the households experience the worst socio-economic condition; this is investigated in
Chapter 4.
Chapter 4, examines whether the possession of a caste certificate by an eligible member of
a slum-dwelling household improves the household’s standard of living compared to similar
eligible households that do not possess one. This slum-level study is a novel contribution to
the literature on AA programmes and socio-economic well-being of disadvantaged groups of
people in the India. We have used uniquely collected dataset comprising of 1,361 households
residing in the urban slums of Mumbai (a city in the state of Maharashtra) and Kolkata (a
city in the state of West Bengal). This slum-level dataset has been collected as a part of the
NOPOOR project in 2013-14, funded by the European Commission. Mumbai and Kolkata
have larger shares of population residing in slums (i.e., 41.8% and 31.4% respectively) among
all other Indian cities. Due to the endogeneity in the status of caste certificate holding, an
instrumental variable approach has been used. Original state of residence (i.e., whether a
household is residing within its state of origin) is used as an instrument for the possession
of a caste certificate. Residing in the state of origin is positively correlated with the caste
certificate possession because the certificate can be only issued from the state of origin, if an
eligible candidate registers for one and it can be used within the same state. The findings in
this study reveal that the possession of a caste certificate improves the standard of living of
1For one to be eligible for a caste certificate, a beneficiary’s caste must be listed in the central or a state govern-
ment’s list of identified caste groups (or jatis) that are broadly classified into SC, ST and OBC.
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the eligible slum-dwelling households compared to similar eligible households that do not
possess one. Such a positive impact of a caste certificate on the standard of living of the
eligible households is mediated through government job positions held, potentially through a
reservation channel, by at least one member per households. The impacts are predominantly
relevant to OBC households.
The structure of this thesis is summarised as follows. Chapter 2 revisits the Q-Q theory orig-
inally formulated by Becker (1960) and empirically examines whether such a trade-off exists
in India using the 2011 IHDS, a nationally representative dataset. I fill some of the gaps in
the literature by measuring child-quality using both education and health outcomes for all age
groups of children (1–4 and 5–18) and by considering several instruments for child-quantity,
namely twin births, nth delivery of twin births, same gender composition of first two chil-
dren. This chapter also examines the impact of child-quantity on child-quality based on a
dichotomy between an extended and a nuclear family setting. Chapter 3, contributes to the
labour economics literature, theoretically, by revising the original Gronau-equilibrium time
allocation by a woman. Following the theoretical demonstrations, I have empirically exam-
ined the causal impacts of the exogenous fertility shock on female labour market outcomes
in the Indian context using the same dataset. Chapter 4 examines whether the possession of
a caste certificate by an eligible member of a slum-dwelling household improves the house-
hold’s standard of living, compared to similar eligible households that do not possess one.
This study also investigates whether such a benefit of a caste certificate is mediated through
the procurement of government jobs by at least a member of the eligible slum-dwelling house-
hold. Chapter 5 summarises the key findings of this thesis before discussing the limitations
of this work and suggesting potential avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2. Child Quantity-Quality Trade-off Revisited: Evidence from India
2.1. Introduction
Improving educational attainments of children in India has been one of the long-term goals
since the initiation of several education policies by the Government of India (G.o.I) in the
1970s. Despite the initiation of the recent Right to Education (RTE) Act of 2009, there has
continued to exist an enormous gap between school enrolment and schooling attainment of
children. According to the Statistics of School Education report (G.o.I, 2014), the drop-out
rates in 2011-12 at Primary (Classes 1–5), Elementary (primary level: Classes 1–5 and upper
primary level: Classes 6–8) and Secondary (Classes 9–10) levels have been 22.3%, 40.8%
and 50.3% respectively. Despite the initiation of the RTE Act in 2009 these high drop-out
rates are not surprising because it generally takes a considerable amount of time for a gov-
ernment programme to be effectively implemented on a wider section of society. Thus, such
an act is likely to have an impact on the sample of young children who were born around
2009, rather than on those children who were born in the 1990s.2 In addition, although 100%
enrolment of the children in schools has been achieved but this has not guaranteed high qual-
ity of school education for all the children in India. Therefore, an education policy needs to
focus on the quality of schooling, which has been emphasised by Kingdon (2007), rather than
solely focusing on increasing school enrolment of the children. In addition, health of chil-
dren, which is a crucial driver for educational performance of children, has also been a subject
of concern in many developing countries including India. The economic value of preventing
child malnutrition has been the subject of investigation in the economics literature starting
from Strauss (1986) to Scholte et al. (2016) and Singh and Masters (2017). It is equally
important to investigate the cause for such malnutrition and poor schooling attainments of
2In this study, I look at the schooling performance of 5–18 year old IHDS-II children. The IHDS-II children,
who are within the age range of 5–18 are less likely to be impacted by the RTE Act of 2009 (as these children
have already started schooling having being born in the 1990s) than the children who are within the age range
of 0–4 (as these children are expected to start schooling after the implementation of the RTE Act.
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children. There could be several factors that may influence poor educational attainment and
malnutrition of children in developing countries, such as a large family size, lower educa-
tional attainments of parents, child labour in economically poor households, differences in
socio-cultural norms, such as a practice of discrimination by caste or religion that are likely
to deprive children from getting admission to schools and have access to health facilities due
to a parental caste background and many more reasons. This chapter primarily focuses on
one of these reasons and investigates whether a large family size (measured by the number of
surviving children per mother) has causal impacts on schooling and health outcomes of the
children.
To motivate this research question on child quantity-quality trade-off, it is essential to under-
stand the empirical pattern of the relationship between a large family size and child-quality
and also the theory behind the observed pattern? Let’s first look at the observed relationship
across the states of India. The 2011 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II) dataset
reveals that the states where families have on average two children per woman have higher
schooling attainments of children compared to the states where families have on average three
or four children per woman (refer to Appendix Table A2.4).3 Thus, the association between
family size and schooling attainment of children across the states appears to be negative for
both the age groups of children: 5–14 (i.e., the ages that are consistent with primary and
secondary levels) and 15–18 (i.e., the ages that are consistent with higher secondary level).
Previous research studies have tried to provide a theoretical explanation for the observed neg-
ative relationship by underscoring the fact that a resource-constrained household with a large
family size will not have enough resource to invest in each child’s human capital (Kumar and
Kugler, 2017; Becker and Lewis, 1973). In other words, when the number of children in-
creases, the marginal cost of investment in each child’s quality (i.e., in education and health)
increases in a resource-constrained household. This increase in marginal cost of investment
in each child’s quality makes children more expensive to parents; it discourages parents from
3The state-wise fertility rate per woman is presented in Appendix Table A2.5.
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making higher investment in each child’s human capital, causing this trade-off. This notion
is popularly known as the child quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off in the economics literature.
Thus, the Q-Q trade-off implies that the parental decisions regarding child-quantity and child-
quality cannot be made in isolation. In addition, the confounding nature of parental fertility
decisions makes child-quantity an endogenous variable, which complicates a causal infer-
ence. An empirical testing of this theoretical notion is therefore challenging and is of policy
relevance.
To proceed with the empirical testing of the Q-Q theory, two things remain crucial for the
analysis. First, how child quality can be measured? Second, how to control for the endo-
geneity of child-quantity for drawing a casual inference? This study therefore revisits the
existing literature to understand how child-quality has been measured. Some studies have
used education as the sole measure of child-quality while others have used either health or
both education and health to measures child-quality. For example, in the context of China,
Liu (2014) has used school enrolment, middle school graduation status, normalized years of
schooling and height-for-age as child-quality measures. Liu finds that the Q-Q trade-off is
weaker when quality is measured by educational attainments of children, whereas a stronger
trade-off is observed when quality is measured by height of children. He therefore concludes
that by focusing solely on one specific dimension of child-quality, one may arrive at a mis-
leading conclusion on the overall Q-Q trade-off. The existing studies, in the Indian context,
have used the following education indicators for measuring child-quality, such as years of
schooling, ever attended school, whether currently enrolled and age-standardise schooling
index. Although, several schooling indicators has been used by Azam and Saing (2018)
that are directly available from the IHDS-II dataset, I use some new indicators for schooling
outcomes. Besides, child-health has not been studied consistently using all the three health
indicators (i.e., z-scores for weight-for-age, height-for-age and BMI-for-age) and for all the
age groups of children (i.e., 1–4 and 5–18), which provides a scope to fill the existing gap.4
4Although in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, Sarin (2004) uses quality indicators, such as height-for-age
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Following these previous studies and using IHDS-II dataset, I have constructed a wide-
ranging indicators for measuring child-quality. For schooling outcomes of children between
the ages of 5–18, I have used the following indicators: a) completed years of schooling; b)
school attendance if a child is currently enrolled in school (binary variable); c) delay in years
of schooling if a child is currently enrolled in school (binary variable); d) ratio of actual
years of schooling to expected years of schooling at a given age (ERT); e) age-standardised
schooling index (EDT); f) test scores in reading, writing and arithmetic, the score categories
are available for children between the ages of 8–11 and are converted to binary variables. The
child health indicators are assessed in accordance to child growth standards of World Health
Organisation (WHO) and they include i) weight-for-age z-score, ii) height-for-age z-score,
iii) BMI-for-age z-score. I have used two different age groups of children i.e., 1–4 and 5–18
to analyse the sibling impact on health outcomes.
To control for the endogeneity of child-quantity variable, I have used an instrumental variable
approach where twins (i.e., whether a mother has surviving twin-children or not) is used as an
instrument for child-quantity. This instrument has been used in several studies in the context
of both developing as well as developed countries (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b; Angrist
et al., 2005, 2010; Black et al., 2005, 2010; Caceres-Delpiano, 2006; Dayioglu et al., 2009;
Fitzsimons and Malde, 2014; Li et al., 2008; Sanhueza, 2009; Ponczek and Souza, 2012).
Using twins, the findings reveal an extra child in a family, on average, lowers the completed
years of schooling by 0.12 years, reduces the chances of school attendance by 3.6 percentage
points, and it reduces the ratio of actual years of schooling to expected years of schooling by
0.02 of a unit. These findings are robust to birth order of children. In the aspect of heath,
z-score, height-to-weight ratio and immunisation (i.e., chance of receiving Measles vaccine) for below five-
year-old children born during the 1990s from Demographic Health Survey datasets (DHS). He has not studied
the health outcomes for school-aged children. Azam and Saing (2018) have only used height-for-age z-scores
for 6–18 year old IHDS-II children but not for those who are below 5 years. Besides weight-for-age is also
an important indicator of a child’s health in the initial years of birth. In addition, these studies have neither
examined heterogeneity in the Q-Q trade-off by types of family setting (i.e., extended versus nuclear) nor used
all the health indicators consistently for all age groups of children, which provides further scope for research
that is undertaken in this study.
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the children between the ages of 5–18 experience a loss of 0.23 of a standard deviation in
BMI-for-age z-score, on average, due to an extra sibling, whereas children between the ages
of 1–4 experience a loss of 0.50 of a standard deviation in weight-for-age z-score due to an
extra sibling. The empirical findings reveal that the negative impact of having a large family
size on completed years of schooling and ERT are relevant to the urban settlement and the
nuclear family setting. These negative impacts on the average schooling outcomes primarily
emerge from families that have five or more children. The impacts on health outcomes are
relevant to the rural settlement and to both the extended and the nuclear family settings.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a contextual background
and discusses the related studies in the literature that have motivated this study. I then expand
on the studies relevant to the Indian context and underscore the relevant contribution to the
existing gap in the literature. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical model of Becker and Lewis
(1973). Section 2.4 presents the data and the descriptive statistics of the sample under study.
Section 2.5 discusses the empirical strategy and identification. Section 2.6 presents the main
results. Section 2.7 discusses the key findings, caveats of the study and concludes with policy
implications and avenues for future research.
2.2. Contextual background
In the subsection below, I revisit the Q-Q trade-off literature and provide a broad overview
of the studies that have been done so far in both developed and developing countries. In the
following subsections, I narrow the research focus to India, identity the existing gaps in the
literature and subsequently outline my contributions.
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2.2.1. Literature review
The association between child-quantity and child-quality has been extensively researched
since the 1960s in the context of developed as well as developing countries, where no-
table contributions reveal positive, negative and null effects. The contributions by Anh et al.
(1998), Blake (1981), Knodel et al. (1990), Knodel and Jones (1996), Knodel and Wongsith
(1991), Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) reveal a negative association between child-
quantity and child-quality. In contrast, Chernichovsky (1985); Gomes (1984), Mueller (1984)
find positive associations. However, Arnold (1976), Clark (1979), Shavit and Pierce (1991),
Sudha (1997) do not find any association.
In the context of Brazil, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989) use grade attainment by chil-
dren between 7–14 years. Grade attainment is a truncated dependent variable as it is not
known how much schooling these children would have attained if they have been enrolled in
school. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure as well as a tobit model, they find a
negative association between the number of school-aged children and their grade attainments.
Similarly, Anh et al. (1998), in the context of Vietnam, use four measures of educational at-
tainment: ever attended school, finished primary school, entered lower secondary school and
finished upper secondary school. They find a negative association only for families with six
or more children. They have used logistic regressions and interpreted the negative associa-
tion between family size and child’s school attendance in terms of log odds ratio. They find
that controlling for additional explanatory variables, such as region, parental education and
household wealth, considerably reduces the strength of the association between family size
and current school attendance for all age groups: 10-12; 13-18; 19-24. In addition, they
find there is no significant advantage for boys, except at secondary schooling. This result
is consistent with the study by Knodel and Jones (1996) in the context of Vietnam, where
boys take longer than girls to complete any particular level of schooling although, on aver-
age, boys start schooling earlier than girls. Knodel et al. (1990) study the quantity-quality
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trade-off in the context of Indonesia. Educational attainment is measured by the proportion
of children who have entered or are likely to enter lower secondary school and the proportion
of children who have entered or are likely to enter upper secondary school. Using a logistic
regression technique, they find that children from smaller families are more likely to continue
education to higher levels (i.e., lower secondary school and upper secondary school), on av-
erage, than children from larger families. In contrast, Shavit and Pierce (1991) find a null
effect in the association between the number of siblings and educational attainment for three
ethnic groups in Israel, Ashkenazi Jews, Oriental Jews and Muslim Arabs, by using an OLS
procedure and a logit model. The educational attainment is measured by years of education,
completed primary education, entered secondary education, completed secondary education,
entered post-secondary education. Desai (1995) finds negative association between family
size and height-for-age z-score using cross-section of countries from Demograph and Health
Survey dataset of 1986-90.
Recent studies have used several identification strategies for child-quantity to strengthen the
causal analysis. For example, Black et al. (2005) have used the nth delivery of twins to instru-
ment family size using an administrative data of Norway comprising of population between
the ages of 16–74 during 1986–2000. Their study finds that the child-quantity and child-
quality trade-off is sensitive to birth orders of children, i.e., the results become negligible by
controlling for birth order of children; the instrumental variable (IV) estimates are consider-
ably smaller than OLS estimates.
Gender composition as an instrument for family size has been used by Black et al. (2005),
Conley and Glauber (2006), Goux and Maurin (2005), Lee (2008). By using the same gender
of first two children as an alternative instrument for family size, Black et al. (2005) find that
an increase in family size significantly leads to higher educational attainments for children.
Therefore, their findings reveal that the two instruments for child-quantity have a contrasting
impact on children’s educational outcome. In addition, they do not find the magnitude of
this estimate credible and suspect the exogeneity of this instrument. Following Black et al.
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(2005), Angrist et al. (2005) have exploited two instruments, namely nth delivery of twins
and mixed sibling gender composition as exogenous variations for family size. In Israel,
there are large differences in family size among ethnic groups: for example, Jews of African
and Asian origin are different from Jews of European and North American origin. Therefore,
they have thoroughly taken care of these differences through interaction dummies of multiple
births with ethnic groups. They find OLS estimates are strongly negative, while IV estimates
generate no evidence of negative consequences of increase in sibling-size on the educational
outcomes, namely years of schooling, highest grade completed and college graduation.
Twins as an instrument is also used by Caceres-Delpiano (2006), Qian (2006) and Li et al.
(2008). Caceres-Delpiano (2006) uses twins and finds negative impact of child-quantity on
private school enrolment, using US Census data. Qian (2006) exploits an exogenous variation
in family size caused by implementation of the ‘One Child Policy’ in China to examine a
causal effect of family size on children’s school enrolment. Qian also uses twins and finds
that having one sibling has a positive effect on child’s schooling, while an increase from one
to two siblings has a negative effect. In the context of China, Li et al. (2008) use nth delivery
of twin births to examine its impact on children’s educational attainment level and school
enrolment; they find negative impact of twin births at first and third deliveries on children’s
educational outcomes. These results are robust to children’s birth order control. The trade-off
is predominantly observed for the rural children.
Maralani (2008) uses a different instrument (i.e., number of miscarriages experienced by a
woman) to control for the endogeneity of child-quantity in the context of Indonesia. She con-
siders a sample of Indonesian children between the ages of 6–19. The number of miscarriages
that a woman experiences is a constraint to fertility.5 However, miscarriage experienced by
a woman is endogenous because a woman’s miscarriage is correlated with her preference to
have more children. For example, mothers who desire to have more children are likely to ex-
5The reason for not using twins in her study is because twinning is a rare event and is limited by data. On the
other hand, information on the number of miscarriages is readily available from most of the survey data.
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perience many pregnancies and, therefore, experience more chances of miscarriages because
of an increase in exposure to the risk of miscarriage (Kline et al., 1989). Another problem
with using miscarriage information is a recall error. In addition, a woman’s knowledge re-
garding a miscarriage may vary with her age, level of schooling and place of residence (i.e.,
whether she is residing in urban or rural area). Given that a woman’s fertility or a miscarriage
can be influenced by her knowledge and her contraceptive use, it cannot be a valid instru-
ment for fertility. Therefore, Maralani acknowledges this weakness of the instrument and
uses a slightly different approach to address an identification. She regresses the number of
miscarriages experienced by Indonesian women on their total number of pregnancies and on
pregnancies squared and pregnancies cubed using a Poisson model. Assuming that the resid-
ual from this regression is orthogonal to the number of pregnancies, this residual together
with residual squared and residual cubed are used as the instruments for family size. Using
these instruments, Maralani finds that in urban sub-sample, family size has a positive im-
pact on schooling outcomes (namely, years of school completed, completed junior secondary
school, entered senior secondary school) for older cohorts (1948–57; 1958–67) but a negative
impact for more recent cohorts (1968–77). In rural sub-sample, there is a little evidence of
statistically significant association between family size and children’s schooling outcomes.
Further relevant contributions to a causal analysis in this field of research (such as Becker
et al. (2010), Bougma et al. (2015), Dang and Rogers (2013), Hotz et al. (1997)) are sum-
marised in Appendix Table A2.1.
The empirical findings in the literature are mixed because of diverse social, economic and
cultural factors across countries. For example, Caldwell et al. (1985) discuss how education
cost in sub-Saharan Africa is spread among a wide circle of a couple’s relatives. In such
a scenario, the number of children that a couple possess may hardly affect the educational
attainments of those children. Similarly, in West Africa, child fosterage serves as a way
by which parents with a large family can obtain economic support and education for their
children (King, 1987). Mueller (1984) also explains that in a developing country context,
18
such a trade-off may not exist if the costs of schooling do not fall on children’s parents.
This is more so in the rural areas of developing countries where schooling is made free by
government at least at the primary level.
2.2.2. Indian context
In the context of India, the use of twin ratio to address an endogeneity in child-quantity has
been first pioneered by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a). Twin ratio is defined by the number
of twin births divided by the number of pregnancies per woman. Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980a) have used a household level sample that comprises of 1,633 children (between the
ages of 5–14), of which 25 were twins. They have used three rounds of data collected be-
tween 1969 and 1971 by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in New Delhi,
India. Their study finds a negative effect of family size on child quality measured by an age-
standardised index for schooling attainments. The age-standardised index is defined by ratio
of schooling attainment of child i at age x to the schooling attainment of all children of age
x in the total sample. These indices are constructed for all twin- and non-twin-children. The
trade-off is higher for the sample including twin children.
Although the denominator of twin ratio is endogenous, which may question the validity of the
instrument, such a natural experiment with twinning has been first conducted by Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1980a). Since then, twins have been extensively used in the literature to examine
a causal impact of child-quantity on child-quality in many developed countries (Black et al.,
2005, 2010; Angrist et al., 2005, 2010; Caceres-Delpiano, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Dayioglu
et al., 2009; Sanhueza, 2009; Ponczek and Souza, 2012; Fitzsimons and Malde, 2014).
Clark (2000) finds empirical evidence from India that son preference affects gender-composition
of children in a family; smaller families have a significantly higher proportion of sons than
larger families. Therefore, a first-born girl is likely to increase a family size due to son prefer-
ence. Therefore, in a recent study in India, Kumar and Kugler (2017) (like Lee (2008)) have
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used first-born girl to address the endogeneity of child-quantity using the 2007-08 District
Level Health Surveys (DLHS) and the first round of the NFHS (1992–1993). The sample
comprises of children between the ages of 6–20. The educational outcomes are measured
by two indicators, namely years of education and primary school completion. They find
that having a large family negatively affects children’s educational outcomes. They find this
trade-off to hold across all caste groups, for all levels of mothers’ education, in both rural and
urban areas, and for children belonging to families possessing low or medium wealth.
With respect to health of children, in a recent study, Azam and Saing (2018) have used height-
for-age as child-quality measure for the 6–18 year old IHDS-II children but they have not
found any trade-off using first girl as an instrument for family size following Kumar and Ku-
gler (2017). In one unpublished chapter of the dissertation thesis, Sarin (2004) uses height-
for-age z-score, height-to-weight ratio and immunisation (chance of receiving Measles vac-
cine) for below five year old children but he did not find any impact of family size on these
health indicators using combined instruments for family size, such as twins and first-born
son; twins and gender-composition. The use of gender-composition of children to study the
impact of children on health is questionable because Pande (2003b) finds children born after
multiple same-gender siblings experience poor health outcomes. This implies that same-
gender siblings are likely to have a direct impact on health of children.
Further studies in India relate to gender discrimination within large size families. Makino
(2018) finds no negative effect of sibling gender composition and birth order on primary
school-aged girls’ test scores and school-enrolment, suggesting that there is no evidence of
gender discrimination (i.e., against Indian girls). However, the gender difference is visible
when family size is large (with at least four or five children) and it could be possible that
large size families have higher proportion of girl children, which is due to son preference
in India. Similarly, Zimmermann (2012) finds intra-household discrimination in schooling
expenditure against girls and Asfaw et al. (2010) find similar kind of gender discrimination
in health-care expenditures.
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Despite these novel contributions, there are still some gaps in the literature where I contribute
some key features.
2.2.3. Contribution
I primarily contribute in the following three areas:
First, unlike the earlier studies, I have consistently used all three child-health outcomes for
both the age groups of children (1–4 and 5–18), namely z-scores for weight-for-age, height-
for-age and BMI-for-age, in addition to the traditionally used schooling outcomes (year of
schooling and age-standardised schooling index) to measure child-quality. Furthermore, I use
three new measures of schooling outcomes, namely school attendance (instead of enrolment),
delay in school and ratio of actual years of schooling to expected years of schooling at a given
age.
Second, for a causal analysis, Kumar and Kugler (2017) have used first-born girl as an in-
strument for child-quantity. A first-born girl child may have a direct impact on siblings’
schooling attainments because an older sister in a family often takes care of the educational
responsibility of her younger siblings. An empirical test supports this prediction; having a
first-born girl is positively correlated with the average years of schooling completion of all
siblings, which weakens the validity of the instrument for the given sample in my study.6 In
addition, twin ratio that has been used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) is also endoge-
nous by its definition. I therefore use twin births as an exogenous instrument and same gender
composition as an alternative instrument for robustness analysis.7
6To test this, I use the IHDS-II dataset and regress completed years of schooling on first-born girl child together
with a set of control variables, such as age of child, age of mother, squared age of mother, education of mother,
Brahmin (General), General Forward Class (FC), SC, ST and OBC, FC-Muslim and Others (Christians, Sikh,
Jain), age gap between the first and last child, dummy variable for birth order of children, distance to medical
treatment location and state dummies. I find that the coefficient of first-born girl is 0.13 and statistically
significant at the 1% level.
7I find similar negative sibling impact on educational outcomes in contrast to the findings by Black et al. (2005).
Same-gender composition has been used for education outcomes and not for health outcomes as it may have
direct impact on health (Pande, 2003b).
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Third, a family that experiences twin births at the first delivery may have different character-
istics which may influence children’s outcomes differently compared to a family that expe-
riences twin births in the latter deliveries. To examine how this kind of heterogeneity across
families may influence children’s schooling outcomes, I study the impact of nth delivery of
twins on schooling outcomes of all previous born children, following Black et al. (2005).
Fourth, I study the impact of siblings on schooling and health outcomes based on a dichotomy
between an extended family and a nuclear family setting.
Finally, I have tried to address the concern relating to a closer (i.e., zero) birth spacing be-
tween children that affects educational outcomes of all previous born siblings. To do this, I
have controlled for age gap between the first- and last-born children. When the gap is high,
the first-born child is likely to take care of his/her younger siblings’ education. Controlling
for the gap is likely to mitigate a potential negative impact of zero birth spacing of twins on
previous born siblings’ education in a family. Similarly, contraceptive use by either of the
parents is used as an alternative control variable to examine the robustness of the results.
2.3. Theoretical model
In this section, I briefly discuss the theoretical model of Q-Q trade-off formulated by Becker
and Lewis (1973). Theoretical explanation behind the trade-off is that a resource-constrained
household with a small (a large) family size will have enough (not enough) resource to invest
in children’s human capital. In other words, when the number of children increases, the
marginal cost of investment in each child’s quality, such as in education and health, increases
in a resource-constrained household. This increase in marginal cost of investment in each
child’s quality makes children more expensive to parents. This will discourage parents from
investing in quality due to the rise in the quantity of children. This rise in the marginal cost
of child-quality due to the increase in the number of children can be demonstrated using the
following theoretical framework.
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Suppose, a utility function of a family is given by:
U = U(n, q, y). (2.1)
where n is the number of children born in a family, q is quality of each child, y is consumption
of all other commodities. The model assumes quality is same for all children in a family.
The budget constraint of a family comprises the expenditure on children as well as the ex-
penditure on the commodity basket y. This is given by the following equation:
I = nqπ + yπy, (2.2)
where I is income of the family, π is the shadow price of children with a given level of quality
(nq) and πy is the price of the commodity basket y.
The utility function in Equation 2.1 is maximised subject to the budget constraint in Equa-
tion 2.2. The Lagrangian function (L) for unconstrained optimisation can be defined by the
following expression:
L = U(n, q, y) + λ(I − nqπ − yπy), (2.3)
where λ is the marginal utility of money income. Lagrangian function is maximised with
respect to the three choice variables: n, q and λ. The first order conditions for unconstrained
maximum of L with respect to n and q are given as follows:
∂L
∂n
= 0 =⇒ Un − λqπ = 0. (2.4)
or,
MUn = MCn, (2.5)
where is Un = MUn is marginal utility of n. λqπ = MCn is marginal cost of n, which is a
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positive function of q. In Equations 2.4 and 2.5, at equilibrium, when q increases, MCn is
higher than MUn. This implies, when parents invest more in a child’s quality, the cost of an
additional child increases more than marginal utility from it with a given budget constraint.
This discourages parents from having more children. Similarly,
∂L
∂q
= 0 =⇒ Uq − λnπ = 0. (2.6)
or,
MUq = MCq, (2.7)
where marginal utility of q is MUq = Uq. Marginal cost of q is MCq = λnπ, which is
a positive function of n. In Equations 2.6 and 2.7, at equilibrium, when n increases MCq
is higher than MUq. This implies that, when the number of children increases, the cost
of investment in an additional child’s quality increases more than the marginal utility from
having the child, given the family budget constraint. This discourages parents from investing
in child-quality. Therefore, Equations 2.5 and 2.7 explain the trade-off between child quantity
and quality.8
2.4. Data and descriptive statistics
The 2011 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II) dataset has been used in this study.
This is a nationally representative dataset and covers all 28 states and 5 union territories of
India, excluding 2 union territories, namely Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.
The primary reason for selecting this dataset over the National Family Health Survey (NFHS)
and National Sample Survey (NSS), is that IHDS has information on the health of children
for all ages, whereas, NFHS has information on education and health of children who are
8A comparative static effect of an exogenous increase in child-quantity, instrumented by twin ratio, on child
quality is theoretically derived by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b).
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below the age of 5.9 NSS has not collected information on the health of children. In addition,
IHDS-II has comprehensive information relating to households’ socio-economic conditions,
including – educational status, employment, income, consumption expenditure and social
capital.10
IHDS-II dataset contains 42,152 households of which 27,579 are in rural areas and 14,573
are in urban areas. IHDS-II has interviewed all eligible married women between the ages of
15–49, as well as older women who were eligible in 2005. The information that has been
collected relates to health, education, fertility planning, gender relations in the household
and community. Among 39,523 women, 34,927 have completed the interview. The survey
contains the birth history of 111,193 children born to the women, including those children
who are either not alive or are living outside the households. The sample under study com-
prises of 43,731 children between the ages of 5–18 who are residing with 21,918 women (see
Appendix A2.2 for further information on the sample).
2.4.1. Dependent variables
In this section, I discuss the schooling and health indicators that have been used to measure
child-quality.
Schooling indicators:
First, I use completed years of schooling (denoted by Edu. Yrs.), following Angrist et al.
(2005), Black et al. (2005), Hermalin et al. (1982), Knodel et al. (1990), Maralani (2008),
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989), Qian (2006), Shavit and Pierce (1991) and Sudha
(1997).
9Weight-for-age z-scores based on WHO growth standard are available for children until the age of 10 years.
Some states in India have many missing observations on health indicators. These states are namely Karnataka,
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh.
10Although IHDS contains two years of panel data, a panel data analysis may not be relevant for the type of
research question investigated in this study. This is because the number of children will increase overtime
which may complicate a causal analysis.
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Second, school enrolment does not necessarily mean children are attending school, although it
has been used by Anh et al. (1998), Knodel et al. (1990), Li et al. (2008), Psacharopoulos and
Arriagada (1989). Therefore, this study uses school attendance instead of school enrolment.
School attendance (denoted by Attend) is a dummy variable and is assigned a value of 1 if
children are absent for less than 15 days, provided they are enrolled in school; otherwise it is
assigned a value of 0.
Third, delay in years of schooling (denoted by Delay) is a dummy variable and is assigned a
value of one if a child is two or more years below the standard level of schooling (i.e., where
a child is supposed be) at any given age, provided the child is currently enrolled in school;
otherwise it is assigned a value of zero.
Fourth, ratio of actual years of schooling to expected years of schooling for a given age
(denoted by ERT).
Fifth, Age-standardised schooling index defined by completed years of schooling relative to
average years of schooling of children for a given age (denoted by EDT), following Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin (1980b).
Sixth, I use scores on reading, writing and arithmetic tests following Hanushek (1992). These
test scores are available in IHDS-II for children between the ages of 8–11. The reading scores
are numbered zero to four. The reading score of zero means cannot read; one corresponds to
the ability to read letters; two corresponds to the ability to read words; three corresponds to
the ability to read paragraph; four corresponds to the ability to read stories. The arithmetic
scores are numbered zero to three. An arithmetic score of zero means cannot recognise num-
bers; one corresponds to the ability to recognise numbers; two corresponds to the ability to do
subtraction; three corresponds to the ability to do division. The writing scores are numbered
zero to two. A zero means cannot write; one corresponds to the ability to write with one or
two mistakes; two corresponds to the ability to write without any mistakes. These tests are
developed in collaboration with researchers from Pratham, India and have been pretested to
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ensure comparability across languages. I have redefined these discrete variables as dummy
variables; for example, reading is assigned a value of one if reading scores are numbered
from one to four, zero otherwise. Arithmetic scores are assigned a value of one if arithmetic
scores are numbered from one to three, zero otherwise. Writing scores are assigned a value
of one if writing scores are numbered from one to two, zero otherwise.
Health indicators:
The health indicators are constructed based on World Health Organization (WHO) growth
standards and these include (1) weight-for-age z-score, (2) height-for-age z-score (3) BMI-
for-age z-score.11 The weight-for-age z-cores are available for children until the age of 10
years.
The growth chart consists of z-score to identify whether a child has normal growth or has a
growth problem or trends suggesting a child is at a risk of a problem.12,13 The zero line on the
chart represents the median, which is the average. The other curves are z-score lines, which
indicates distance from average. There are three positive z-score lines above the zero line (1,
2, 3) and three negative z-score lines below the zero line (-1, -2, -3). The growth indicators
are plotted on the respective growth charts; if a plotted point lies above z-score 3 or below
z-score -3 then that may indicate a growth problem or a severe health condition.
A child suffer from being underweight if a weight-for-age z-score is more than 2 standard
deviation below the median (or zero line), and a child is severely underweight if a weight-
for-age z-score is more than 3 standard deviation below the median (or zero line). A child
is stunted if the length/height-for-age z-score is more than 2 standard deviation below the
median (or zero line), and a child is severely stunted if the length/height-for-age z-score is
11Note that for children below the age of five, BMI-for-age is precisely the weight-for-height/length. For chil-
dren below the age of 24 months, length is measured in the lying position. Whereas, for children of 24 months
or above, height is measured in the standing position. However, this study uses a common terminology i.e.,
‘BMI-for-age’ for both the age groups.
12The growth chart differs by gender of child as boys and girls grow to different sizes.
13See Appendix A2.6 for calculation of a z-score for a growth indicator.
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more than 3 standard deviation below the median (or zero line). Similarly, a child is wasted
if a weight-for-length/height z-score is more than 2 standard deviation below the median (or
zero line) and severely wasted if a weight-for-length/height z-score is more than 3 standard
deviation below the median (or zero line).
2.4.2. Explanatory variables
Child-quantity is measured by number of surviving children residing with their mothers. The
child specific characteristics that are used in this analysis include age of child, gender of
child and the interaction of child’s age with child’s gender to capture gender differences that
cumulate over time.
The mother and household specific characteristics include age of mother, squared age of
mother, education of mother, distance to medical treatment location, religious and adminis-
trative caste groups and state fixed effects. The health and fertility of women are influenced
by access to health facilities. Therefore, distance to medical treatment location is a crucial
control variable in this analysis. Medical treatment location has four categories depending
on distance from village or town. This variable is coded as: one if location is from the same
village or town; two if location is from another village; three if location is from other town
and four if location is from a town in a different district.
Several religious and administrative caste groups (or communities) include Brahmin General,
Forward Class General (FC), Forward Class Muslims (Muslims), disadvantaged class (in-
cludes Other Backward Class (OBC), Scheduled Caste (SC also called ‘Dalit’) and Scheduled
Tribe (ST also called ‘Adivasi’)), and ‘Others’ (includes Christian, Sikh and Jain). Majority
of the population in India are identified as Hindu. The collective proportion of population
who are identified as Christian, Sikh and Jain are relatively small in number (i.e., approx-
imately 2% in the IHDS-II dataset) and are therefore grouped under the ‘Other’ category,
which is considered as the base category in all the regression models.
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2.4.3. Sample descriptive statistics
Child level characteristics:
Table 2.1 below compares the descriptive statistics of children residing with their mothers
who have at least a pair of twin children and mother who do not have twin children. The total
number of children in the sample under study is 43,731 out of which 42,903 children have
non-twin siblings and 828 children have twin siblings. The average age of children is 11.8.
There is no statistically significant difference in the average age of children between the two
types of family. The proportion of boys in non-twin families is larger than in twin families.
School attendance among children in non-twin families is higher than among those born in
twin families. The children between the ages of 5–18 have completed five years of schooling
on average. There is no statistically significant difference in the years of schooling among
children between the two types of family. The majority of children have their reading, writing
and arithmetic skills and there is no statistically significant difference in the attainment of
these skills between the two types of family.














 Mean  SD  Obs.  Mean  SD  Obs.  Mean  SD  p-value 
Age of child (in Years)  11.78  3.94  828  11.92  3.92  42,903  11.77  3.94  0.29 
Boy Proportion (0/1)  0.52  0.50  828  0.49  0.50  42,903  0.52  0.50  0.06 
                   





               
Years of schooling  4.93  3.59  828  4.90  3.49  42,903  4.93  3.59  0.80 
School Attendance  0.78  0.42  828  0.73  0.44  42,903  0.78  0.42  0.00 
Delay in years of schooling  0.28  0.45  828  0.27  0.44  42,903  0.28  0.45  0.50 
Expected to actual years of 
schooling (ERT) 
 0.59  0.31 
 
828  0.58  0.31  42,903  0.59  0.31  0.80 
Age-standardised schooling 
index (EDT) 
 1.00  0.74  828  0.99  0.76  42,903  1.00  0.74  0.80 
                   





               
Reading  0.89  0.31  168  0.90  0.30  8,835  0.89  0.31  0.70 
Maths  0.85  0.36  168  0.82  0.38  8,835  0.85  0.36  0.42 
Write  0.75  0.43  168  0.74  0.44  8,835  0.75  0.43  0.78 




Table 2.2 below provides mother and the household level characteristics of the children who
are between the ages of 5–18. The average age of mothers is 36 years. The average age of
the mothers with twin children is higher than the mothers with non-twin children by approx-
imately a year. On average, a woman have 4 children. These children were born in the the
1990s when the fertility rate per woman was 3.8 (refer to Appendix Table A2.3). It is reason-
able to have an extra child in a twin family compared to a non-twin family which is clearly
evident in Table 2.2. The average number of children born per mother in the twin family is
4.7 while it is 3.5 in the non-twin family. The difference in the number of children between
the two types of family is approximately one and it is statistically significant. The average
household size is larger by approximately a member in the twin sample.
There are 70% of women who are residing in the rural settlement and 64% of them belong
to disadvantaged households. Hence, the average annual per capital income and average
annual per capita consumption per household are very low (i.e., 20,561 INR and 21,226 INR
respectively). Twin families are poorer in terms of annual per capita income and annual per
capita consumption than non-twin families.
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   Mother 












  Obs.  Mean  SD.  Obs.  Mean  SD  
p-
value 
Age of mother (in years)  36.39 6.56    828  37.78  6.66  42,903  36.37  6.56  0.00 
Education (in years)  4.23 4.65    828  4.04  4.41  42,903  4.23  4.66  0.21 
No. of living children   3.50 1.65    828  4.72  1.98  42,903  3.47  1.63  0.00 









             
Household size 1  6.13 2.41    828  7.05  2.49  42,903  6.11  2.41  0.00 
Medical treatment 
location2 













Household assets 3  14.81 6.39    828  14.86  6.10  42,890  14.80  6.40  0.78 







828  17,617  24,674  42,903  20,618  36,437  0.00 
















             
Brahmin (0/1)  0.04 0.20    828  0.04  0.20  42,903  0.04  0.20  0.83 
FC (0/1)  0.14 0.34    828  0.11  0.31  42,903  0.14  0.34  0.01 
Disadv. group (0/1)4  0.64 0.47    828  0.60  0.49  42,903  0.64  0.48  0.01 
Muslim (0/1)  0.16 0.36    828  0.23  0.42  42,903  0.15  0.36  0.00 
Others (0/1)5  0.02 0.14    828  0.02  0.15  42,903  0.02  0.14  0.72 
Notes: 1Household size refers to number of members in a household. 2Medical treatment location has four categories depending on its 
distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain information on number of assets that a household has. The 
number ranges from 0 to 33. 4Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 5Others include – Christian, Sikh 
and Jain. †One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of January 19, 2020. 
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.  
 
 
The majority of households (64%) belong to disadvantage groups that include OBC, ST and
ST. Disadvantaged households are economically poor and deprived of many government ben-
efits in education (i.e., in school and higher education levels) due to the practice of social
discrimination although protective affirmative action (AA) has been in place since the mid
of 20th century.14 Besides, average number of IHDS-II children in disadvantaged house-
holds (i.e., OBC, SC and ST) is higher (i.e., approximately four children on average) than
non-disadvantaged households (i.e., Brahmins and FC that have approximately three chil-
dren on average). This implies that the economically poor households have larger number of
children than non-poor households. Therefore, the empirical question on child-quantity and
child-quality trade-off remains a relevant research question in the context of India.
Descriptive statistics on health of children:
14AA improves the access to higher education and in government jobs for the disadvantaged households.
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The average z-scores for all three health indicators are negative. A negative average z-score
indicates that the average health of a child is below the zero line (i.e., median line). The aver-
age z-scores in the three health indicators for the children aged 1–4 are as follows: weight-for-
age is -1.59, length/height-for-age is -1.88 and weight-for-length/height is -0.69. The average
z-score in the three health indicators for the children aged 5–18 are as follows: weight-for-age
is -1.51, for height-for-age is -1.54 and for BMI-for-age is -0.99.
The mean differences in the z-scores for the three health indicators between twin and non-
twins families are presented in Table 2.3 below. The table shows that young children (between
ages of 1–4) have lower weight-for-age on average within twin families compared to non-
twins families. This is reasonable because twins have lower birth weights and it takes a
considerable amount of time to regain weight as they grow up. Older children (between
the ages of 5–18) have lower BMI on average within twin families compared to non-twin
families.









Children Z-scores Mean Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
1-4 years
Weight for age -1.59 33 -1.95 1.37 2,066 -1.59 1.15 0.37 (0.07)
Height for age -1.88 33 -2.06 2.15 2,066 -1.88 1.66 0.18 (0.54)
BMI for age -0.69 33 -1.09 1.72 2,066 -0.68 1.43 0.41 (0.10)
5-18 years
Weight for age -1.55 245 -1.63 1.45 14,091 -1.55 1.40 0.08 (0.38)
Height for age -1.57 623 -1.59 1.40 34,226 -1.57 1.41 0.02 (0.72)
BMI for age -0.98 623 -1.18 1.38 34,226 -0.98 1.40 0.20 (0.00)
Note: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Figure 2.1 below provides information on the percentage of children who have z-scores more
than 2 and 3 standard deviations below the median (i.e., zero line). The upper panel of the
figure reveals that 27% of young children are under-weight while 10% are severely under-
weight; 22% of them are stunted while 24% are severely stunted; While 13% of these children
are wasted, 4% are severely wasted. Similarly, the lower panel of the graph reveals 32% of
older children are under-weight while 5% of them are severely under-weight; 21% of them
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are stunted while 14% are severely stunted; While 15% of these children are wasted, 7% are
severely wasted.
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Z-score: Weigth for age
Under-weight: area between two vertical lines: 27%
Severely underweight: area to the left of dashed line:10%









-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Z-score: Heigth for age
stunted: area between two vertical lines: 22%
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Z-score: BMI for age
Wasted: area between two vertical lines: 13%
Severely wasted to the left of dashed line: 4%
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Under-weight: area between two vertical lines: 32%
Severely under-weight to the left of dashed line: 5%
Weight for age available for 5 to 10.08 years
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Z-score: Height for age
Stunted: area between two vertical lines: 21%
Severely stunted to the left of dashed line: 14%
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Z-score: BMI for age
Stunted: area between two vertical lines: 15%
Severely stunted to the left of dashed line: 7%
BMI for age: 5-18 years
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
It is to be noted that the health sample is smaller than education sample. This is because there
are 1%–7% of z-scores that are missing for different age samples are either because these
z-scores are not within the reasonable range of WHO standard or because of missing data
which is systematically observed in the states of Karnataka, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh
for both the age groups and for all health indicators. For children aged 1–4, 0.8% of weight-
for-age z-scores lie outside the WHO standard range of -6 and 5; systematic missing includes:
27% from Karnataka, 9% from Maharashtra. Similarly, 6.58% of height-for-age z-scores are
outside the range of -6 and 6; systematically missing includes: 20% from Karnataka and
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10% from Maharashtra. While 3.02% of BMI-for-age z-scores are outside the range of -
5 and 5; systematic missing includes: 21% from Karnataka, 11% from Maharashtra. For
children between ages of 5 and 18, 0.26% of weight-for-age z-scores lie outside the WHO
standard range of -6 and 5. WHO only estimates the weight-for-age z-score for children
until the age of 10 years. Therefore, this z-score is missing for children older than 10 years;
systematically missing includes: 17% from Karnataka, 8% from Maharashtra and 6% from
Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, 1.7% of height-for-age z-scores are outside the range of -6 and
6; systematically missing includes: 17% from Karnataka, 8% from Maharashtra and 10%
from Andhra Pradesh. About 1.6% of BMI-for-age z-scores are outside the range of -5 and 5;
systematically missing includes: 17% from Karnataka, 8% from Maharashtra and 10% from
Andhra Pradesh.
These cases represent a gap in the data available for analysis but there is no way of addressing
this problem.
The mean observable characteristics for the sub-sample of missing health outcomes are statis-
tically different from the included sub-sample (see Appendix Tables A2.17 to A2.22). This
difference is observed for both the 0–4 and 5–18 year old age categories. This explains a
possibility of selection bias in the included sub-samples considered for this study.
Let us now look at the unconditional empirical association between family size (i.e., number
of children per woman) and some of the child-quality outcomes, namely years of schooling
(for school-aged children) and the z-scores for weight-for-age, height-for-age and BMI-for-
age for both the age groups.
2.4.4. Empirical relationship between child-quantity and child-quality
In the sample of school-aged children (between the age of 5–18), there are 3.8% of house-
holds have one child, 27.8% have 2 children, 28% have 3 children, 17.7% have 4 children,
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10.6% have 5 children, 6% have 6 children, 3% have 7 children and 1.6% have 8 children.
Less than 1% of households have 9 to 13 children: 0.64% of households have 9 children,
0.28% of households have 10 children, 0.06% have 11 children, 0.04 have 12 children and
remaining 0.02% have 13 children.
Figure 2.2 shows that the average completed years of schooling for school-aged children
increases from roughly 4 to 5 years as the number of children per woman increase from
1 to 3 and it starts declining thereafter. As the number of children increase from 3 to 12,
the completed years of schooling continuously decreases. Children with 11 siblings (i.e., a
family with 12 children) end up completing approximately 2 years of schooling on average.
A similar picture is observed within the rural sub-sample. Within the urban sub-sample, the
average years of schooling attainment increases from 4 to 5 years (approximately) as the
number of children increases from 1 to 3 and starts declining for families with 4 or more
children per woman. We thus observe an inverse U-shaped association between years of
schooling and the number of children in both urban and rural sub-samples. An empirical
investigation of such non-linearity is investigated in Section 2.6.2.
In addition, if we compare the state-wise fertility rates and average years of schooling of
children in India (see Appendix Table A2.4), the data clearly shows that there is an existence
of an inverse relationship between the two variables of interest and for both 5–14 and 15–18-
year-old children. Therefore, an empirically investigation of a causal impact of child-quantity
on child-schooling outcomes is of a policy relevance.
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Figure 2.2: Association between child-quantity and child-quality (years of schooling and
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Z-score: for whole sample
5-18 years
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
If we look at the z-scores for all three health indicators for all schooling-aged children, we
observe that as the number of children increases from 1 to 3 the weight-for-age z-score keeps
declining from -1 to -2 and it remains stable thereafter until 10 children. As the number of
children increases from 10 to 12, the z-score declines below -2 and it drops to -3 for mothers
with 12 children; there are only 0.04% of mothers who have 12 children. Such decline is
emerging from rural areas (see Figure 2.3). In urban area, the average z-score for weight-for-
age remain between -1 and -2 for mother with 3 to 9 children (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: Association between child-quantity and health z-scores for 5-18-year-old chil-
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5-18 years
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
The graph for height-for-age z-score appears to be more or less flat hovering between -1
and -2 as the number of children increases from 1 to 10 in both rural and urban areas and it
declines below -2 for mothers with 11 and 12 children in rural areas (see Figure 2.3).
BMI-for-age within urban sub-sample of school-aged children shows a U-shaped pattern. As
the number of children increases from 1 to 7, the z-score keeps declining from zero to slightly
below -1 and it starts to rise above -1 thereafter but remains below the zero line (see Figure
2.3). Similar declining patter in the z-score is observed within rural areas as the number of
children increases from 1 to 8. As the number of children further increases from 9 to 13 in
rural areas, the score starts declining further below -1 (see Figure 2.3). Hence, the overall
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pattern of relationship between z-score for BMI-for-age and family size in the whole sample
is emerging from rural areas.
We thus observed that the decline in z-scores for the three health indicators for the sample of
school-aged children are relevant to rural sub-sample.
Let us now look at the sample of young children (between the ages of 1-4). For the overall
sample of young children (sample size is 2,099) the graph of weight-for-age z-score graph
looks flat. As the number of 1–4 year old children increases from 1 to 3 the z-score declines
slightly between -1 to -2 and it declines to -2 when the number of children increases to 8; it
starts to rise thereafter but the score remains below -1. Similar picture is observed in both
rural and urban sub-samples. Thus, no severe underweight issue is observed for the sample
of young children.
For the overall sample of young children, the graph of height-for-age z-score remains flat and
keeps hovering around -2 score until five children and it starts to decline below -2 when the
number of children increases from 6 to 7; it starts to increase thereafter but remains below
the zero line. This picture is similar to rural sub-sample (sample size is 1,485). In the urban
sub-sample, mother who have 1 or 2 children their average z-scores lies between -1 and -2
and it starts declining to -2 when the number of children increases from 3 to 5; it declines
further below -2 for 6 children. Given that the urban sample size is very small i.e., 614 and
mother having 7 or more children are less than 1%, the average z-score estimated for 7 or
more children may not be precise. Severe stunting issue is not observed in the overall sample
and in rural sub-sample of young children.
The graph for BMI-for-age for young children more or less remains flat. As the number of
children increases from 1 to 9, the z-score remains between 0 to -1. It drops below -1 for 10
children. Similar picture is observed in the rural sub-sample. In the urban sample, the z-score
remains between 0 to -1 as the number of children increases from 1 to 6 and it touches the
zero line for 7 to 9 children but declines sharply for 10 children below -3; this estimate may
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not be precise because there are only 0.49% of mothers who have 10 children in the urban
sample of size 614.
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Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
2.5. Empirical strategy and identification
I estimate the effect of fertility on schooling and health outcomes using a linear regression
equation that can be written as,
yij = α + βNj + γCij + Θ0X
′
j + εij, (2.8)
where yij denotes schooling and health outcomes for the ith child of the j th mother. It includes
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Edu. Yrs., Attend, Delay, ERT, EDT, test scores, z-scores for health indicators, as discussed
in Section 2.4.1. Nj denotes the number of children born and residing with the j th mother,
Cij is a vector of child specific characteristics; these include age of a child, gender of a child
and interaction of age and gender of a child. Xj is a vector of mother and household level
characteristics, these include age of a mother, squared age of a mother, education of a mother,
medical treatment location (this variable has four categories as discussed in Section 2.4.2),
religious or social groups, state dummies, and εij is the error term.
The outcomes variables namely Attend, Delay and test scores (in reading, arithmetic and
writing) are binary variables. I therefore use a linear probability model for regression analyses
using these variables. The remaining outcome variables are continuous and therefore OLS
procedure is used for descriptive analyses.
2.5.1. Identification strategy
As the fertility decisions are taken by parents depending on a household’s economic con-
dition, parents’ future expectations from their children, parents’ knowledge in birth control
techniques, social and cultural norms (such as preference for a boy in a family) and many
more unobserved factors, child-quantity (i.e., Nj) is an endogenous variable in Equation 2.8.
Parents’ preference for an ‘ideal’ family size depends on the cost of investment in children’s
human capital. If these confounding factors are not controlled in the regression analysis, then
Equation 2.8 will give a biased estimate of the β. Given that these omitted variables are
difficult to measure and control in the model, establishing a causal link is challenging. To
examine a causal link, I instrument child-quantity with twins.
Twin births practically mean an ‘extra child’ and it is therefore likely to increase the number
of children. The empirical test for the relevance of this instrument is discussed in the results
section. For an orthogonality of the instrument, it can be argued that people in India have
limited access to ultra-sound technology because prenatal gender detection is still illegal in
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India. Besides, culture (i.e., family conservativeness) plays a vital role in the restrictive use
of such a technology since fertility is a highly sensitive issue for women in India. In addition,
in vitro fertilisation is very expensive and not affordable for people in general. A total of 70%
of the women in the sample are from rural areas and their economic condition may not allow
them to have access to such a technology. Therefore, this instrument can be considered as
exogenous in the Indian context. Empirical tests for an orthogonality of twins is presented in
the results section. In the given sample, empirical tests show that twins do not have any direct
impact on the children’s education and health outcomes. These tests strengthens the validity
of the instrument. In addition, I use the available information of contraceptive use by either
parent as an alternative control to strengthen the orthogonality condition. This is because twin
births may be influenced by parents’ knowledge of birth prevention instruments. I therefore
control for this variable and examine the robustness of the results.
In a two stage least squares method (2SLS), to study a causal impact of child-quantity on
child-quality, the first stage regression equation can be written as,
Nj = α
′ + β′Twinsj + γ
′Cij + Θ1X
′
j + εij, (2.9)
where Nj is the number of living children born to the j th mother. Twinsj is a binary variable
and is constructed using months and years of birth that are available from the children’s birth
history. All children who are born to the same mother and have the same age are considered
to be twins. The twin variable is assigned a value of one if a mother has twins, otherwise it is
assigned a value of zero.
Second stage of a 2SLS regression equation can be written as,
yij = α
′′ + β′′N̂j + γ
′′Cij + Θ2X
′
j + ξij, (2.10)
where, vectors Cij and Xj are the same as in the first stage regression equation (i.e., Equation
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2.9). N̂ is predicted values of N obtained from the first stage regression Equation 2.9.
However, using twins as an instrument is not free of caveats. The major practical problems
with twins are as follows: First, twinning is a rare event. In the sample there are only 1.9%
of children who are between the ages of 5–18 and are twins. Second, twinning may affect
sibling outcomes through mechanisms other than family size, such as (i) closer birth spac-
ing (Black et al., 2005); (ii) reallocation of family resources from twins towards non-twin
children (Behrman et al., 1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Rosenzweig and Zhang,
2009). The concerns relating to closer birth spacing and reallocation of family resources are
discussed in the following sections.
2.5.2. Birth spacing
Birth spacing may influence twin births and the outcomes in several ways. First, a mother is
more likely to have twins if their birth is spaced farther from the previous birth, conditional
on her age at the previous birth (Li et al., 2008). To examine this, I regress twins on age gap
between previous birth and twin births using an LPM model; I find that the impact of age gap
on the probability of twin births is negligible and insignificant.15
Second, it is well-established in literature that closer spacing between last pair of children
have negative effect on educational outcome of earlier born children (Rosenzweig and Zhang,
2009). If this is true, then zero birth spacing of twins will have a negative effect on educa-
tional outcomes of earlier born children. To test this I consider a sample of non-twin children
and regress completed years of schooling of X children on the age difference between the two
following children, conditional on there being Y children in the family where X = 1, 2, 3, 4
and Y = 3, 4, 5, 6. The results are presented in Appendix Table A2.7 which shows, there is
a positive association between the age gap of two successive younger siblings on education
15I find the coefficient of age gap is positive and equal to 0.02 with p-value 0.135. I have controlled for mother’s
education, age of mother, squared age of mother, gender, interaction of gender with child age, social classes,
state dummies, medical treatment location. The result is robust when birth order of children is controlled.
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outcomes of the earlier born siblings. The estimates are statistically significant at the con-
ventional levels of 1% and 5%. This implies older children do better when younger children
are spaced further apart. This result can be extrapolated on twins for whom age spacing is
approximately zero. This would imply twin births can adversely affect prior children’s edu-
cational outcomes, not only through an increase in family size but also through closer birth
spacing between them. To control for the spacing issue I use two approaches: first, age gap
between the first and last children is used as an additional control in regression analyses. This
is because if a gap between the eldest and youngest children of a mother is very high then it
is highly likely that the eldest child will assist in the younger siblings’ education (including
twin children) (Masako and Moffatt, 2007) which will potentially net out a negative impact
of birth spacing. Second, I use contraceptive use by either of the parents as an alternative
control variable to address this spacing concern.
2.5.3. Resource reallocation between twins and non-twins
Twin children experience lower birth weights and therefore have poorer endowment to start
with compared to non-twin children. Therefore, parents are likely to invest more resources on
non-twin children (with better endowment) than on twin children (with poorer endowment)
(Behrman et al., 1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Us-
ing a sample of Chinese twins, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find some empirical evidence
of a reinforcing behaviour of parents, where a reallocation of resources from twins to non-
twin children has a negative effects on educational outcomes of twin children but a positive
effect on educational outcomes of non-twin children. The difference between reinforcing par-
ent and compensating parents has been discussed by Becker and Tomes (1976) and Clarke
(2016). Reinforcing parents have a tendency to take away resource from poor quality children
and invest more on better quality children. On the other hand, compensating parents are those
who not only invest in better quality children, but also in poorer quality children to improve
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educational performance of all children. Therefore, reinforcing parents will reinforce the in-
vestment differences between their twin and non-twin children and transfer their resources
to non-twin children (who have better health endowment). Hence, β′′ in Equation 2.10 will
underestimate the magnitude of trade-off, i.e., β′′ is expected to be closer to zero. On the
other hand, compensating parents will compensate for children with poor health endowments
(i.e., twins) and will either allocate more resources to twin children or will allocate resources
to all children equally. Therefore, the trade-off is expected to be larger in this case as the
given family resource is shared among all children equally; this means β′′ in Equation 2.10
will overestimate the magnitude of trade-off (i.e., it is expected to be even more negative). It
is likely that the educated mothers are of a compensating nature compared to mothers with no
education. Therefore, mothers’ educational attainments are controlled in regression analyses,
which may potentially capture this kind of parental nature.16
2.6. Results
In this section, I present the OLS and 2SLS results, using twins as instrument for the number
of children to study its impact on schooling outcomes for children between the ages of 5–18.
At first I use the entire sample of school-aged children to examine the average impact. I
then present the results for different family sizes using nth delivery of twins as an instrument
for the number of children in order to examine the heterogeneity across mothers who have
experienced twin births at different deliveries.
I further examine the heterogeneity across types of settlement (i.e., urban versus rural set-
tlement); across gender and settlement types; and types of family setting (i.e., an extended
versus a nuclear family setting). For these sub-sample studies, I consider all the children,
instead of considering different family sizes because of a significant reduction in data points.
16The concern of resource reallocation could be controlled by considering birth weights of children. How-
ever, the IHDS-II dataset does not have information on birth weights of children to proxy for their health
endowments. So, for the current purpose of the study, I control for mothers’ educational attainments.
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Besides, there are approximately 2% twins in the entire sample of 43,731 children. Hence,
the strength of the instrument is weaker in such smaller sub-samples.
I perform robustness tests using additional control variables, such as birth order of children,
age gap between the first and last children, contraceptive use by either of the parents. In
addition, I have used same gender composition of the first two children as an alternative
instrument to twins.
I finally present health outcomes for two different age groups of children: 1–4 year old chil-
dren who are termed as young children; and 5–18 year old children who are termed as school-
aged children. For these samples, I also study the heterogeneity across types of settlement
and types of family setting.
2.6.1. Effect of child-quantity on the schooling outcomes
The OLS results in Table 2.4 show, on average, an additional child in a family reduces the
completed years of schooling of children by 0.18 years; it reduces the probability of school
attendance by 1.2 percentage points; it reduces ERT by 0.03 of a unit, and it reduces EDT by
0.03 of a unit. The probability of delay due an additional child increases by 1.1 percentage
points. These results are significant at the 1% level. Using the 2007-08 District Level House-
hold Survey (DLHS) in India, Kumar and Kugler (2017) find that the OLS estimate for the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Before interpreting the 2SLS results, let us first look at the empirical test for the validity of
the instruments. In Table 2.4, the coefficient of twins appears to be positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics are sufficiently larger than
the rule-of-thumb of 10 for it statistical relevance.
An orthogonality of an instrument requires that, i) an instrument must not be correlated
with any unobserved characteristics in the error term ξij in Equation 2.10; in other words,
cov(twin, ξij) = 0 ; ii) an instrument can only affect outcome variables through a problem-
atic endogenous variable (i.e., Nj), which is instrumented, but cannot directly affect outcome
variables. The first condition is difficult to test. However, following Black et al. (2005), I ex-
amine whether the probability of twins is related to observed characteristics, such as mother’s
and father’s education. To test this, I use a linear probability model and regress twins on
mother’s education as well as on father’s education in two separate regression equations. The
regression results indicate that the coefficients of parents’ education are statistically insignif-
icant. The results strongly suggest that twinning probabilities are not correlated to parents’
education. The second condition is also satisfied for the sample under study because the
instrument has no direct impact on the education and health outcomes.17 In addition, the
Pre-natal Diagnostic Technique (PNDT) Act has made foetal gender detection illegal in India
(Kumar and Kugler, 2017). In vitro fertilisation (IVF) is a very expensive technology and
cannot be afforded by general people in India.18 Hence, twins as an instrument for child-
quantity can be considered as orthogonal to the error process (ξij) in the structural equation
of primary policy interest (i.e., Equation 2.10).
There could be further concerns regarding twin births. It is well-established in literature that
the probability of twin births increases with maternal age (Jacobsen et al., 1999; Bronars
and Grogger, 1994). The probability of twin births increases when mothers are between 38–
17The coefficient of mother’s education in the regression is -.0001 with p-value 0.442. Regression controls
for other variables, such as, age of child, age of mother, age of mother square, gender, interaction of gender
with child age, social classes, state dummies, age gap between first and last child, birth orders of children.
Similarly, father education coefficient is .0002 with p-value is 0.229.
18Note that 70% women in the sample are from rural areas.
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48 years due to hormonal changes with age. In the sample under study, I do not find such
evidence.19
The 2SLS results, using twins as an instrument, are presented in Table 2.4. On average, an
additional child in a family reduces the completed years of schooling of children by 0.12
years; it reduces the probability of school attendance by 3.6 percentage points; it reduces
ERT by 0.02 of a unit. These estimates are statistically significant at the conventional levels
and they reaffirm the existence of quantity-quality trade-off in the Indian context.
Kumar and Kugler (2017) find that the estimate for the completed years of schooling is -0.36
using gender of the first child as an instrument for the number of children. This difference in
the magnitudes of the estimate is potentially due to a local average treatment effect pertaining
to the chosen instruments in the two studies. By using twin births, Black et al. (2005) find
that the magnitude of 2SLS estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate which is consistent
with the finding in this study.
In Appendix Table A2.8, I present the results for test scores. I do not find a causal effect of
children on test scores in reading, arithmatic and writing for children between the ages of
8–11.
2.6.2. Schooling outcomes: Heterogeneity by order of twin delivery
As we have seen in Figure 2.2 that the average years of schooling increases as the number
of children increases from 1 to 3 and it starts declining thereafter. Hence, in this section,
I investigate whether such an inverse U-shaped association holds by considering different
family sizes and conditioning on all other control variables. I further examine whether such
19In the sample, the average age of children is 11.8 years, and the average age of mothers in the twin sample
is 37 years. This means, on average, twins are born to mothers when mothers are around 26 years of age,
i.e., when mothers are younger. Therefore, age of mother, on average, should not affect twin births. To test
this, I regressed twins on mother’s age together with the usual control variables used in this analysis; I find
that the coefficient of mother’s age is 0.001 with the corresponding p-value of 0.229. Hence, maternal age is
uncorrelated with the probability of twin births for the sample under study.
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a relationship is causal.
In addition, by considering different family size, it is possible to capture the fact that a woman
who experiences twin births in the second delivery may have completely different household
characteristics and is likely to experience different child outcomes compared to a woman who
experiences twin births in later deliveries. In this section, I therefore examine the impact of
family size of at least n children by instrumenting it with the nth order of twin delivery on
average schooling outcomes of all children born before the nth order twin.
In Table 2.5, within families with at least two children, I examine the impact of second order
twin delivery on schooling outcomes of the first born child. Although there exist negative
associations between the number of children and the schooling outcomes but 2SLS results
show that, on average, the first child’s ERT increases by 0.07 of a unit and EDT by 0.10 of a
unit if the second order births are twins (marginally significant at the 5% level).
In Table 2.5, I examine the impact of a third order twin delivery on schooling outcomes of
first and second born children. In families with at least three children, a similar negative as-
sociation is observed between the number of children and the schooling outcomes. However,
2SLS results show that the first two children’s completed years of schooling increases by 0.57
years on average if the third order births are twins (marginally significant at the 10% level);
the effects on ERT and EDT are 0.08 of a unit and 0.12 of a unit respectively (statistically
significant at the 5% level).
In families with at least four children, although the negative associations persist for all ed-
ucational outcomes, but there is no causal impact found for a fourth order twin delivery on
schooling outcomes of all previous born children. This could be because the strength of the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In families with at least five children, again the negative association persist for all educational
outcomes. 2SLS results show that the first four children’s completed years of schooling
reduces, on average, by 1.53 years (statistically significant at the 5% level) if the fifth order
births are twins. This also increases the probability of delay in school by 24 percentage points
(marginally significant at the 10% level), and its effects on ERT and EDT are -0.19 of a unit
and -0.28 of a unit respectively (statistically significant at the 1% level).
First stage regression results are reported in Table 2.5. It is interesting to note that Li et al.
(2008) find negative causal impact of family size induced by twin births at the first deliv-
ery and third delivery on children’s educational level and school enrolment whereas I find
negative impact of twins at the fifth delivery.
These findings suggest that there is no trade-off in small families (i.e., with at least two or
at least three children). The trade-off becomes visible in families with at least five children.
Thus the average trade-off for the overall sample of children, as evident from Table 2.4, is
likely to arise from a family size of at least five children.
2.6.3. Schooling outcomes: Heterogeneity by types of settlement
The descriptive statistics on children’s educational outcomes are presented in Appendix Table
A2.11. The table shows children’s educational performances are better in urban settlement
compared to rural settlement. Average years of schooling completed by school-aged urban
children is 5.34 years while it is 4.7 years for rural children. School attendance for urban
children is higher than rural children by 3 percentage points; delay in the years of schooling
completion at an expected age is lower among urban children than rural children by 4 percent-
age points; ERT is higher for urban children than rural children by 0.05 units. Among 8–11
year old children, there is statistically significant difference in reading, writing and arithmetic
scores between urban and rural settlements. These scores are higher for urban children than
for rural children.
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The mother and household level characteristics are presented in Appendix Table A2.12. The
table shows that there are statistically significant differences in these characteristics by the
types of settlement. Urban mothers are older, more educated and have lesser number of
children than rural women. Urban households have higher annual per capita income and
annual per capita consumption than rural households. While 69% of disadvantaged groups
live in rural settlement, 53% of them live in urban settlement.
OLS results in Table 2.6 shows that there is a negative association between child-quantity and
child schooling outcomes in both urban and rural settlements. In urban (rural) settlement, an
additional child, on average, reduces years of schooling by 0.29 (0.22) years; attendance by
2.7 (1.7) percentage points, ERT by 0.01 (0.01) of a unit and EDT by 0.03 (0.02) of a unit.
These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the chance of delay in
completing an expected year of schooling at any given age is 0.4 of a percentage point among
rural children (marginally significant at the 10% level). The observed negative association is
reasonable because majority of these children belong to disadvantaged households in both
these types of settlement. Even though the urban households have higher annual per capita
income and education of women (see Appendix Table A2.12) than rural area but, on average,
these are very low in both the settlements.
2SLS estimates in Table 2.6 show that, in urban settlement, an additional child reduces chil-
dren’s years of schooling by 0.26 years on average, and it reduces ERT by 0.05 of a unit. The
results are statistically significant at the conventional level.
Although the unconditional average educational outcomes of the urban children are higher
than the rural children (see Appendix Table A2.11) but the sibling impacts on the educational
outcomes of urban children are negative. Such negative causal impacts among urban children
could be because the urban women are likely to be more compensating in nature (having
higher education than rural women (see Appendix Table A2.12) and are therefore likely to
reallocate resources fairly among all children. This means, if there are some children in a
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family who are of a poor quality then the average educational performance of children in that
family will be poor. Investigation on the quality of children is outside the scope of this study.
In rural sub-sample, an additional child reduces the probability of children’s school atten-
dance by 3.6 percentage points on average (statistically significant at the 5% level). This
could be because rural women prefer sending their sons to work outside home to supplement
family incomes in a resource poor household while girls are generally assigned household
chores. However, there is a null impact of having siblings on the remaining schooling out-
comes. This could be because of a possible reinforcing nature of rural women who are likely
to invest more on better quality children and less on poorer quality children as the household
resources are limited. Consequently, the positive and negative effects of such investments are
likely to be averaged out, causing a null impact. Nature of parents, whether compensating
or reinforcing, is clearly something that requires investigation as part of an agenda for future
research.
Maralani (2008) also finds a negative sibling impact on years of schooling completion in



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.4. Schooling outcomes: By gender and types of settlement
Table 2.7, examines the Q-Q trade-off by a gender of the children and a place of residence. In
urban settlement, OLS results in the table show that an additional child, on average, reduces
boys’ (girls’) years of schooling by 0.29 (0.29) year, school attendance by 3.6 (2.0) percent-
age points, ERT by 0.01 (0.01) of a unit and EDT by 0.03 (0.03) of a unit. In rural sub-sample
OLS results in the table show that an additional child, on average, reduces boys’ (girls’) years
of schooling by 0.23 (0.21) year, school attendance by 1.5 (1.8) percentage points, ERT by
0.01 (null) of a unit and EDT by 0.03 (0.01) of a unit. The estimates are statistically signifi-
cant at the conventional levels. Thus, similar negative association between a large size family
and educational outcomes is evident for both the genders and in both the settlement types.
2SLS results in the table suggest that an additional child in urban settlement reduces ERT for
boys (girls) by 0.04 (0.06) of a unit, on average. These estimates are statistically significant
at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. While the trade-off in an educational outcome (i.e, in
ERT), is observed among urban children and for both the genders, once again, such a trade-
off is not observed within rural sub-sample. In contrast, rural girls experience lesser chances
of delay in schooling (by 3.4 percentage points) which is likely to increase their chances of
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.5. Schooling outcomes: Extended versus nuclear family
The extended family is a dummy variable and is assigned a value of one if women are living
with at least one family member other than their own children or husband if the women are
married, or with at least one family member other than the women’s own children if women
are widowed or divorced or not living with husbands; otherwise a value of zero is assigned.
The descriptive statistics of educational outcomes of children by types of family settlement is
presented in Appendix TableA2.13. The table shows that the children’s educational outcomes
are better in nuclear families than in extended families (see Appendix Table A2.13). The
mothers are younger in nuclear families although educational attainment of mothers is same
in both types of family setting. Average number of children in nuclear families is smaller
than in extended families (see Appendix Table A2.14). These are unconditional means. Let
us now look at the conditional average effects of siblings on children’s educational outcomes
that are presented in Table 2.8 for both the types of family setting.
OLS results in the table reveal that an additional child, on average reduces the years of school-
ing of children in extended (nuclear) family setting by 0.19 (0.20) years, reduces probability
of schooling attendance by 2.1 (2.3) percentage points, and ERT by 0.01 (null) of a unit and
EDT by 0.02 (0.03) of a unit. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus,
the negative association is evident in both the types of family setting.
2SLS results reveal, on average, that an additional child reduces the probability of school
attendance of children by 5.2 percentage points in an extended family setting (marginally
significant at the 10% level). However, there is a null impact of siblings on the remaining ed-
ucational indicators within extended family setting. This could be because children are often
assisted by other educated members of their family, which is very common in an extended
family setting in India.
However, in a nuclear family setting, an additional child reduces the completed years of
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children’s schooling by 0.12 years on average, and it reduces ERT by 0.02 of a unit. These
results are statistically significant at the conventional level. The negative impact of child-
quantity on years of schooling and ERT are relevant to a nuclear family setting; this may be
due to a lack of adequate time available to women to guide children in education when there
are already too many other responsibilities to perform at home, and in absence of additional
family members to assist them. This may be more relevant to women who may be working



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.6. Schooling outcomes: Robustness checks
Some additional controls:
I have used some additional control variables, namely age gap between the first and last
children in a family, birth order of children and contraceptive use by either of the parents; I
find that the results are robust (compare Table 2.4 and Appendix Table 5.1).
The age gap between the oldest and youngest child in a family is controlled for two reasons.
First, a larger age gap indicates lesser possibility of a woman’s future fertility. Second, when
the age gap is high, it is likely that the oldest child in a family will take care of the younger
siblings’ education. So, the negative effect of birth spacing may be controlled using this
variable.
To address a concern relating to unobserved parental preference for a child, I use the in-
formation on contraceptive use by either of the parents as an additional control variable.
Contraceptive use is a binary variable and is assigned a value of one if either of the parents of
a child use any kind of contraceptive methods, otherwise it is assigned a value of zero. The
results are similar to the earlier estimates (compare Table 2.4 and Appendix Table 5.1).
Birth order has an independent effect on children’s educational outcomes (Black et al., 2005;
Angrist et al., 2005). Therefore, it is essential to control for the birth order of children oth-
erwise the results are likely to be biased. By controlling the birth order of children, I find
the results are robust (see Table 2.4); the robustness of the estimates is consistent with the
findings by Li et al. (2008) (for Chinese children) and Kumar and Kugler (2017) (for Indian
children). In contrast, Black et al. (2005) (for Norwegian children) and Angrist et al. (2005)
(for Israeli children) find that the impact of child-quantity on children’s educational outcomes
becomes negligible when the birth order of children is controlled.
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Alternative instrument: Same gender composition of first two children
Parents having the first two children of same gender are more likely to desire another child
of the opposite gender. This is likely to increase the number of children in a family. The
instrument, i.e., same gender composition of first two children, is a binary variable and is
assigned a value of one if the first two children born to the mother are either both girls
or both boys; otherwise, a value of zero is assigned. The sample is therefore restricted to
mothers with at least two children.
The first five columns of Appendix Table A2.16 present the results for using twins as an
instrument for child-quantity while last five columns present the results for using same gender
composition as an instrument for child-quantity. Here, I interpret the results for the same-
gender composition of children; the results for twins are in parentheses. On average, an
additional child reduces completed years of schooling by 0.62 (0.12) years, the probability of
school attendance by 4.2 (3.2) percentage points, ERT by 0.04 (0.02) of a unit and EDT ratio
by 0.08 (0.01) of a unit. The results are statistically significant at the conventional levels.
In a developed country setting, Black et al. (2005) do not find any quantity-quality trade-off
by using same gender composition of first two children as an instrument, although they find
the trade-off by using twins as an instrument. Angrist et al. (2005) find similar results as
Black et al. (2005) using the same instrument.
Reasons behind the difference in the estimates: twins versus same gender composition
The results in Appendix Table A2.16 show that the estimates of child-quantity, i.e., β′′ on
children’s schooling outcomes using twins, are consistently smaller than the corresponding
estimates using same gender composition. When twins are used as an instrument, β′′ estimate
in Equation 2.10 is an effect of an extra child on schooling outcomes of children in families
that are affected by multiple births. Similarly, β′′ estimate for same gender composition gives
the average effect of an extra child on schooling outcomes of children in families that are
affected by children’s same gender composition. For these reasons, twin births and same
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gender composition do not necessarily identify the same average effects. These differences
in the estimates strongly suggest that the two types of fertility shock have different local
average treatment effects. Hence, the difference in the estimates is mainly due to a local
average treatment effect that is very much instrument specific.
Furthermore, a smaller effect with twins can be explained by the following reasons: First,
let us assume that the nth child is of the same age in both twin and non-twin families. In
a twin family where nth and (n + 1)th children are twins, the (n + 1)th child from a twin
family would be older than (n+ 1)th child in a non-twin family; this is because it would take
at least a year to have (n + 1)th child in a non-twin family. Therefore, the average age of
children in twin family is expected to be higher than in a non-twin family. The difference
in the average age of children has implications on educational attainments. Thus negative
effects of an additional child on educational outcomes using twins as an instrument are likely
to be smaller in magnitude because children are older in twin families compared to non-twin
families. Second, there are economies of scale in parenting two children of same age (Angrist
and Evans, 1998). However, poor health endowment for twin children could have negative
effect on schooling outcomes (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Therefore, the net effect of
twins as an instrument will depend on how the two opposite effects balance each other.
2.6.7. Effect of child-quantity on the health outcomes
OLS results in Table 2.9 shows that an additional child increases height-for-age z-score for
young children by 0.12 of a standard deviation on average. For school-aged children, an
additional child reduces weight-for-age z-score by 0.02 of a standard deviation on average,
height-for-age z-score by 0.02 of a standard deviation on average and BMI-for-age z-score
by 0.04 of a standard deviation on average.
2SLS estimates in the table reveal that an additional child reduces weight-for-age z-score for
young children by 0.5 of a standard deviation on average. An additional child reduces BMI-
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for-age z-score for school-aged children by 0.2 of a standard deviation on average. Uncondi-
tional average z-scores are reported in the footnote of Table 2.9. The results are statistically
significant at the conventional levels. These results suggest that there is a negative sibling
effect on children’s health in both age groups. However, we need caution while interpreting
these results because of a potential selection bias in both age groups. The selection possibil-
ity is discussed at the end of Section 2.4.3. Hence, these results may not be precise and it
requires further research.
Same-gender composition has not been used as an alternative instrument to study health
outcomes because it may have direct impact on health outcomes of children (Pande, 2003a).
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Table 2.9: Effect of child-quantity on the health outcomes



















OLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children)
No. of children 0.048 0.121∗∗ -0.050 -0.022∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.060) (0.045) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
R-squared 0.081 0.060 0.062 0.084 0.062 0.071
First stage of 2SLS (No. of children regressed on twin births)†
Twin births 1.000∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.060) (0.047) (0.047)
R-squared 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.725 0.662 0.662
No. of twins 33 33 33 245 623 623
Second stage of 2SLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children)
No. of children -0.495∗∗ -0.413 -0.381 -0.123 0.019 -0.228∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.329) (0.281) (0.100) (0.057) (0.058)
F-Statistic 43 43 43 239 433 433
Observations 2,099 2,099 2,099 14,336 34,849 34,849
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance of coefficients is based on robust standard error.
1Weights are measured by WHO for children until age 10.08. †In the first stage regression number of
children is regressed on twin births which is used as an instrument.
Regression equations control for age of child, age of mother, squared age of mother, education of
mother, child gender, child gender*child age, medical treatment location, state dummies, communi-
ties include Brahmin, FC-General, disadvantaged groups (SC, ST and OBC), FC-Muslim and Others
(Christians, Sikhs and Jains) are considered as base categories. Age gap and birth order of children
are additional controls used. 1R-squared is reported for first stage of 2SLS. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistic is reported.
Children (1–4 years): Overall sample mean z-scores: weight (-1.59); height (-1.88); weight for
length/height (-0.69);
Children (5–18 years): Overall sample mean z-scores: weight (-1.51); height (-1.54); BMI (-0.99).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
2.6.8. Health outcomes: Urban versus rural settlement
For young children, within urban sub-sample, OLS results show that there is no associa-
tion between number of siblings and health outcomes. However, 2SLS result shows that an
additional child increase height-for-age z-score by 1.3 standard deviations. Thus the posi-
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tive sibling effect on health of urban young children could be because the majority of urban
households (83%) have at the most 3 children (61% have at the most two children and 21.5%
have three children). Only 17% of households have 4 or more children. So the trade-off
may be less likely in the urban sub-sample. Within rural sub-sample, an additional child,
on average, increases the weight-for-age z-score for young children by 0.08 of a standard
deviation and it increases height-for age z-score by 0.2 of a standard deviation. In contrast,
2SLS results show that, on average, an additional children reduces weight-for-age z-score for
young children by 1.1 standard deviations, it reduces height-for-age z-score by 1.5 standard
deviations. Hence, the OLS results are likely to be biased and 2SLS results suggest that there
is a negative sibling-effect on health of rural young children. This could be because a larger
percentage of rural households (29%) have 4 or more children than urban households (17%)
and this is more so in the extended families. There are 24% (13%) of rural (urban) extended
families that have four or more children (including young children). Hence, the trade-off is
likely to be arising from an extended family setting in rural areas (see results for extended
family setting in Table 2.11).
For school-aged children, within urban sub-sample, an additional child reduces height-for-
age z-score by 0.05 of a standard deviation on average and it reduces their BMI-for-age z-
score by 0.08 of a standard deviation on average. The results suggest that there is a negative
association between the number of siblings and health of school-aged children. However,
there is no causal relationship found within urban sub-sample. Within rural sub-sample, OLS
(2SLS) result shows that an additional child reduces BMI-for-age z-score for school-aged
children by 0.02 (0.23) of a standard deviation on average. These results are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Similar to rural young children, there is a similar negative sibling
effect on health of rural school-aged children. This could be because the number of children
is higher on average in rural than in urban sub-sample (see Appendix Table A2.12). Besides,
households with four or more children is higher in rural (45%) than in urban households
(32%) and this is more so in extended families.
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Table 2.10: Effect of child-quantity on the health outcomes by type of residence



















OLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children): Urban
No. of children 0.004 0.067 -0.064 -0.033 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.128) (0.092) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 614 614 614 4,074 10,814 10,814
R-squared 0.119 0.097 0.123 0.122 0.071 0.083
OLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children): Rural
No. of children 0.079∗ 0.164∗∗ -0.043 0.000 -0.013 -0.021∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.069) (0.052) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 10,262 24,035 24,035
R-squared 0.096 0.064 0.079 0.060 0.060 0.063
First stage of 2SLS (No. of children regressed on twin births)†: Urban
Twin births 1.197∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.381) (0.381) (0.125) (0.083) (0.083)
No. of twins 11 11 11 59 182 182
Observations 614 614 614 4,074 10,814 10,814
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.746 0.706 0.706
First stage of 2SLS (No. of children regressed on twin births)†: Rural
Twin births 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.066) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 10,262 24,035 24,035
R-squared 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.717 0.647 0.647
No. of twins 22 22 22 186 441 441
Second stage of 2SLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of childrens): Urban
No. of children 0.403 1.282∗ -0.621 -0.305 0.106 -0.203
(0.437) (0.734) (0.576) (0.199) (0.118) (0.126)
F-Statistic 10 10 10 46 105 105
Observations 614 614 614 4,074 10,814 10,814
Second stage of 2SLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of childrens): Rural
No. of children -1.080∗∗∗ -1.486∗∗∗ -0.253 -0.042 0.015 -0.227∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.357) (0.317) (0.117) (0.064) (0.066)
F-Statistic 38 38 38 197 351 351
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 10,262 24,035 24,035
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance of coefficients is based on robust standard error.
1Weights are measured by WHO for children until age 10.08. †In the first stage regression number of chil-
dren is regressed on twin births which is used as an instrument.
Regression equations control for age of child, age of mother, squared age of mother, education of mother,
child gender, child gender*child age, state dummies, medical treatment location, communities include
Brahmin, FC-General, disadvantaged groups (SC, ST and OBC), FC-Muslim and Others (Christians, Sikhs
and Jains) are considered as base categories. Age gap and birth order of children are additional controls
used. 1R-squared is reported for first stage of 2SLS. Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic is reported. Chil-
dren (1–4 years): urban sample mean z-scores: weight (-1.67); height (-1.96); BMI (-0.73); Rural sample
mean z-scores: weight (-1.67); height (-1.96); BMI (-0.73); Children (5–18 years): Urban sample z-scores:
weight (-1.22); height (-1.43); BMI (-0.74); Rural sample z-scores: weight (-1.68); height (-1.63); BMI (-
0.08).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
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The positive health outcomes in urban settlement while negative outcome is rural settlement
could be because it is difficult to access medical centres in rural areas due to its distant
location. Appendix Table A2.12 shows that the medical locations in urban settlement are
mostly located in the same town while in rural settlement it is located in another village.
2.6.9. Health outcomes: Extended versus nuclear family
Extended families on average have larger number of children than nuclear families (see Ap-
pendix Table A2.14). Therefore, Q-Q trade-off is likely to be visible in an extended family
setting. Nuclear families may have lower number of children on average but these families
have no additional member (other than married couples, widowed or divorced women) to
look after the children or to help with household chores. Hence, Q-Q trade-off is equally
likely in such as setting.
For young children, within an extended family setting, OLS results in Table 2.11 show that
there is no association between number of siblings and health outcomes. In contrast, 2SLS re-
sults for extended family setting show that an additional child reduces weight-for-age z-score
and height-for-age z-score by 0.7 of a standard deviation on average. Thus the hypothesis in
the previous section, that the negative sibling impact on health of rural young children could
arise from an extended family setting, may be true.20 Within a nuclear family setting, OLS re-
sults show that there is a positive association between number of siblings and health of young
children: an additional child increases weight-for-age z-score by 0.1 of a standard deviation
and height-for-age z-scores by 0.3 of a standard deviation. However, no causal relation is
found.
For school-aged children, within an extended family setting, OLS results show that an addi-
tional child, on average, reduces height-for-age z-score by 0.02 of a standard deviation and
20Further subdivision of a sample by settlement and family types may not be feasible due to limited observations.
Besides, the strength of the instrument will be questionable for such a small sample size.
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BMI-for-age z-score by 0.04 of a standard deviation. 2SLS result shows that an additional
child, on average, reduces a BMI-for-age z-score by 0.2 of a standard deviation. Thus, there
exists a similar negative sibling effect on school-aged children’s health arising from extended
family setting, as for young children. Within a nuclear family setting, OLS results show that
there is a negative association between number of siblings and health of school-aged chil-
dren: an additional child reduces weight-for-age z-score and height-for-age z-score by 0.04
of a standard deviation and BMI-for-age z-scores by 0.05 of a standard deviation. 2SLS result
show that an additional child, on average, reduces a BMI-for-age z-score by 0.2 of a standard
deviation. The results are statistically significant at the conventional levels and suggest that
there is a negative sibling effect on health of school-aged children in both the extended and
nuclear family settings.
These above results, however, should be interpreted with caution due to a possible sample-
selection issue as discussed at the end of Section 2.4.3.
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Table 2.11: Effect of child-quantity on the health outcomes



















OLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children): Extended family
No. of children -0.006 0.019 -0.034 -0.016 -0.021∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.082) (0.059) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 7,595 18,627 18,627
R-squared 0.085 0.072 0.079 0.089 0.064 0.066
OLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of children): Nuclear family
No. of children 0.112∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ -0.078 -0.038∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.089) (0.073) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 907 907 907 6,741 16,222 16,222
R-squared 0.105 0.094 0.099 0.085 0.064 0.080
First stage of 2SLS (No. of children regressed on twin births)†: Extended family
Twin births 1.599∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.076) (0.063) (0.063)
No. of twins 12 12 12 111 291 291
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 7,595 18,627 18,627
R-squared 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.746 0.670 0.670
First stage of 2SLS (No. of children regressed on twin births)†: Nuclear family
Twin births 0.742∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.089) (0.067) (0.067)
Observations 907 907 907 6,741 16,222 16,222
R-squared 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.730 0.699 0.699
No. of twins 21 21 21 134 332 332
Second stage of 2SLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of childrens): Extended family
No. of children -0.714∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗ -0.435 -0.042 0.190∗ -0.245∗∗
(0.169) (0.352) (0.264) (0.151) (0.099) (0.103)
F-Statistic 38 38 38 96 151 151
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 7,595 18,627 18,627
Second stage of 2SLS (Z-scores regressed on No. of childrens): Nuclear family
No. of children -0.184 -0.191 -0.125 -0.137 -0.055 -0.221∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.554) (0.505) (0.128) (0.069) (0.070)
F-Statistic 46 46 46 152 295 295
Observations 907 907 907 6,741 16,222 16,222
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance of coefficients is based on robust standard error. 1Weights are measured by WHO for children until age
10.08. †In the first stage regression number of children is regressed on twin births which is used as an instrument.
Regression equations control for age of child, age of mother, squared age of mother, education of mother, child gen-
der, child gender*child age, state dummies, medical treatment location, communities include Brahmin, FC-General,
disadvantaged groups (SC, ST and OBC), FC-Muslim and Others (Christians, Sikhs and Jains) are considered as base
categories. Age gap and birth order of children are additional controls used. Children (1-4 years): Extended family
mean z-scores: weight (-1.54); height (-1.80); BMI (-0.68); Nuclear family mean z-scores: weight (-1.66); height
(-1.98); BMI (-0.69). Children (5-18 years): Extended family mean z-scores: weight (-1.51); height (-1.54); BMI (-
0.99); Nuclear family mean z-scores: weight (-1.60); height (-1.60); BMI (-0.96).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
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2.7. Discussion and conclusions
This study empirically tests the theoretical model of child quantity-quality trade-off that has
been formulated by Becker and Lewis (1973). Child-quantity is measured by the number
of surviving children residing with a mother and child-quality is measured by schooling and
health outcomes. Using the IHDS-II dataset, I have constructed wide-ranging indicators for
measuring child-quality. For schooling outcomes of children between the ages of 5–18, I
have used the following indicators: a) completed years of schooling; b) school attendance if
a child is currently enrolled in school (binary variable); c) delay in years of schooling if a
child is currently enrolled in school (binary variable); d) ratio of actual years of schooling
to expected years of schooling at a given age (ERT); e) age-standardised schooling index
(EDT); f) test scores in reading, writing and arithmetic; the score categories are available for
children between the ages of 8–11 and are converted to binary variables. The child health
indicators are assessed in accordance to child growth standards of World Health Organisation
(WHO) and these include i) weight-for-age z-score, ii) height-for-age z-score, iii) BMI-for-
age z-score. I have used two different age groups of children i.e., 1–4 and 5–18 to analyse
the sibling impact on health outcomes.
Given the endogenous nature of fertility, testing the existence of this trade-off is indeed chal-
lenging. To control for the endogeneity of child-quantity variable, I have used an instrumental
variable approach where twins (i.e., whether a mother has twin children or not) is used as an
instrument for child-quantity. Using twins as an instrument for child-quantity, I find that an
extra child in a family, on average, lowers the completed years of schooling by 0.12 years,
reduces the chances of school attendance by 3.6 percentage points, and it reduces the ratio
of actual years of schooling to expected years of schooling by 0.02 of a unit. These findings
are robust to controlling for birth order of children, age gap of children and contraceptive
use by either of the parents. In the aspect of heath, the children between the ages of 5–18
experience a loss of 0.23 of a standard deviation in BMI-for-age z-score, on average, due
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to an extra sibling, whereas children between the ages of 1–4 experience a loss of 0.50 of a
standard deviation in weight-for-age z-score due to an extra sibling. The empirical findings
show that the negative impact of having a large family size on years of schooling is relevant
to the urban settlement and the nuclear family setting. The negative sibling impacts on health
outcomes are relevant to the rural settlement and to both the extended and the nuclear family
setting. The positive health outcomes in urban settlement while negative outcome is rural
settlement could be because it is difficult to access medical centres in rural areas due to its
location. Appendix Table A2.12 shows that the medical locations in the urban settlement are
mostly located in the same town, while those in the rural settlement are located in another
village.
Given that families with different number of children may experience different schooling
outcome, I consider different sub-samples of families with different number of children. Us-
ing nth order of twin delivery as an instrument, my findings reveal that the families with at
least three children have positive sibling effects on the schooling outcomes (namely years of
schooling, ERT and EDT), whereas families with five or more children experience negative
sibling effect on the schooling outcomes (namely years of schooling, delay, ERT and EDT). I
further test the robustness of the results using same-gender composition of children for fam-
ilies with at least two children and compare the results with twins. I find that the magnitude
of the trade-off using same gender composition is higher compared to twins.
The policies that talk about this trade-off are already in place, such as provision of schools
for children, universal income subsidies to poor families, public health improvements through
expenditure on sanitation and mass immunisation. All these policies have favourable reper-
cussions on children through an increase in school attendance, reduction in educational ex-
penditure, reduction in children’s labour market participation, improvement in children’s nu-
tritional requirement, reduction in child mortality and, at the same time, discouraging parental
fertility (Cigno et al., 2001). Despite the implementation of such policies and the initiation
of RTE Act of 2009, the drop-out rates have remained high at all levels of schooling in In-
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dia. The finding in this study reveals the existence of trade-off among urban children in
years of schooling attainments. In India, policy goals are primarily focused on improving
the quantity of schools and increasing school enrolments in rural areas; however, at the same
time it should also consider improving the quality of schooling in both rural and urban ar-
eas. This is because government education in India is free for all but is generally of poor
quality in terms of both teacher input, school resources and infrastructure (Kingdon, 2007).
In addition, a finding in this study reveals that an additional child reduces the probability of
school attendance in rural areas by 4 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the
Ministry of Human Resource Development report (MHRD, 2003, 2014).21 Although, 100%
school enrolment has been achieved but improving the quality of schools and the attendance
of children are yet to be achieved and hence, they are of policy relevance.
For future research, it would be interesting to understand how parents reallocate their re-
sources among children after twin births in order to study how such reallocations may in-
fluence child-quality as motivated by (Li et al., 2008). Given that there is a possibility of a
selection issue in the health sample, further investigation is essential as a part of an agenda
for future research.
21MHRD (2003) finds that, when student’s attendance is measured at several points in the year, attendance
varies from 43% to very high rates of over 90% (Kingdon, 2007). The Government of India (G.O.I) aiming
to improve school attendance through several policies and programmes, such as Right of Children to Free
and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act of 2009 that aims to provide free elementary education to ensure
compulsory admission, attendance and completion of elementary education by every child between 6–14
years of age (MHRD, 2014).
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Chapter 3. The Impact of Fertility on Female Labour Market Outcomes: Evidence
from India
3.1. Introduction
A vast literature in labour economics over the past 20–30 years has questioned why women
are under-represented in the labour market in both developed and developing countries.
Among several socio-economic factors, an observed fact is that women disproportionately
assume child-rearing responsibilities has always been recognised in the labour economics lit-
erature (Waldfogel, 1998; Piras and Ripani, 2005). The related studies in the past have tried
to explore several factors (such as fertility and unearned family wealth) that discourage fe-
male labour market participation. The studies have also investigated how an incentive, such
as a wage rate influences female time-allocation in different activities, such as housework,
market-work and leisure. This broad division of time into the three types of regular activities
is known as the trichotomy of time allocation in the labour economics literature. Theoretical
study based on the trichotomy of time allocation by married women has been motivated by
Gronau (1977).
Gronau assumes that, in a developed country setting, a woman may choose to spend zero
hours at home and may allocate her total time between market-work and leisure. I modify
this assumption in my work to reflect a more realistic context. I assume that a woman spares
some compulsory minimum amount of time at home such that hours spent at home is strictly
positive, instead of a zero possibility. Hence, I have refined Gronau’s original proposition
on a woman’s equilibrium allocation of hours into house-work, market-work and leisure by
introducing an additional time-constraint: compulsory house-work time requirement. By in-
corporating the constraint into the model, I show how the optimal hours of labour supply
in the market may decline below Gronau-equilibrium hours of labour supply. I further show
that, depending on the relative magnitude of the shift in the constraint (i.e., compulsory house-
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work time requirement) from its reference point due to an exogenous shock, for example, a
fertility shock, there could be a possibility of a sub-optimal solution that may cause a working
woman to exit the labour market.
To empirically examine the impact of exogenous fertility shock on female labour market
outcomes, I instrument fertility using twins, following Bronars and Grogger (1994). To im-
prove the strength of the causal interpretation, I also use an alternative instrument: first-born
girl.22 So far, the related studies in the Indian context have not examined the causal impact
of fertility on female labour market outcomes.
In addition to fertility, there are several other determinants of female labour market outcomes
that are also considered for empirical analyses. The economics determinants include wage
rate and unearned family wealth.23 The demographic variables include female age, female
age at marriage, female education, female marital status, place of residence, caste, religion
etc.
Using the IHDS-II dataset, the primary findings reveal that fertility discourages female labour
market participation and longer hours of labour supply, particularly when children are young
(below the age of six). An additional young child, on average, reduces female labour mar-
ket participation by 11 percentage points and it reduces annual hours of labour supply by
approximately 200 hours.24 The negative impact of young children on female labour mar-
ket participation is evident in the urban area and in the nuclear family setting. The negative
impact of young children on hours of work in the market is relevant to both the types of set-
22The latter instrument is suitable in the Indian context because of a strict ‘son’ preference by Indian parents.
Such a preference is guided by a cultural practice where a son is considered as future security for parents at
their retirement ages. Maertens (2013) finds that the parental aspiration for girls is sensitive to social norm
such as age of marriage while aspiration for sons is sensitive to returns to higher education. That is why girl
are force to marry at the early age while boys are allowed to achieve higher education in expectations of higher
returns from their higher education. Therefore, having a first-born girl is likely to encourage Indian parents
to have another child of an opposite gender.
23For graphical illustrations of hourly wage and unearned wealth effects on time allocation, see Gronau (1977),
pp. 1107–08.
24Similar negative impacts are found for the sample of women who have both young and school-aged children
Appendix Table A3.50.
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tlement (urban and rural) and to both the types of family setting (extended and nuclear). In
contrast, school-aged children encourage female labour market participation, although they
have null effect on average hours of labour supply. In addition to my primary focus on the
fertility impact, the study examines the impacts of hourly wage and family wealth on the out-
comes; the findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), which are typically relevant for a developed country context.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides the contextual back-
ground while discussing the related studies in the literature that motivate this study. I then
expand on the studies relating to the Indian context and underscore the relevant contribu-
tion to the gaps in the existing literature. Section 3.3 presents Gronau’s original theoretical
model, amendment to the Gronau-equilibrium condition and I graphically demonstrate how
a woman’s time-allocation may change due a new-born child. Section 3.4 presents the data
and the descriptive statistics of the sample. Section 3.5 discusses the empirical strategy and
identification, while Section 3.6 presents the main results. Finally, Section 3.7 discusses the
key findings, caveats of the study and concludes with policy implications and avenues for
future research.
3.2. Contextual background
At first, I provide a broad overview of the related studies in the labour economics literature.
I narrow down my focus to the Indian context to reflect on India’s standing in terms of the
number of births per woman and female labour market participation during 2011-12; discuss
the possible reasons for such decline in the participation rate. Finally, with the understanding




In this section, I review some recent studies that discuss how social, economic and political
factors may impact female labour market participation across different countries. These fac-
tors include welfare policies, demographic features, fertility (i.e., number of children born
per woman), labour market features (such as wage rate, minimum wage and gender-gap in
wage), travel or transport costs, public care provisions and culture. I discuss these determin-
ing factors of female labour market participation sequentially below.
Impact of welfare policies on female labour market participation:
According to Esping-Andersen et al. (2002) and Jensen (2017), female labour market par-
ticipation has increasingly been justified in economic terms as more women in the labour
market will increase the number of taxpayers, thereby ensuring the sustainability of a welfare
state. Welfare policies have evolved to make the European countries most competitive and the
most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world (such as the 10-year Lisbon Strategy,
adopted in 2000). These policies have aimed to increase female labour market participation
by more than 60% by 2010 in order to promote equality of opportunity, higher productivity
and a higher standard of living for all (Caruana, 2006). Welfare and taxation policies have
mixed impacts on female labour market participation. For example, the state welfare policies
aiming at increasing the number of tax-payers and making provisions for public childcare and
elder-care facilities have encouraged female participation in the labour market. On the other
hand, the higher taxation (such as progressive taxation) that eats away the utility of working
by cutting a large chunk of obtainable wages discourages women from participation in the
labour market (Keeley, 1981; Summers et al., 1993; Jepsen et al., 1997).
Impact of demographic features on female labour market participation:
Demographic variables, such as age, health and education are primary predictors of female
labour market participation (OECD, 1989; Gustafsson et al., 1996; England et al., 2012;
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Grunow et al., 2012). Household composition has continued to play a vital role towards
female participation decision and work-time because the household is the basic unit for
decision-making (Becker, 1965). For example, in a household, whether a woman will of-
fer to participate in the labour market depends on her marital status, economic-status of her
household and family income (Hakim, 2002; Matysiak and Steinmetz, 2008; Stähli et al.,
2009). Within a household, a woman with a low-earning spouse is more likely to participate
in the labour market than a woman with a high-earning spouse (Jensen, 2017).
Impact of fertility on female labour market participation:
The association between fertility and female labour supply has been extensively researched
since the 1970s, especially within the context of developed countries, where notable contri-
butions reveal positive, negative as well as null effects. The contributions by Bell (1974),
Schultz (1978), Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer (1978), Lehrer and Nerlove (1984) and Vere
(2007) reveal a negative association between fertility and female labour supply. In contrast,
Cain and Dooley (1976), Cogan (1981), Carliner et al. (1984) and Fleisher and Rhodes (1979)
find positive associations. DeFronzo (1980) and Link and Settle (1981), nevertheless, do not
find any association between fertility and female labour supply. The magnitude of the associ-
ation between fertility and female labour supply is, however, observed to be much smaller in
developing countries compared to developed countries; this is partly due to the availability of
inexpensive and accessible childcare alternatives in developing countries (Stycos and Weller,
1967). For instance, in many developing countries, childcare responsibilities are often shared
by grandparents and other available household members in an extended family setting. Stud-
ies exploring these associations, however, do not establish causality given that the fertility
decisions are endogenous and are influenced by a variety of unobserved factors. In addition,
some studies find an existence of a reverse causality.25
A number of studies have exploited an exogenous variation in fertility to establish a causal
25For example, Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer (1978) find that fertility has a negative impact on female labour
market participation, whereas female labour market participation has a positive impact on fertility.
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relationship between the number of children and female labour market outcomes by consid-
ering different instruments for fertility. For example, the use of twins as an instrument has
been exploited by Bronars and Grogger (1994) and Jacobsen et al. (1999). Alternatively, the
same-gender composition of first two children (i.e., whether a mother has the first two chil-
dren of the same gender) has been used by Angrist and Evans (1998) and Cruces and Galiani
(2007). Bronars and Grogger (1994) use twins as instruments for fertility and find it exerts
a negative impact on single (i.e., unwed) women’s performance in the labour market in the
United States. Angrist and Evans (1998) exploit same-gender composition and find a nega-
tive impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes in the Unites States, while Agüero
and Marks (2008) use infertility as an instrument and find no impact of fertility on female
labour market participation in the context of Latin American countries.
Impact of labour market features on female labour market participation:
There are numerous studies in the literature that have analysed the extent to which labour
market features (such as the wage rate, minimum wages and gender gap in wages) have im-
pacted on the female labour supply. For example, Cloı̈n et al. (2011) find that a high minimum
wage stimulates the female labour market participation of low-educated women. However,
wage cannot solely explain the female labour market outcome. Financial incentives together
with occupational characteristics (i.e., service economy) can determine labour market out-
comes. For example, the service economy is more open towards female workers in European
countries (Pissarides et al., 2005) and, more importantly, the flexibility to work part-time has
increased orientation of women towards the service sectors (Jaumotte, 2003; Caruana, 2006;
Plantenga and Remery, 2009). This flexibility allows for the reconciliation between work and
care obligations.
In the United States, past studies find that wage rate has a positive impact on female labour
supply (Cain and Weininger, 1973; Lehrer and Nerlove, 1981, 1982; Dooley, 1982; Carliner
et al., 1984; Moffitt, 1984; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985). In regard to the impact of un-
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earned family income on female labour market participation, the empirical results are mixed.
Schultz (1980) finds a depressing impact of a husband’s income on female labour force par-
ticipation, which is less pronounced for the youngest age cohort (14–24 years). In a similar
way, Lehrer and Nerlove (1981) and Lehrer and Nerlove (1982) report that a husband’s in-
come has a significant effect only after the onset of child-bearing. Bean et al. (1982) assume
that the role incompatibility between mother and worker decreases when husband’s income
decreases. However, the empirical results are mixed; while such assumptions are found to
hold true for Mexican Americans, they do not hold true for Puerto Rican and Cuban women.
Impact of travel cost and distance to work on female labour market participation:
Buckner (2009) finds affordable travel costs influence the decision-making of women on
whether to participate in the labour market or not. Similarly, Yeandle (2009) finds women
generally prefer to work locally. In addition, women who work close to their homes and on
a part-time basis experience less conflict between the mother and worker roles (Lehrer and
Nerlove, 1986).
Impact of the service economy and public care provisions on female labour market partici-
pation:
In urban areas, the localities possessing a strong service economy as well as provision of
social services (such as childcare and elder-care) have continued to have positive impact on
female labour market participation (Trydegård and Thorslund, 2010; Jensen and Lolle, 2013).
Research studies based on welfare policies have strongly argued that the public childcare pro-
visions and elder-care institutions are major drivers of female employment prospects (Daly
and Lewis, 1998; Lewis, 2002; Kangas and Rostgaard, 2007; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011;
Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard, 2011).
Impact of culture on female labour market participation:
Culture plays a crucial role for women’s decision-making on whether to participate in the
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labour market or not. For example, in a developing country, such as India, the restrictions on
activities of women are a throwback to cultural regimes of the past where women working
with men outside the household is frowned upon, especially for married women (Eswaran
et al., 2013). Even in developed countries, cultural norms discourage female labour market
participation in a different way. For example, in Finland and Germany, there is a widely held
belief that a caring and loving mother will take care of their own children without putting
them in childcare facilities. Such a belief also discourages mothers from using public child-
care provisions and consequently from the labour market participation (Kröger et al., 2003;
Mätzke and Ostner, 2010). However, cultural ideals may not be homogenous within an en-
tire nation because the ideals may vary across societies, localities and communities. Within
a given national culture, divergence and even contradictory values and ideals may co-exist
(Harris, 1983; Jensen, 2017).
3.2.2. Indian context
Female labour market participation rate in India has been at 37% in 2005 and it has continued
to decline gradually thereafter, remaining close to 25% in 2011-12 (see Figure 3.1). The 2011
IHDS dataset also reveals that female labour market participation rate is 25% (see Table 3.2)
while the the average number of surviving children per woman during 2011-12 has been
four. These children were born during the 1990s, when the live birth per woman was 3.8
(see Appendix Table A2.3). These estimates provide a scope for further investigation into
the research question: whether a large number of children per woman, during 2011-12, have
negative impacts on female labour market outcomes, particularly in presence of least one
child, who is below the age of six.26,27
26Note that although both the fertility rate and female labour market participation rate have declined in the
recent years, the presence of young children (although in the short-run) is likely to have negative impacts on
female labour market outcomes.
27In Section 3.3.2, I graphically demonstrate how a woman’s time-allocation may change due a new-born child
(see Figure 3.5)
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Source: World Bank (2019). Refer to Appendix Table A3.25 for age wise statistics on female labour market
participation since 1987.
The declining rate of female labour market participation is not only evident in urban areas
(Klasen and Pieters, 2015) but also in rural areas (Afridi et al., 2018). According to Afridi
et al. (2018), the increasing educational attainments among India’s rural married women and
men is the most prominent attribute contributing to this decline. This is because educated
women choose to invest more time at home on children’s education and health. In addi-
tion, with the rise in women’s education, their reservation wages are likely to be higher.
With the rise in their reservation wages, if women do not find suitable jobs, they prefer to
stay at home and contribute to home production. Similarly, Klasen and Pieters (2015) un-
derscore that a slow rate of sectoral expansion in urban areas in the face of the rising rate
of educational attainments among both men and women and rising household income are
primary factors contributing to the decline in female labour market participation in India.
Eswaran et al. (2013) emphasise the fact that time allocation of women to market-work is
primarily mediated through a family’s desire to maintain economic-status. Women belong-
ing to disadvantaged communities participate in the labour market because of the need to
augment their economic-status by contributing to family income. When the families become
economically better-off, these women exit the labour market and contribute to family-status
production through contributing towards household chores and establishing good network
with the neighbours. Therefore, female labour market participation decisions are determined
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by educational attainments of both men and women and family incomes.
Although unearned family wealth has been used in the earlier studies as a determinant of fe-
male labour market participation, the impact of wage rates on female labour market outcomes
have never been explicitly studied before, which is included in this study.
Related studies in the past have also looked at the possible association between fertility and
female labour market participation. For example, Das and Desai (2003), Klasen and Pieters
(2015), Afridi et al. (2018) find that fertility (i.e., children below the age of six) has a negative
association with female labour market participation, although Eswaran et al. (2013) observes
no correlation. In contrast, school-aged children (i.e., between the ages of 6–15) have a
positive association with female labour market participation. Recently, Sarkar et al. (2019)
have studied Indian female employment transitions using panel data for two years period.
One of the determinants of female employment transitions has been the number of children.
Using IHDS datasets for 2005 and 2011, they also find a contrasting association between
young children (under the age of six) and school-aged children (between the ages of 7 and
12) on female entry and exit from the labour market. They observe that an additional young
child increases the chance of a woman exiting from the labour market, whereas the impact of
a school-aged child is the reverse. However, the study has acknowledged that these effects
are not causal, which requires further investigation.
3.2.3. Contribution
This study makes four novel contributions to the existing literature in the Indian context.
First, I have redefined a woman’s equilibrium allocation of time between house-work, market-
work and leisure by introducing an additional constraint (i.e., compulsory house-work time
requirement) into the Gronau model. Second, this is the first study in India that examines
the causal impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes. To achieve this, I use two
instruments for fertility: twins (i.e., whether or not a mother has twin children), following
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Bronars and Grogger (1994) and first-born girl (i.e., whether or not the first-born child is a
girl). Third, while all the earlier studies in the Indian context have focused mainly on female
labour market participation, I have focused on both female participation and hours of labour
supply in the market. Finally, I examine the impact of hourly wage on female labour market
outcomes, which has not been explicitly studied earlier in the Indian context.
3.3. Theoretical model
In this section, I present the theoretical structure of female time allocation into three broad
activities: housework, market-work and leisure. This allocation of time is known as the
trichotomy of time allocation and can be formalised using a utility maximisation framework
following Gronau (1977).
3.3.1. Gronau (1977): Trichotomy of time allocation
In the original Gronau framework, a woman derives her utility from her household’s total
consumption of goods and services as well as from her own leisure consumption. Her utility
function may be written as:
U = U(X,L), (3.1)
where X is the total amount of goods and services consumed by all her household members,
and L is the total amount of leisure time consumed by the woman. For simplicity, I assume
that the woman has homothetic preferences over X and L.28
Goods and services, i.e., X are either purchased from the market (denoted by XM ) or pro-
duced at home (denoted by XH). Therefore, the allocation of total goods and services can be
28This implies a woman’s utility increases (decreases) monotonically with the increase (decrease) in the un-
earned income or wage, with the prices of X and L remaining unchanged. Therefore, the expansion path is a
straight line from the origin.
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expressed by the following equation,
X = XM +XH . (3.2)
Gronau implicitly assumes that XM and XH are perfect substitutes.
Let the time devoted by the woman for the home-good production be H , such that
XH = f(H); fH > 0, fHH < 0. (3.3)
The home-goods production is subject to diminishing marginal productivity, therefore fHH <
0.29
The woman’s incentive for market participation is determined by an exogenously given wage
rate (W ). In other words, when the market wage rate is sufficiently large relative to the
woman’s marginal productivity (fH) at home, she will have an incentive to participate in the
market.
The woman maximises her utility (U ) subject to two constraints, a time-constraint and a
budget-constraint. Her budget-constraint is given by,
XM = WN + V, (3.4)
where W is a given market wage rate, N is the amount of time that the woman spends in the
market, and V is her unearned income (i.e., property or spouse’s income). Her time-constraint
is given by,
T = L+H +N, (3.5)
where T is the fixed time, H is the amount of time for home-goods production, N is the
29The diminishing marginal productivity at home is exhibited after a certain point of total production due to
fatigue.
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amount of time for market-goods production, and L is the amount of time allocated to leisure
activities.
To maximise the woman’s utility subject to her budget constraint and her time constraint, the
Lagrangian function (L) is defined by,
L = U{XM + f(H), L}+ λ(WN + V −XM) + µ(T − L−H −N), (3.6)
where λ and µ are Lagrange multipliers, such that λ is the marginal utility of income and
µ is the marginal utility of time. The Gronau-equilibrium condition is derived in Appendix
A3.23.
Whenever the woman’s imputed value of time in home-production is more than the market
wage rate (W ), she does not participate in the market and produces solely at home. The im-
puted value of time spent by the woman in home-production (in real terms) is her marginal
productivity of home-production and is known as the shadow price of time. Suppose, the
shadow price of time for home-production is W ∗, such that fH = W ∗. Therefore, the equi-
librium condition for home-based production can be written as:
MRSX,L = fH = W
∗, (3.7)
where MRSX,L is the marginal rate of substitution between X and L.30 When a given wage
rate is greater than marginal productivity of the woman at home (i.e., W > fH), the woman
has an incentive to participate in the labour market. The market-equilibrium condition that
determines the optimal allocation of time into leisure, market-work and home-work and is
given by the following expression (refer to Appendix A3.23, Equations A3.6 to A3.7),
MRSX,L = fH(= W
∗) = W. (3.8)
30Refer to Appendix A3.23, Equations A3.5 and A3.6
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Equations 3.7 and 3.8 are the Gronau-equilibrium conditions for the home-based production
(without market participation) and the market-based production respectively.31
Graphical illustrations of Gronau-equilibrium
Figure 3.2 graphically illustrates the home-based and the market-based optimal solutions as
obtained from Equations 3.7 and 3.8. A woman’s preference for X and L is represented by
an indifference curve U0. Her home-production function is given by be0E0t. The indifference
curve is tangent to the home-production function at e0. The slope of the production function
at e0 is the shadow price of home production W ∗. Given a woman’s preference and her
home-production function, B0e0 is the total optimal consumption of goods, and OB0 is her
optimal amount of time for leisure consumption (denoted by L∗0). The woman produces a0e0
amount of the goods (denoted by X0H) at home using the amount B0t of time (denoted by
H∗0 ). The amount of market-goods consumed is B0a0 (denoted by X
0
M ), which is purchased
from the market using the unearned family wealth. The slope of the budget line is given by
the market wage rate, W .32
Whenever the market wage rate is greater than the shadow price for home production, she
will have an incentive to participate in the market. Consider a market wage rate of W = W1.
Clearly, W1 > W ∗. By participating in the market, she can enjoy higher utility at e1, with
higher amount of goods consumption as well as a higher amount of leisure.
At e1 her household will consume a1b1 amount of home-goods (denoted by X1H), which is
produced by using B′1t amount of her time (denoted by H
∗
1 ), and B1a1 + b1e1 amount of




M ). To produce X
1
M
amount of market-goods, the woman spends B1B
′
1 amount of her time in market activity
(denoted by N∗1 where N
∗
1 > 0). The remaining OB1 amount of time is consumed by her
31The second order conditions for the Gronau optimal solution are also presented in Appendix A3.24.
32When the wage rate is below the reservation wage W ∗, the woman will not have any incentive to participate
in the market and she will allocate her total time into home-time and leisure. Her home-time and leisure-time
allocation will be determined at the point e0 where her utility function is tangent to home production function,
given her homothetic preference.
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as leisure (denoted by L∗1). Clearly, when the wage rate provides an incentive for the woman
to participate in the market, the amount of leisure-time and market-time increases while the
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3.3.2. Effect of compulsory housework time on optimal time allocation: Revised Gronau-
equilibrium
In the Gronau framework, goods produced at home and those produced at market are assumed
to be perfect substitutes. Therefore, with a reasonably high market wage rate, it is possible
for a woman to replace her entire time for housework with market-work. In other words, the
optimal amount of housework time can be equal to zero. This possibility, however, may not
appear to be reasonable in practice and particularly in a developing country context where
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inflexible schedules at home, especially for women with young children, compel them to
reserve a certain amount of time for household chores.33
In this paper I assume that a woman spends a minimum amount of compulsory time at home,
which I refer to as the compulsory housework time (denoted by H̄). This is devoted by
a woman to compulsory household chores, including inflexible child-related activities for
existing dependent children. Total housework time H, therefore, consists of the compulsory
housework time H̄ and any other additional (flexible) time spent on housework (HH), i.e.,
H = H̄ + HH where H̄ > 0 and HH ≥ 0. This means that, even though HH may be equal
to zero, H̄ can never be equal to zero. This is the amendment made into the original Gronau
framework. The time-constraint in Equation 3.5 may then be revised as
T − H̄ = L+HH +N. (3.9)
The incorporation of this additional compulsory time constraint (H̄) contributes to the un-
derstanding of how the optimal time allocation deviates from that of the Gronau-optimal
time allocation. Unlike in the Gronau framework, where a woman returns to a job to buy
child-related goods when home-time becomes expensive after a certain period of time, my
model explains the alternative possibility that a working woman may quit her job in order to
undertake responsibilities for a new-born child.
Given that I aim to focus on women who are already participating in the labour market, for
the remaining analysis I assume that the given market wage is W = W1 so that W > W ∗. To
keep the model simple, I assume HH = 0.
When the compulsory housework time H̄ is less than or equal to the optimal housework time
H∗1 (i.e., H̄≤H∗1 ), the optimal allocation of time is identical to the Gronau framework where
H∗1 = H̄ (refer to Figure 3.2).
33This inflexible nature of work at home is also true for a developed country context. See Smith-Lovin and
Tickamyer (1978) in the context of the USA.
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The optimal time allocation, however, departs from the Gronau framework when the compul-
sory housework time H̄ is larger than the optimal housework time H∗1 (i.e., H̄ > H
∗
1 ) with
two possibilities: (I) H∗0 > H̄ > H
∗
1 and (II) and H̄ > H
∗
0 .
34 I illustrate these cases using
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 below.
In Case I: when H∗0 > H̄ > H
∗
1 (refer to Figure 3.3 below; H̄ = B
′
2t, determined by the
hatched vertical line), a woman produces a2b2 amount of goods at home using the optimal
amount of time B′2t. The increase in home-time (H̄ > H
∗
1 ), primarily due to certain addi-
tional household chores, reduces her time available for market-work. Therefore, she earns a
lower market wage reflected by the parallel shift in the market wage line downwards (denoted
by the dotted straight line) as the wage rate remains the same. She produces b2e2 amount of
goods in the market using B2B
′
2 amount of time (denoted by N
∗
2 ), while her household con-
sumes market goods of the amount b2e2 + B2a2 (denoted by X2M which is less than X
1
M but
greater than X0M , see Figure 3.2). The remaining amount of time OB2 is consumed in leisure
(denoted by L∗2 which is less than L
∗
1 but greater than L
∗
0, see Figure 3.2). Her utility at e2 is
higher than that at e0 (original home-based equilibrium) and so she continues to participate
in the market.
34Recall from the Gronau framework (refer to Figure 3.2) that the optimal time allocated to housework is H∗1
when the market wage W (= W1) > W ∗. Likewise, the optimal time allocated to housework is H∗0 when the
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Source: Author’s own presentation.
In Case II: when H̄ > H∗0 (refer to Figure 3.4 below; H̄ = B
′
3t, determined by the vertical
hatched line), a woman produces ae3 amount of goods at home using B
′
3t amount of time.
I denote this optimal amount of time spent on housework (B′3t) by H
∗
3 . At the given wage
rate W1 and the compulsory hours of housework (H∗3 ), if she continues to participate in the
market then she will obtain lower utility at e3 than at e0 (original home-based equilibrium).
In other words, to the left of point e0, at the given wage rate, the decrease in her leisure to
compensate for the increase in the production of market-goods will be so expensive that it
will compel her to exit the market and continue to produce at home at e0.35
35Note that e3 in Figure 3.4 is a sub-optimal point (neither the utility curve is tangent to the production function
at this point nor is it a point on the woman’s homothetic preference line). Therefore, the woman will never
choose to produce at this point.
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The above graphical illustrations portray how the magnitude of change in H̄ can have an
impact on the allocation of time as well as on female labour market participation. There
could be several causes behind this change in H̄ . One of these causes could be the arrival of a
new-born child in a family, bringing some additional responsibilities and therefore increasing
the compulsory housework time to H̄ ′ such that H̄ ′ > H̄ . There could be two possible cases
as discussed before: (I) H∗0 > H̄
′ > H̄ > H∗1 and (II) H̄
′ > H∗0 .
In Figure 3.5, when H∗0 > H̄
′ > H̄ > H∗1 a woman produces a4b4 amount of goods at home
using B′4t amount of time. This further increases home-time, primarily due to additional
childcare time requirements, further reducing her time available for market-work (N∗4 < N
∗
2 )
and leisure (L∗4 < L
∗
2). The intuitive reasons behind the decline in L andN due to the increase
in H̄ (such that H̄ ′ > H̄) is discussed in Appendix A3.51.
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Similarly, when the increase in the compulsory housework time is higher than the optimal
amount of home time (at e0) such that H̄
′
> H∗0 , the woman will exit the labour market (i.e.,
this case is similar to Figure 3.4 above).
Figure 3.5: Illustration of allocation of time with new-born children (H∗0 > H̄
′ > H̄ > H∗1 )
  
 















   
 
  
   
  
  
Source: Author’s own presentation.
Therefore, the incorporation of H̄ ′ as an additional constraint in the Gronau model can lead
to two possible solutions: optimal solution at e4 (in Figure 3.5, where a working woman
continues to participate in the labour market), and sub-optimal solution at e3 (in Figure 3.4
where a working woman exits the labour market).
In the above theoretical framework, the shifts in the H̄ can be explained by a fertility shock.
I am going to use this theoretical framework to situate my empirical analysis. In particular,
I examine the impact of an exogenous change in female fertility on female labour market
outcomes. In doing so, I exploit two instruments for the fertility variable, namely, twins and
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first-born girl. The instruments are used to control for the endogeneity in the fertility variable.
In this analysis, the fertility variable comprises of two age groups of children: young children,
below 6 years of age and school-aged children between the ages of 6–17.
3.4. Data and descriptive statistics
The Human Development Survey (IHDS) is considered more suitable for this study than
the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) because the latter does not have information on
wages or salaries. In contrast, the IHDS survey comprises of information on socio-economic
conditions of households including educational status, employment, income, consumption
expenditure and social capital. The survey covers all 28 states and 5 union territories of India,
but excludes the 2 union territories of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.
I use the latest 2011 Human Development Survey dataset (IHDS-II) in this study to capture
the latest information on the fertility of the women.
The sample comprises 15,790 women aged between 18 and 62 years. I consider two sepa-
rate non-overlapping independent female sub-samples with dependent children: one sample
is comprised of women who are aged between 18–54 and have only young children (be-
low the age of 6); the other sample is comprised of women who are aged between 18–62
and have school-aged children (between the ages of 6–17). There are 6,277 women having
solely young children and 9,513 women having solely school-aged children.36 All the eligible
women have at least one child.37 Twin births are identified using the month and year of birth
of the children. Only 1.09% of mothers have twin children in the whole sample (0.86% in
the sample of women with young children, 1.24% in the sample of women with school-aged
children). In contrast, 46% of the mothers have a first-born girl in the whole sample (48% in
the sample of women with young children, 45% in the sample of women with school-aged
36I do not consider the sample of women who have a combination of both young and school-aged children as
this sample of women may pick up a different and contaminated fertility effect of all types of children.
37IHDS has interviewed all eligible women who are aged 15 or above.
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children).
















No. of children 1.87 2.93 1.86 1.07 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.87 19.33 18.87 0.46 (0.36)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.45 0.39 0.45 -0.06 (0.10)
Age of mother 31.51 33.45 31.49 1.97 (0.00)
Age at marriage 18.59 18.93 18.58 0.35 (0.28)
Married 0.97 0.97 0.97 -0.00 (0.94)
Widowed & divorced 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 (0.94)
No education 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.01 (0.82)
Primary 0.15 0.12 0.15 -0.03 (0.24)
Secondary 0.37 0.35 0.37 -0.02 (0.61)
Post sec. education 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.02 (0.36)
Graduate education 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.02 (0.45)
OBC 0.35 0.31 0.35 -0.04 (0.26)
Hindu Brahmin 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 (0.56)
Hindu Forward 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.03 (0.31)
SC and ST 0.29 0.26 0.29 -0.03 (0.45)
Muslim 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.01 (0.68)
Christian and others 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 (0.41)
Urban 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.01 (0.77)
Childhood in urban 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.03 (0.28)
Market participation rate 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.02 (0.66)
Market work hours 332.16 350.05 331.96 18.08 (0.75)
Observations 15,790 172 15,618 15,790
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p-values. The overall share of women who are doing part-
time jobs is 77%. Part-time work included: 240-1,984 hours. Full-time work includes 2,000-
4,000 hours. Only 0.2% of participating women have reported that they have worked for 4,000
hours on an annual basis.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Almost all the women (i.e., 97%) are married, while 3% are either divorced or widowed (see
Table 3.1). The average age of women is 31.5 years. Thirty-five percent of the women belong
to households who are from Other Backward Classes (OBC), 5% are Brahmins, 18% belong
to Forward class, 29% of the women are Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST)
members, 11% are Muslims and the remaining 3% of the women are Christian, Buddhist,
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Jain, Sikh and from other religion. The majority of women (i.e., 66%) reside in rural areas.
Almost half the women in the sample own lands as property, and the average regional hourly
wage is 18 rupees.38 A quarter of women participate in the labour market, of which 77% have
part-time jobs with annual hours of work ranging between 240 and 1,990 hours, while 23%
of women have full-time jobs with annual hours of work ranging between 2,000 and 4,000
hours.39
Table 3.2 reveals that out of the 3,987 working women, 48% work in the agricultural sector
(60% of rural women are agricultural workers, while only 11% are such workers in urban
areas). The remaining employment sectors in which the working women are engaged include
business, official (i.e., formal), manufacturing and other menial work. Although the majority
of the working women are engaged in the agricultural sector in rural areas, the average annual
working hour is highest in the official (i.e., formal) sector. In urban areas, the majority of the
working women are engaged in the official (i.e., formal) sector, where the average annual
working hour is found to be the highest (i.e., 2,150 annual hours).
38The country is segmented into five regions, namely Northern, North eastern, Central, Eastern, Western and
Southern.
39In the IHDS-II women sample, 8 out of 3,987 (i.e., 0.2%) participating women have reported that they have
worked for 4,000 hours or more on an annual basis. Hence, in the dataset, the reported 4,000 or more hours
are capped to 4,000 hours. Further information on average hours worked per week by female workers as
self-employees, regular wage or salaried employees and casual labours are available from GOI (2019) (refer
to Statement 26, p. 77). Considering all economic activities, the statistics show that the average number of
hours worked in a week for regular wage or salaried female employees (casual female labour) is 50 (39) in
rural areas and 52.6 (42) in urban areas.
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Participation Rate 25.25 17.03 29.56
Agriculture 48.33 11.03 59.60 1046.02 1281.71 1032.85
Business 18.69 12.32 20.61 976.41 1680.03 849.29
Official 14.85 32.43 9.54 2109.44 2149.99 2067.77
Manufacturing 9.73 19.35 6.83 1646.64 1781.02 1531.55
Other 8.40 24.86 3.43 1832.87 1888.93 1710.08
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 1315.48 1860.01 1150.98
Total participation 3,987 925 3,062 3,987 925 3,062
Total by area 15,790 5,430 10,360 15,790 5,430 10,360
Notes: Participation rate is calculated by total number of women participating in the labour market divided by to-
tal number of women in the sample.
Further statistics on percentage distribution of female workers in usual status and subsidiary status by broad indus-
try division from 1997–78 to 2017–18 are available from GOI (2019) (refer to Statement 16 in the report).
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
3.4.1. Dependent variable
Female labour market participation is a binary variable denoted by LFPi for the ith woman:
FLPi =
1 if women in paid work in the last 12 months
0 if women not in paid work in the last 12 months

In this study I consider women who are working in paid jobs outside home. It is not feasible
to provide empirical insights of what unpaid work the women routinely do at home in family
enterprises (such as livestock or poultry farming, fishing, supplying production in neighbour-
hood grocery stores, making small items for sale, growing fruit and vegetables for sale etc.)
because of limited information in the dataset. Hence, I have kept the model simple to enable
testing its predictions using the available data on paid work of the women.
The annual hours of market-work are the number of hours of paid work undertaken by women
in the labour market in the last 12 months.
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3.4.2. Explanatory variables
The primary explanatory variable, i.e., fertility, is measured by the number of children born
and currently residing with the women. I categorise the sample of women into two groups:
women who have children below the age of 6 (defined as young children), and the sample of
women who have children between the ages of 6 to 17 (defined as school-aged children).
The economic determinants of labour market outcomes are wage rate and family wealth. The
average regional hourly wage earned by the women is calculated as follows: India is broadly
divided into six regions: northern, north-eastern, central, eastern, western and southern. The
hourly wage is averaged by the wage rate prevailing in these regions. I use the natural log-
arithm of the regional wage rates in the empirical analysis. The regional wage rates are
considered exogenous, but it is acknowledged that there is limited variation in the empirical
values within the measure.
Land ownership by the households is considered as a proxy measure for family wealth. There
are two reasons behind considering land ownership as the wealth measure. First, there are
limited data on husbands’ incomes. Second, more than 60% of the women are from rural
households and hold property in the form of land.
The demographic variables comprising of women and household specific characteristics (de-
noted byX1i) include the age at marriage, the current age of the women, marital status, urban
place of residence, urban childhood place of residence, educational attainment (completed
primary, secondary, post-secondary or graduation; no education is considered as the base cat-
egory), caste (Brahmin, Forward Class, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBC, Muslim,
Christians and other). The states of India are categorised into six regions: Northern, North-
Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern, the latter of which is considered as base
category in the regression analysis.
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3.4.3. Empirical relationship between fertility and female labour market outcomes
The empirical relationship between the number of children and female labour market out-
comes are presented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below.
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Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation.
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The vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. The graphs depict the empirical
relationship between fertility and female labour market participation; this is negative for those
women who have only young children, especially in urban India (see Figure 3.6, Panel C).
The participation rate among rural women rises with the increase in the number of young
children, but it drastically declines for women who have more than four young children (see
Figure 3.6, Panel E). For the overall sample of women who have only school-aged children,
the participation rate remains between 20-40% (see Figure 3.6, Panel B). The participation
rate remains stable around 25% for urban women with school-aged children (see Figure 3.6,
Panel D), and it is independent of the number of school-aged children. However, for rural
women the participation rate remains higher than for urban women and remains more or less
stable but slightly below 50% (see Figure 3.6, Panel F).
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Figure 3.7: Empirical relationship between fertility and the IHDS-II women’s average annual
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Source: Estimates based on author’s own calculations.
The vertical bars again represent the 95% confidence intervals. The graphs show that the
relationship between fertility and average annual hours of labour supply by women is negative
for the sample of women who have young children in both urban and in rural areas (see Figure
3.7, Panels A, C and E respectively). For women with 4 young children, the average annual
hours of labour supply in the market is less than 1,000 hours (see Figure 3.7, Panel A),
whereas it never falls below 1,000 hours for women with school-aged children (see Figure
3.7, Panel B). For the overall sample of women with school-aged children, annual hours of
labour supply keep declining below 1,500 hours with each additional child (see Figure 3.7,
Panel B). Compared to the sample of women with young children, the average annual hours
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of labour supply for women having school-aged children remains higher in both urban and
rural areas (see Figure 3.7, comparing Panel C with Panel D; Panel E with Panel F).
In summary, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 reveal that the relationships between fertility and women’s
labour market outcomes are negative for the sample of women with young children, which is
prominently visible in urban areas.
3.5. Identification strategy
The primary variable of interest in this study is the number of children which is potentially
endogenous with respect to the selected labour market outcomes (i.e., participation in the
labour market and annual hours of labour supply in the market). This is because the unob-
served individual preference may influence fertility as well as the selected outcomes. For
example, the parental desire for having a male child can influence both fertility and labour
market outcomes. This desire for having a son increases the family size and simultaneously
reduces the likelihood of female participation in the labour market when the child is young.
Without accounting for such unobserved parental choices, the estimated coefficient of fertility
may be subjected to omitted variable bias.
On the other hand, the selected outcomes may also influence fertility decisions (Smith-Lovin
and Tickamyer, 1978). For example, the poor economic condition of a family may necessitate
a woman to participate in the labour market; in turn, this may compel a woman to choose a
smaller number of children to facilitate her labour market participation. This is a case of
reverse causality and, therefore, the estimated coefficient of fertility will be subjected to
simultaneity bias.
Therefore, in order to examine the causal impact of fertility on female labour market out-
comes, I exploit the exogenous variation in fertility using two separate instruments that are
considered suitable in the Indian context, namely twins and first-born girl.
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In the Indian context, twins can be considered as an exogenous instrument for two main
reasons. First, the Pre-natal Diagnostic Technique Act (PNDT) has made foetal-sex detection
illegal in India (Kumar and Kugler, 2017). Second, according to the medical literature, in
vitro fertilisation can increase the chances of twin births. However, such a procedure is
expensive and strictly unaffordable for the type of households in the sample where the major
share of women are working in the agricultural sector, and the average hourly regional wage
is 18 rupees.
However, the instrument may not be free of caveats. It is possible that twin births have an
independent effect on women’s health. In the IHDS-II survey dataset, there is a variable
describing a woman’s general health conditions across five criteria: ‘very good’, ‘good’,
‘okay’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’. I have used this woman’s general health information to test
the proposition that twin births exert an independent effect on the health of a woman. I regress
a woman’s general health condition on twin births and a set of control variables that include:
the number of children residing with mothers, regional wage, unearned income (land), age
of women, square age of women, education of women, place of residence (urban or rural),
caste, regions of India. The sample is comprised of women who are aged between 18-54 and
only have young children (i.e., those are aged between the ages of 0-5). The estimated effect
of twins on a woman’s health outcomes is not found to be statistically significant (t-ratio =
1.1) suggesting the birth of twins does not adversely affect a mother’s health.
In addition, the estimated effect of twins on female labour market participation and hours of
labour supply is not found to be statistically significant for the entire sample (t-ratio = 0.14,
1.88 respectively) suggesting the birth of twins does not adversely affect a mother’s labour
supply outcomes directly.
In addition, it is acknowledged that the ‘shock’ of having twins may impose additional costs
on households but these costs are unlikely to be alleviated by the mother participating or
working longer hours in the labour market as suggested by this finding. The costs are more
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likely to be off-set by other members of the household participating in the labour market.
However, this is a conjecture and cannot be formally tested but is clearly something that
requires investigation as part of an agenda for future research.
The validity of the second instrument, i.e., the first-born girl, can be analysed as follows.
Given the strong preference for sons among Indian parents, a woman with a first-born girl
may prefer to have a male child. Hence, first-born girl is likely to increase the number of
children for a woman. With regard to the orthogonality (i.e., exogeneity) of the instrument,
however, there could be an issue with first-born girl. For example, mothers generally benefit
from having a first-born girl because a girl is likely to take care of her younger siblings and
several household chores thus, freeing their mothers for market work. However, the empirical
findings do not support this hypothesis. Using the given sample under study, I find that the
impact of first-born girl on women’s labour market participation is statistically insignificant.
This could be because freeing mothers to work outside home requires a girl to be at least a
teenager if not an adult. Therefore, the gender of the first-born child can be considered as a
valid instrument in the Indian context. Nevertheless, there could be an alternative issue with
first-born girl. For example, having or not having a first-born girl could be influenced by
unobservable parental preferences. Parents may choose to abort a girl child before the birth
of the first child. Although such information is not available in the given dataset even then it
can be argued, especially in the Indian context, that the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques act
(PNDT) has made foetal-sex detection illegal in India (Kumar and Kugler, 2017); this makes
abortion legally a difficult choice for Indian parents.40
The orthogonality condition for a set of instruments comprising of twins and first-born girl is
tested using Hansen-J statistics. This is discussed in the results section.
40Abortion through illegal channels could prove costly for rural women who may be left with no choice but to
give birth. However, after giving birth, there are potential possibilities that women may prefer giving away
their girl children to those who want to adopt children through special organisations or hospitals. In the
presence of such possibilities, the first-born girl may not be a valid instrument. In this analysis, I therefore
assume that there are no such possibilities as these are beyond the scope of the current investigation.
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To examine the causal impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes, the first stage
regression equation for the number of children residing with the ith woman can be expressed
as,
Ci = γ0 + γ1IVi + γ2Wi + ΓX
′
i + ωi, (3.10)
where i = 1, 2, ...., n; IVi denotes the instrumental variables for fertility (i.e., twins and first-
born girl) corresponding to the ith woman. These instruments are dummy variables and are
assigned a value of one if the respective event occurs, otherwise, a value of zero is assigned;
Wi is the regional hourly wage. VectorXi is the set of characteristics relating to the ith woman
and her household, and ωi is the error term.
The primary equation of policy interest can be written as,
yij = δ0 + δ1Ĉi + δ2Wi + ∆X
′
i + ξij, (3.11)
where yij is the j th labour market outcome for the ith woman, Ĉi is predicted values for the
number of children obtained from the first stage regression equation (Equation 3.10) and
ξij is the error term. Assuming that the orthogonality and the relevance conditions of the
instruments are satisfied, the estimated coefficient δ1 gives the causal impact of fertility on
the selected outcomes.
3.6. Results
My empirical analysis is conditional on the two age-groups of children: 0–5 and 6–17. The
focus on these two different age-groups provides a good opportunity of identifying the un-
ambiguous effects on female labour market outcomes of fertility decisions. There is likely to
be heterogeneity in the effects of fertility on labour market outcomes for these two groups. In
particular, the 0–5 age-group is anticipated to give negative effects while the 6–17 age-group
is likely to yield positive effects. By considering the two groups separately, it is possible to
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obtain unambiguous effects for these two heterogeneous groups.
In contrast, if one uses the whole age-group (i.e., those with children aged between 0–18
years) is not able to untangle these two unambiguous effects because there is a good chance
that opposite effects may cancel each other.
This study primarily aims to examine whether having young children (school-aged children)
has negative (positive) impacts on female labour market outcomes. The economic variables,
such as wage rate and unearned family wealth, also feature as a key part of the theoretical
framework. The wage rate captures the opportunity cost of engaging in domestic household
production activity by the woman. Therefore, it is relevant to comment on the impact of the
wage rate on female labour market outcomes, although it is acknowledged that the main focus
of the research is on the fertility effect. In addition to these variables, I have also controlled for
the demographic characteristics that are likely to influence female labour market outcomes.
The empirical results are presented in the following sub-section. The columns of the tables
differ depending on the outcome variables and the econometric methodology used. In the
second columns of the tables, I report the estimates using a linear probability model (LPM)
for female labour market participation outcome, and in the third columns of the tables, I
report the estimates using a ordinary least squares (OLS) method for women’s annual hours
of labour supply outcome. From the fourth to ninth columns, I report the estimates using an
instrumental variable analysis (using the instruments: twins, first girl and the combination of
both the instruments) for the two labour market outcomes.
3.6.1. Main results
Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes:
At first, I look at OLS results to examine the association between fertility and the female
labour market outcomes. Table 3.3 reveals that, on average, an additional young child re-
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duces the probability of female labour market participation by 1 percentage point while it
reduces female labour supply by 25 hours annually on average. These results are statisti-
cally significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. These estimates reveal that there is a
negative association between young children and female labour market outcomes.
Before examining the causal relationship between fertility and labour market outcome, let us
look at the economic and demographic variables that are likely to influence the labour market
outcomes.
Since wage rate plays a crucial role in influencing women’s labour market participation de-
cision, it becomes important to test its implications. The empirical results in Table 3.3 reveal
that a 1% increase in the wage rate increases the chance of female labour market participa-
tion by 0.30 of a percentage point, and it increases the female labour supply by 5 hours on
average annually. These results are statistically significant at 1% level. The results show that
the wage rate meaningfully captures its positive impact on women’s labour market outcomes,
which is consistent with the developed country literature.
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Table 3.3: 2SLS: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01∗ -25.14∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -201.85∗∗∗ -0.05 -94.09 -0.10∗∗∗ -176.84∗∗∗
(0.01) (11.02) (0.03) (29.74) (0.08) (128.43) (0.03) (37.57)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.30∗∗∗ 507.13∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 528.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 515.43∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 525.39∗∗∗
(0.09) (132.75) (0.09) (134.40) (0.09) (133.98) (0.09) (134.00)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.05∗∗∗ -78.79∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -84.23∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -80.91∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -83.46∗∗∗
(0.01) (16.24) (0.01) (16.56) (0.01) (16.62) (0.01) (16.46)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -5.23∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -14.36∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -8.80 -0.01∗∗∗ -13.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.60) (0.00) (3.00) (0.00) (7.08) (0.00) (3.20)
Age of mother 0.01 16.09 0.04∗∗∗ 63.41∗∗∗ 0.02 34.56 0.04∗∗∗ 56.72∗∗∗
(0.01) (14.98) (0.01) (15.63) (0.02) (37.41) (0.01) (17.01)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.06 -0.00∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.34 -0.00∗∗ -0.67∗∗
(0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.30)
Married -0.20∗∗∗ -302.81∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -234.61∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -276.20∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -244.26∗∗∗
(0.05) (86.15) (0.05) (87.03) (0.06) (96.06) (0.05) (86.54)
Urban -0.08∗∗∗ -59.46∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -67.56∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -62.62∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -66.42∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.18) (0.01) (19.48) (0.01) (20.02) (0.01) (19.41)
Childhood in urban -0.01 -12.15 -0.01 -11.80 -0.01 -12.01 -0.01 -11.85
(0.01) (18.71) (0.01) (18.97) (0.01) (18.71) (0.01) (18.89)
Primary 0.00 1.05 0.00 3.85 0.00 2.14 0.00 3.45
(0.02) (22.64) (0.02) (23.16) (0.02) (22.75) (0.02) (23.01)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -82.48∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -98.77∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -88.84∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -96.46∗∗∗
(0.01) (18.20) (0.01) (18.72) (0.02) (21.99) (0.01) (18.82)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ -65.28∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -99.19∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -78.51∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -94.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.26) (0.02) (25.91) (0.02) (36.53) (0.02) (26.63)
Graduate education 0.01 163.13∗∗∗ -0.01 120.16∗∗∗ 0.00 146.36∗∗∗ -0.01 126.24∗∗∗
(0.02) (39.22) (0.02) (39.05) (0.03) (50.26) (0.02) (39.69)
Brahmin -0.03∗ -63.29∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -67.97∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -65.12∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -67.31∗∗
(0.02) (29.29) (0.02) (29.54) (0.02) (29.23) (0.02) (29.39)
Forward -0.03∗∗ -41.47∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -36.51∗ -0.03∗∗ -39.53∗ -0.03∗∗ -37.21∗
(0.01) (20.05) (0.01) (20.36) (0.01) (20.41) (0.01) (20.29)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 66.19∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 74.19∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 69.31∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 73.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.88) (0.01) (18.25) (0.01) (18.79) (0.01) (18.18)
Muslim -0.07∗∗∗ -63.69∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -40.25∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -54.54∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -43.57∗
(0.01) (21.22) (0.01) (22.24) (0.02) (27.16) (0.01) (22.25)
Christian and others -0.02 2.86 -0.02 -4.06 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 -3.09
(0.03) (53.71) (0.03) (53.59) (0.03) (53.66) (0.03) (53.53)
Observations 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
R-squared 0.080 0.057 0.0580 0.0223 0.0763 0.0519 0.0635 0.0315
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (married versus divorced and
widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation
and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered
as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
A general theoretical model of labour supply proposes that an increase in unearned household
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wealth discourages women from labour market participation. Since, more that 60% of women
are from rural settlements, I use land ownership as a proxy measure for unearned household
wealth. The empirical results in Table 3.3 reveal that, on average, having land reduces the
probability of female labour market participation by 5 percentage points (see second column)
and the annual labour supply in the market by 79 hours on average (see third column).41
These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. These negative impacts of unearned
wealth on Indian female labour market outcomes are consistent with the labour economics
literature of advanced countries.
I now move on to the other relevant demographic characteristics, such as age of women,
marital status, place of residence, education, religion and caste. Caste is considered relevant
in this analysis because the administrative caste categories is likely to play an important role
in determining female labour market participation in India (Eswaran et al., 2013).
The result in Table 3.3 reveals that the women’s age does not seem to have any impact on
women’s labour market participation when their children are young.42
Married women are 20 percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market com-
pared to widowed or divorced women. Similarly, married women work for 303 hours less
per year on average compared to those who are widowed and divorced. Women in urban
settlements are 8 percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market and work
for 59 hours less annually compared to women in rural settlements.
There are five categories for women’s educational attainments, such as no education, primary
education (year 1–5), secondary education (year 6-10), post secondary (year 11-12 and some
undergraduate level education), graduate (year 15 and higher education). Women having 15
41Land ownership is considered as an exogenous variable in this analysis because 66% of women are from rural
settlements who hold property as land. Land as property is generally inherited over generations.
42For the sample of women with young children, the turning point for the impact of female age on labour
market participation is not statistically significant. I have used post-estimation ‘nlcom’ command to test
this non-linear proposition as follows: H0 : b[mother age]/2 × (−b[mother age squared]) = 0 against H1 :
b[mother age]/2× (−b[mother age squared]) 6= 0.
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or more years of education are assumed to have completed their under-graduate degree and
hence are categorised as graduates. Women with graduate level education, on average, have
null effect on labour market participation but they work, on average, 163 hours more in the
labour market on an annual basis compared to women having no educational qualification
at all. This is reasonable because higher educated women are likely to be more ambitious
towards jobs fulfilments and are likely to work for longer hours to fulfil the job requirements.
These women with graduate level education are likely to work in the official (i.e., formal)
employment sector (see Appendix Table A3.26).
In India, the administrative caste groups play a vital role in determining female labour market
outcomes (Eswaran et al., 2013). Brahmin and Forward Class enjoy many socio-economic
advantages, such as in education and occupations whereas Scheduled Castes (SC), Schedule
Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) experience many disadvantages in terms
of education, income, religious practices and territories of residence. Among these disad-
vantaged groups, SCs are socially oppressed groups and are called ’ex-untouchable’ jatis or
Dalits. SC group does not fall in the Indian ‘varna’ system and they are therefore called
‘avarnas’. They are considered so low that they are considered unfit to be given a varna
(Deshpande, 2011). STs (known as Adivasis) are geographically isolated tribal group of peo-
ple. Government of India has geographically isolated STs in order to protect and preserve
their original culture (Deshpande, 2013).43 OBCs are known as ‘sudras’ who fall within the
‘varna’ system but are placed in the lowest category of the system. OBCs have prospered
overtime. Their economic condition has improved over time through social mobility in their
occupations and in political standing (Deshpande, 2011, 2013).44Hence, the participation of
women belonging to SC/ST and OBC are expected to be higher compared to Brahmins and
Forward Class. Again, compared to OBC women, the SC and ST women are likely to partic-
43Chapter 4 discusses on the caste system in India in further details.
44Within OBC groups, there is a ‘creamy layer’ OBC group of people who have better economic conditions and
hence, they are not eligible for government-sponsored educational and professional benefit programmes that
are implemented for economically backward group of people.
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ipate more in the labour market as they are from poorer economic environment.
The findings in Table 3.3 support this characterisation and reveal that SC/ST women are 7
percentage points more likely to participate in the labour market compared to OBC women.
Similarly, women from the General category, such as Brahmin and Forward Class, are 3
percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market compared to women from
OBC households. The results are statistically significant at the conventional levels. In terms
of hours of work, SC/ST women work 66 more hours than OBC women on an annual basis,
whereas Brahmin (Forward Class) women work approximately 63 (41) fewer hours on an
annual basis compared to OBC women, at any given wage rate.45
Causal impact of young children on women’s labour market outcomes:
Before interpreting the 2SLS results in Table 3.3, let us first look at the empirical results on
validity of the instruments (see Appendix Tables A3.38). The first three columns of the table
report the first stage regression results for the sample of women with young children (i.e.,
it depict the regression equation where the fertility variable is regressed on the instrumental
variables). The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics are 195 and 51 respectively for twins and
first-born girl respectively. These F-statistics are sufficiently larger than the rule-of-thumb
of 10 for relevance and they confirm that the two identifying instruments are relevant for IV
analysis. The Hansen J statistic for the combined instruments in the young children sample is
0.358 (0.655) for the participation (hours of labour supply) outcome, with the corresponding
Chi-square p-value being 0.550 (0.418). This explains that the two instruments are orthogonal
to the error process in the structural equation of primary policy interest (i.e., Equation 3.11)
and thus comprise a valid set of over-identifying instruments.
Using a 2SLS procedure (see Table 3.3), I find that an additional young child, on average,
reduces the probability of female labour market participation by 10–11 percentage points
45Wage rate offered to women belonging to different caste groups are more or less similar in rural areas. How-
ever, in urban areas, the wage rate received by Brahmin and Forward class women are slightly higher than that
received by the lower classes.
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and reduces the annual hours of labour supply by approximately 176–202 hours on average.
These results are statistically significant at the 1% level.46 Two stage least squares estimates
are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. This is because in an instrumental variable
(IV) analysis we identify average effects for sub-populations that are induced by the instru-
ments.47
Estimates using probit and tobit models are presented in Appendix Table A3.40), I find the
estimates of fertility are statistical insignificant.
It is difficult to determine exactly why the estimates between the LPM and 2SLS models and
the probit and tobit models differ in magnitude and statistical significance. However, a key
issue is that the latter maximum likelihood models are more vulnerable to mis-specification
than the OLS-based models. This is particularly so in regard to the violation of the assump-
tions for normality and homoscedasticity, both central to the specification of the probit and
tobit models. The violation of these assumptions will lead to inconsistency and inefficiency in
the maximum likelihood estimates and this may partly explain the differences in the estimates
obtained using these contrasting econometric methods.
Effect of school-age children on women’s labour market outcomes:
Table 3.4 reveals that the school-aged children has null effects on female labour market out-
comes (refer to the second and third columns).
In regard to the economic variables, the empirical results reveal that a 1% increase in the
46By considering a sample of women who have a combination of 0–5 and 6–17 year old children, I find same
negative impact of fertility on female labour market participation. There are 5,287 women in this sample. Us-
ing twins, the 2SLS result shows that an additional child, on average, reduces the probability of female labour
market participation by 11 percentage points; statistically significant at the 1 percent level (see Appendix Ta-
ble A3.50). This finding confirms that the trade-off between fertility and female labour market participation is
evident in the presence of young children. It would also be interesting to examine how the presence of older
children (18 years or above) may affect the female labour market outcomes, following Heath (2017). How-
ever, the current identification strategy does not allow for this and this could be examined using a different
dataset and by developing an alternative identification strategy.
47Heckman procedure may control for the selection of women into the labour market but it does not allow for
instrumenting the fertility variable to examine its causal impacts. The recent STATA command ‘egress’ that
allows for such instrumentation, however, does not produce estimates based on unconditional means.
112
wage rate increases the likelihood of labour market participation of women having school-
aged children by 0.68 of a percentage point (see the second column). Similarly, 1% increase
in the wage rate is associated with an increase of approximately 11 hours of labour supply in
the market on an annual basis (see the third column). These results are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Wealth is expected to have a negative impact on female labour market outcomes. The findings
in Table 3.4 support our prediction and confirm that the ownership of land reduces female
labour market participation by 10 percentage points. In addition, it reduces the annual labour
supply by 225 hours on average. These findings are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We now look at the demographic variables. Age of women has positive association with
women’s labour market outcomes. The results in Table 3.4 show that an increase in a year
of women’s age increases their labour market participation by 1 percentage point and annual
hours of labour supply by 43 hours on average, when they have school-aged children. These
results are statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels. The turning point for the impact
of female age on labour market participation is 46.52 years for women with school-aged
children (statistically significant at 1% level). Married women who have school-aged children
are 26 percentage points less likely to participate in the labour market compared to widowed
and divorced women. Similarly, married women work for approximately 626 hours less
on an annual basis compared to those who are widowed and divorced. Women residing in
urban areas with school-aged children are 17 percentage points less likely to participate in
the labour market and work for 164 hours less annually compared to those residing in rural
areas. Women with graduate level education work in the labour market for approximately
250 more hours on an annual basis compared to those who have no educational attainment
at all. Women with school-aged children work for longer hours (see Table 3.4) than women
with young children (see Table 3.3). This is fairly reasonable because mothers are likely to
have more time to work when their children are older.
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SC/ST women are 14 percentage points more likely to participate in the labour market com-
pared to OBC women. Similarly, Brahmin (Forward Class) women are 11 (9) percentage
points less likely to participate in the labour market compared to OBC women. On average,
SC/ST women work 192 hours more on an annual basis than OBC women whereas Brahmin
(Forward Class) women work 87 (85) fewer hours on an annual basis than women belonging
to the OBC category at any given wage rate.
Causal impact of school-aged children on female labour market outcomes:
Before interpreting the results, we first look at the empirical test for the validity of the instru-
ments (see Appendices A3.38). The last three columns of Appendices A3.38 reports the first
stage regression results for the sample of women with school-aged children (i.e., the regres-
sion of fertility variable on the instruments). The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics are 167
and 239 respectively for twins and first-born girl and are sufficiently larger than the rule-of-
thumb of 10 for relevance, confirming that these two over-identifying instruments are relevant
for analysis. The Hansen J statistic for the combined instruments in the school-aged children
sample is 0.062 (0.156) for the participation (hours of labour supply) outcome, with the cor-
responding Chi-square p-value is 0.803 (0.693). The Chi-square p-value for the participation
outcome is large but less than 0.9.
The 2SLS results, using combined instruments, reveal that having a school-aged child in-
creases the probability of female labour market participation by 4 percentage points (see the
fifth column of Table 3.4). This result is statistically significant at the 10% level. However,
we may need to take precautions while interpreting this result because the Chi-square p-value
for Hansen J statistic is large although less than 0.9 for the sample of women with school-aged
children (see Appendix Table A3.38).
Estimates using probit and tobit models are presented in Appendix Table A3.41), I find the
estimates of fertility are statistical insignificant. The reason for this difference is same as
discussed earlier.
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In the rest of the tables, results relating to the effect of fertility and the economic variables,
namely regional wage rate and land ownership, are interpreted.
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Table 3.4: 2SLS: Effect of school-aged children on female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01 -11.09 0.03 42.71 0.05 75.44 0.04∗ 62.04
(0.01) (8.19) (0.04) (64.49) (0.03) (54.52) (0.02) (42.50)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.68∗∗∗ 1112.58∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1182.22∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 1224.59∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 1207.24∗∗∗
(0.07) (129.34) (0.09) (155.52) (0.09) (147.76) (0.08) (141.52)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.10∗∗∗ -225.40∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.54∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.62∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.59∗∗∗
(0.01) (18.37) (0.01) (18.39) (0.01) (18.45) (0.01) (18.42)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗∗∗ -4.20∗ -0.00 -2.55 -0.00 -1.54 -0.00∗ -1.95
(0.00) (2.45) (0.00) (3.12) (0.00) (2.98) (0.00) (2.77)
Age of mother 0.01∗∗ 42.68∗∗∗ 0.00 27.40 -0.00 18.10 0.00 21.91
(0.01) (11.43) (0.01) (21.21) (0.01) (19.27) (0.01) (16.44)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.50∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.29 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.22
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.22)
Married -0.26∗∗∗ -626.29∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -644.49∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -655.56∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -651.03∗∗∗
(0.02) (48.60) (0.03) (53.08) (0.02) (52.39) (0.02) (50.84)
Urban -0.17∗∗∗ -164.05∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -161.83∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -160.49∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -161.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.09) (0.01) (21.25) (0.01) (21.32) (0.01) (21.22)
Childhood in urban -0.04∗∗∗ -53.54∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -54.15∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -54.52∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -54.37∗∗∗
(0.01) (20.44) (0.01) (20.46) (0.01) (20.50) (0.01) (20.48)
Primary -0.08∗∗∗ -62.79∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -56.98∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -53.45∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -54.89∗∗
(0.01) (22.01) (0.01) (22.97) (0.01) (22.82) (0.01) (22.46)
Secondary -0.19∗∗∗ -197.64∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -187.32∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -181.04∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -183.61∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.99) (0.01) (23.19) (0.01) (22.30) (0.01) (21.29)
Post sec. education -0.15∗∗∗ -54.04 -0.14∗∗∗ -33.95 -0.13∗∗∗ -21.73 -0.13∗∗∗ -26.74
(0.02) (36.98) (0.02) (43.74) (0.02) (42.00) (0.02) (39.94)
Graduate education 0.00 250.33∗∗∗ 0.02 272.15∗∗∗ 0.02 285.43∗∗∗ 0.02 279.99∗∗∗
(0.02) (48.17) (0.03) (54.78) (0.03) (53.19) (0.02) (51.26)
Brahmin -0.11∗∗∗ -86.98∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -84.56∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -83.09∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -83.69∗∗
(0.02) (33.20) (0.02) (33.40) (0.02) (33.64) (0.02) (33.48)
Forward -0.09∗∗∗ -84.75∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -77.27∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -72.73∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -74.59∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.02) (0.01) (22.79) (0.01) (22.45) (0.01) (21.87)
SC and ST 0.14∗∗∗ 191.65∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 187.16∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 184.42∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 185.54∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.87) (0.01) (20.54) (0.01) (20.32) (0.01) (20.13)
Muslim -0.13∗∗∗ -143.98∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -163.93∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -176.07∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -171.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.66) (0.02) (34.83) (0.02) (33.15) (0.02) (30.29)
Christian and others -0.12∗∗∗ -108.57∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -101.17∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -96.66∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -98.51∗
(0.02) (50.05) (0.03) (50.99) (0.03) (50.83) (0.03) (50.58)
Observations 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513
R-squared 0.196 0.152 0.191 0.149 0.187 0.143 0.189 0.146
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (married versus divorced and
widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation
and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as
base category, land (unearned wealth) and the regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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3.6.2. Heterogeneity by types of settlement: Urban versus rural areas
The descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A3.26 show that in urban areas, 23% of women
with a graduate level educational qualification participate in the labour market. This rate is
similar (24.5%) to that for rural women with a graduate level educational qualification. The
lack of quality and affordable childcare facilities in formal employment sector occupations
could render participation in the labour market by highly educated mothers a less preferred
option.
In contrast, 31% of urban women among those with no academic qualifications participate
in the labour market (see Appendix Table A3.26). This rate for rural women is 41% (32%
higher than in urban areas). The higher participation rates among uneducated rural women
could potentially be due to poor socio-economic conditions of the households, which could
be driving them into the labour market (Eswaran et al., 2013; Papanek, 1979). These rural
women work primarily in informal agricultural occupations where there are no restrictions
on taking children to work. In addition, 66% of the overall sample of women live in rural
areas. Therefore, it would be plausible to assume that school-aged children are less likely to
impose negative consequences on female labour market outcomes, whereas young children
may still have negative impacts on the selected outcomes because of childcare requirements.
The heterogeneity of empirical results by type of settlement (i.e. urban and rural settlements)
is presented in Tables 3.5–3.8. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 (Tables 3.7 and 3.8) present the results for
urban (rural) women with young and school-aged children respectively.
In urban areas, Table 3.5 reveals that there is a negative association between having young
children and female labour market outcomes. On average, an additional young child reduces
the probability of an urban woman’s labour market participation by 2 percentage points (sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level), and it reduces the annual labour supply by 38 hours on
average (statistically significant at the 10% level).
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The 2SLS results reveal that an additional young child, on average, reduces the probability
of female labour market participation by 12–13 percentage points, and it reduces the annual
labour supply by 231–234 hours on average. These results are statistically significant at the
1% level.
In urban settlements, for women having young children, a 1% increase in the wage rate
increases the probability of female labour market participation by 0.35 of a percentage point,
and it increases female labour supply by approximately 6 hours on an annual basis in urban
areas (see second and third columns of Table 3.5). These results are statistically significant
at the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: 2SLS: Effect of young children on urban female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.02∗∗ -38.06∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -233.66∗∗∗ -0.16 -214.43 -0.13∗∗∗ -230.76∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.39) (0.02) (42.74) (0.13) (274.16) (0.03) (55.07)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.35∗∗∗ 621.83∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 759.90∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 746.33∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 757.86∗∗∗
(0.11) (219.06) (0.11) (221.34) (0.15) (297.45) (0.11) (223.68)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 15.67 -0.00 2.01 -0.01 3.35 -0.00 2.21
(0.02) (49.01) (0.02) (49.39) (0.02) (52.48) (0.02) (49.39)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00 -1.09 -0.01∗∗ -12.26∗ -0.01 -11.17 -0.01∗∗ -12.10∗
(0.00) (5.86) (0.00) (6.44) (0.01) (16.97) (0.00) (6.81)
Age of mother 0.00 9.51 0.03∗∗ 52.17∗∗ 0.03 47.98 0.03∗∗ 51.54∗∗
(0.01) (24.59) (0.01) (23.12) (0.03) (64.39) (0.01) (24.71)
Age mother square 0.00 0.07 -0.00 -0.55 -0.00 -0.49 -0.00 -0.54
(0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.41)
Married -0.24∗∗∗ -386.36∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -333.60∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -338.78∗ -0.21∗∗ -334.38∗∗
(0.09) (164.02) (0.09) (163.73) (0.09) (173.85) (0.09) (163.10)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -27.91 -0.02 -33.99 -0.02 -33.39 -0.02 -33.90
(0.01) (29.01) (0.01) (29.37) (0.01) (30.89) (0.01) (29.45)
Primary -0.03 -58.16 -0.02 -55.51 -0.02 -55.77 -0.02 -55.55
(0.03) (60.10) (0.03) (60.73) (0.03) (60.63) (0.03) (60.70)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -140.19∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -157.79∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -156.06∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -157.53∗∗∗
(0.02) (48.55) (0.03) (49.48) (0.03) (55.81) (0.03) (49.68)
Post sec. education -0.09∗∗∗ -132.94∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -168.23∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -164.76∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -167.70∗∗∗
(0.03) (55.54) (0.03) (57.04) (0.04) (73.60) (0.03) (57.08)
Graduate education 0.02 103.03 -0.00 60.30 -0.01 64.50 -0.00 60.94
(0.03) (67.46) (0.03) (67.05) (0.04) (89.68) (0.03) (67.53)
Brahmin -0.05∗ -124.60∗∗ -0.05∗ -134.67∗∗ -0.06∗ -133.68∗∗ -0.05∗ -134.52∗∗
(0.03) (57.22) (0.03) (58.14) (0.03) (58.70) (0.03) (58.00)
Forward -0.02 -40.66 -0.02 -35.12 -0.02 -35.67 -0.02 -35.21
(0.02) (42.35) (0.02) (42.52) (0.02) (43.40) (0.02) (42.56)
SC and ST -0.02 -31.82 -0.02 -26.62 -0.01 -27.13 -0.01 -26.70
(0.02) (38.41) (0.02) (38.90) (0.02) (40.05) (0.02) (38.99)
Muslim -0.05∗∗∗ -70.29∗ -0.04∗∗ -54.00 -0.04∗ -55.60 -0.04∗∗ -54.24
(0.02) (38.97) (0.02) (40.04) (0.02) (47.44) (0.02) (40.41)
Christian and others 0.02 62.18 0.02 56.18 0.02 56.77 0.02 56.27
(0.05) (98.90) (0.05) (98.33) (0.05) (98.48) (0.05) (98.30)
Observations 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023
R-squared 0.061 0.059 0.028 0.030 0.0969 0.0349 0.0245 0.030
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (married versus divorced and
widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation
and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered
as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
In Table 3.6, school-aged children have no impact on female labour market participation and
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hours of labour supply in urban areas.
The economic factors seem to have impacts on the selected outcomes for urban women with
school-aged children. The table reveals that for an urban woman with school-aged children,
a 1% increase in wage rate increases the probability of female labour market participation by
0.70 of a percentage point, and it increases the annual female labour supply by 14 hours per
year on average (both are statistically significant at the 1% level). Land ownership reduces
the probability of female labour market participation by 4 percentage points, and it reduces
the annual female labour supply by 92 hours on average.
In the above two tables, we find evidence of negative impact of young children on female
labour supply outcomes in urban settlements. However, such negative impacts are unobserved
for school-aged children. A higher wage rate induces urban women to participate and work
for longer hours in the labour market, irrespective of the age categories of children.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS: Effect of school-aged children on urban female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.00 -21.72 0.03 30.70 0.06 121.51 0.04 72.53
(0.01) (17.42) (0.05) (102.79) (0.06) (129.10) (0.04) (83.87)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.70∗∗∗ 1434.90∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1473.90∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 1541.47∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1505.02∗∗∗
(0.10) (201.98) (0.11) (214.17) (0.11) (220.29) (0.11) (208.78)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.04∗ -91.65∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -94.37∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -99.06∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -96.53∗∗
(0.02) (41.82) (0.02) (42.16) (0.02) (42.73) (0.02) (42.17)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00 -4.66 -0.00 -2.40 -0.00 1.51 -0.00 -0.60
(0.00) (4.90) (0.00) (6.60) (0.00) (7.61) (0.00) (6.19)
Age of mother 0.04∗∗∗ 67.78∗∗ 0.03 51.22 0.02 22.53 0.02 38.00
(0.01) (26.31) (0.02) (41.18) (0.02) (48.59) (0.02) (37.00)
Age mother square -0.00∗∗ -0.74∗∗ -0.00 -0.52 -0.00 -0.15 -0.00 -0.35
(0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.50)
Married -0.34∗∗∗ -820.20∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -837.47∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -867.37∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -851.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (96.01) (0.04) (101.71) (0.05) (105.26) (0.04) (99.95)
Childhood in urban -0.03∗∗ -36.83 -0.03∗∗ -35.81 -0.03∗ -34.03 -0.03∗∗ -34.99
(0.01) (29.78) (0.01) (29.77) (0.01) (30.24) (0.01) (29.92)
Primary -0.13∗∗∗ -213.71∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -205.56∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -191.43∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -199.05∗∗∗
(0.03) (51.17) (0.03) (52.77) (0.03) (55.73) (0.03) (52.69)
Secondary -0.21∗∗∗ -313.27∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -302.88∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -284.87∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -294.58∗∗∗
(0.02) (42.68) (0.02) (46.40) (0.03) (49.85) (0.02) (45.37)
Post sec. education -0.18∗∗∗ -210.34∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -192.06∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -160.40∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -177.48∗∗∗
(0.03) (55.14) (0.03) (63.86) (0.04) (72.78) (0.03) (62.24)
Graduate education -0.05∗ 56.34 -0.04 74.61 -0.03 106.26 -0.04 89.19
(0.03) (64.18) (0.03) (72.58) (0.04) (79.51) (0.03) (70.59)
Brahmin -0.06∗∗ -80.34 -0.06∗∗ -72.99 -0.05∗ -60.25 -0.05∗∗ -67.12
(0.02) (54.38) (0.03) (55.74) (0.03) (58.09) (0.03) (55.70)
Forward -0.05∗∗∗ -60.12 -0.05∗∗ -51.99 -0.04∗ -37.89 -0.04∗∗ -45.50
(0.02) (37.57) (0.02) (40.10) (0.02) (43.00) (0.02) (39.58)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 174.84∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 170.80∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 163.81∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 167.58∗∗∗
(0.02) (41.73) (0.02) (42.03) (0.02) (42.82) (0.02) (41.93)
Muslim -0.11∗∗∗ -151.51∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -172.93∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -210.03∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -190.02∗∗∗
(0.02) (41.87) (0.03) (59.69) (0.03) (68.45) (0.03) (54.78)
Christian and others 0.01 12.43 0.01 14.33 0.01 17.64 0.01 15.85
(0.04) (88.72) (0.04) (88.53) (0.04) (88.81) (0.04) (88.58)
Observations 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407
R-squared 0.138 0.130 0.135 0.128 0.124 0.113 0.131 0.123
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorce or widow), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments: pri-
mary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward class,
SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the regions
of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the results for rural women with young and school-aged children
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respectively. In Table 3.7, 2SLS results, with twins and the combined instruments, show that
an increase in an additional young child reduces the annual labour supply in rural areas by
more than 140 hours on average (see fifth and nineth columns). This result is statistically
significant at the 1% level although there is null effect of young children on rural women’s
labour market participation.
For a rural woman with young children, a 1% increase in the wage rate increases female
labour market participation on average by 0.27 of a percentage point (statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level), and it increases the annual labour supply by 4.5 hours approximately
(statistically significant at the 1% level).
Land ownership reduces the probability of female labour market participation by 5 percentage
points (statistically significant at the 1% level), and it reduces the annual labour supply by 94
hours on average (statistically significant at the 1% level).
Comparing by settlement types, the study finds that the impact of young children on female
labour market outcomes are less severe in rural areas than in urban areas. This is fairly
reasonable because the majority of women working in rural agricultural or other informal
occupations often carry their children to work-place; this is less likely in urban formal sector
occupations. In addition, the results reveal that female labour market participation and the
annual hours of labour supply are more sensitive to the wage rate in urban areas compared
to rural areas. This indicates that urban women are more responsive to higher wage rate than
rural women who work to meet their basic necessity.
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Table 3.7: 2SLS: Effect of young children on rural female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01 -20.22 -0.09 -171.25∗∗∗ -0.01 -70.57 -0.07 -142.77∗∗∗
(0.01) (12.93) (0.05) (39.87) (0.11) (141.61) (0.05) (48.93)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.27∗∗ 451.66∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 424.09∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 442.47∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 429.29∗∗∗
(0.12) (165.42) (0.12) (166.77) (0.12) (166.79) (0.12) (166.20)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.05∗∗∗ -94.18∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -97.74∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -95.37∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -97.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.10) (0.01) (17.40) (0.01) (17.32) (0.01) (17.28)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -7.59∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -15.10∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -10.10 -0.01∗∗∗ -13.69∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.86) (0.00) (3.41) (0.01) (7.47) (0.00) (3.63)
Age of mother 0.02 25.20 0.04∗∗ 70.48∗∗∗ 0.02 40.30 0.04∗ 61.94∗∗
(0.01) (20.14) (0.02) (22.99) (0.03) (47.44) (0.02) (24.84)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.23 -0.00 -0.92∗∗ -0.00 -0.46 -0.00 -0.79∗
(0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.44)
Married -0.18∗∗∗ -259.98∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -191.12∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -237.02∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -204.10∗∗
(0.07) (94.78) (0.07) (96.10) (0.08) (110.92) (0.07) (95.83)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -5.59 -0.02 -0.39 -0.02 -3.86 -0.02 -1.37
(0.02) (24.23) (0.02) (24.54) (0.02) (24.27) (0.02) (24.33)
Primary 0.01 15.63 0.01 18.24 0.01 16.50 0.01 17.75
(0.02) (24.00) (0.02) (24.45) (0.02) (24.07) (0.02) (24.28)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -64.35∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -79.05∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -69.25∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -76.28∗∗∗
(0.02) (19.31) (0.02) (19.76) (0.02) (23.89) (0.02) (19.97)
Post sec. education -0.09∗∗∗ -39.72 -0.11∗∗∗ -70.54∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -50.00 -0.10∗∗∗ -64.73∗∗
(0.02) (29.41) (0.02) (29.60) (0.03) (44.89) (0.02) (31.81)
Graduate education -0.02 150.83∗∗∗ -0.04 113.13∗∗ -0.02 138.26∗∗ -0.04 120.24∗∗
(0.03) (54.32) (0.03) (54.40) (0.04) (64.94) (0.03) (55.16)
Brahmin -0.02 -21.96 -0.03 -23.71 -0.02 -22.54 -0.02 -23.38
(0.02) (31.41) (0.02) (31.24) (0.02) (31.10) (0.02) (31.13)
Forward -0.05∗∗∗ -55.01∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -51.40∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -53.80∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -52.08∗∗
(0.02) (20.90) (0.02) (21.30) (0.02) (21.13) (0.02) (21.15)
SC and ST 0.10∗∗∗ 99.48∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 107.86∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 102.27∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 106.28∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.73) (0.02) (20.19) (0.02) (20.74) (0.02) (19.97)
Muslim -0.08∗∗∗ -55.73∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -32.20 -0.08∗∗∗ -47.88 -0.07∗∗∗ -36.63
(0.02) (24.34) (0.02) (25.94) (0.02) (31.11) (0.02) (25.41)
Christian and others -0.05 -31.89 -0.05∗ -40.14 -0.05 -34.64 -0.05 -38.59
(0.03) (55.97) (0.03) (55.86) (0.03) (56.00) (0.03) (55.74)
Observations 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254
R-squared 0.097 0.078 0.084 0.047 0.097 0.075 0.090 0.058
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorce or widow), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments:
primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward
class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the
regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Let us now look at the impact on school-aged children on female labour market outcomes
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in the rural areas. Table 3.7 reveals that the school-aged children have null effect on rural
women’s labour supply outcomes. This is fairly reasonable because of the two opposite
effects may be balancing one another to generate a null effect. On one hand, when children
are in schools, women get more time to spend at work. On the other hand, when children
grow up, they start taking household financial responsibilities to supplement family incomes
in rural areas thus freeing women from market jobs.
It is to be noted that rural women generally take part in unpaid economic activities by pro-
ducing goods and services for household businesses. This is beyond the scope of the current
investigation.
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Table 3.8: 2SLS: Effect of school-aged children on rural female labour market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01 -8.84 0.02 18.98 0.04 54.77 0.03 41.98
(0.01) (9.06) (0.05) (80.43) (0.04) (55.63) (0.03) (46.47)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.68∗∗∗ 901.66∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 948.56∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 1008.90∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 987.33∗∗∗
(0.10) (165.42) (0.13) (218.48) (0.12) (193.17) (0.11) (186.90)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.11∗∗∗ -255.73∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -255.29∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -254.72∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -254.92∗∗∗
(0.01) (20.46) (0.01) (20.48) (0.01) (20.49) (0.01) (20.47)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -6.68∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -5.97∗ -0.00∗ -5.06∗ -0.00∗∗ -5.39∗
(0.00) (2.76) (0.00) (3.36) (0.00) (3.03) (0.00) (2.92)
Age of mother 0.01 34.60∗∗∗ 0.00 27.17 -0.00 17.61 -0.00 21.02
(0.01) (12.71) (0.02) (24.45) (0.01) (19.50) (0.01) (17.48)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.42∗∗ 0.00 -0.32 0.00 -0.19 0.00 -0.23
(0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.23)
Married -0.22∗∗∗ -509.46∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -519.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -531.79∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -527.30∗∗∗
(0.03) (52.72) (0.03) (59.28) (0.03) (56.67) (0.03) (55.26)
Childhood in urban -0.05∗∗∗ -72.10∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -73.80∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -75.98∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -75.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.24) (0.02) (27.50) (0.02) (27.42) (0.02) (27.29)
Primary -0.06∗∗∗ -26.51 -0.06∗∗∗ -23.48 -0.06∗∗∗ -19.59 -0.06∗∗∗ -20.99
(0.02) (24.14) (0.02) (25.56) (0.02) (24.79) (0.02) (24.56)
Secondary -0.18∗∗∗ -164.19∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -158.52∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -151.22∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -153.83∗∗∗
(0.01) (22.40) (0.02) (27.41) (0.02) (24.87) (0.02) (24.02)
Post sec. education -0.14∗∗∗ 33.60 -0.13∗∗∗ 45.16 -0.12∗∗∗ 60.03 -0.12∗∗∗ 54.71
(0.03) (56.40) (0.03) (65.75) (0.03) (59.62) (0.03) (58.82)
Graduate education 0.01 422.61∗∗∗ 0.02 436.02∗∗∗ 0.03 453.27∗∗∗ 0.02 447.10∗∗∗
(0.05) (103.01) (0.05) (109.87) (0.05) (106.57) (0.05) (105.44)
Brahmin -0.15∗∗∗ -86.28∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -87.83∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -89.82∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -89.11∗∗
(0.02) (40.70) (0.02) (41.01) (0.02) (40.99) (0.02) (40.91)
Forward -0.13∗∗∗ -113.17∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -109.96∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -105.84∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -107.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.01) (0.02) (26.79) (0.02) (25.82) (0.02) (25.61)
SC and ST 0.16∗∗∗ 199.31∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 197.00∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 194.02∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 195.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.83) (0.02) (22.79) (0.01) (22.23) (0.01) (22.09)
Muslim -0.14∗∗∗ -129.03∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -137.43∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -148.24∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -144.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (31.78) (0.03) (39.31) (0.02) (36.21) (0.02) (34.65)
Christian and others -0.19∗∗∗ -176.69∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -170.79∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -163.20∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -165.91∗∗∗
(0.03) (58.36) (0.03) (61.47) (0.03) (60.51) (0.03) (60.04)
Observations 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106
R-squared 0.205 0.192 0.203 0.190 0.198 0.186 0.200 0.188
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorce or widow), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments:
primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward
class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the
regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
The table further reveals that for rural women with school-aged children, a 1% increase in
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the wage rate increases the probability of female labour market participation by 0.68 of a
percentage point and the annual labour supply by approximately 9 hours on average. These
results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Once again, the study finds that, in the
sample of women with school-aged children female labour market outcomes are less sensitive
to the wage rate in rural areas compared to urban areas. This could be for similar reasons to
those discussed earlier.
For a rural woman with school-aged children, land ownership reduces the probability of
female labour market participation by 11 percentage points, and it reduces the annual labour
supply by 256 hours on average. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Female labour market outcomes are more sensitive to land ownership in rural areas compared
to urban areas. This is reasonable because women who have land as family property may
work on family lands without needing to work outside their households. In urban area, land
may not be an accurate proxy for wealth and we may need to look for an alternative proxy
for wealth for urban women.48
3.6.3. Heterogeneity by family type: Nuclear versus extended
The extended family is a dummy variable and is assigned a value of one if women are liv-
ing with at least one member other than their own children and husband (if the women are
married) or with at least one member other than their own children if women are widowed or
divorced or not living with their husbands; a zero value otherwise.49
In urban (rural) areas, 45% (44%) of women live in nuclear families. This implies that the
48The information on household income available from IHDS-II data is not reliable as data on income are
generally subject to reporting bias and, therefore, may not be an accurate measure for wealth. In addition,
in the majority of cases, income earned by husbands is missing. Also, we may need to think about the
exogeneity of an income measure. IHDS-II also has information on numbers of asset ownership but does not
have information on its kinds.
49A woman’s choice to reside in a nuclear or an extended family setting may be determined by the socio-
economic conditions of the family members or by other unobserved factors that are difficult to measure.
For the current purpose of the study, I assume that a woman’s choice to reside in one of these settings is
exogenously determined.
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majority of the women live in an extended family setting in both the types of settlement. It is,
therefore, crucial to try and examine the possible heterogeneity in labour market outcomes
within the two types of family setting.
The OLS results in Table 3.9 reveal that, within a nuclear family setting, an increase in an
additional young child reduces the probability of female labour market participation by 4
percentage points (statistically significant at the 1% level) and the hours of labour supply by
42 on an annual basis (statistically significant at the 10% level). This provided an empirical
evidence of existing negative association between young children and women’s labour supply
outcomes.
Using an IV approach, the results in Table 3.9 show that an increase in an additional young
child reduces the probability of female labour market participation by 25 (27) percentage
points using twins (combined instruments), and it reduces the annual labour supply by 264
(289) hours on average using twins (combined instruments). The results are statistically
significant at the 1% level.
The table shows that wage rate and land ownership do not seem to have any influence on
female labour market outcomes when they have young children within the nuclear family
setting.
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Table 3.9: 2SLS: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes in the nuclear
family setting















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.04∗∗∗ -41.95∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -263.84∗∗∗ -0.35 -394.68 -0.27∗∗∗ -288.74∗∗∗
(0.02) (22.12) (0.03) (37.02) (0.23) (311.50) (0.05) (66.51)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate -0.02 10.56 0.05 87.33 0.08 132.60 0.05 95.94
(0.20) (308.55) (0.21) (315.73) (0.24) (343.69) (0.21) (318.16)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.01 -22.82 -0.01 -28.30 -0.01 -31.53 -0.01 -28.91
(0.03) (36.62) (0.03) (37.51) (0.03) (39.42) (0.03) (37.71)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -5.53 -0.02∗∗∗ -15.38∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -21.18 -0.02∗∗∗ -16.48∗∗∗
(0.00) (5.48) (0.00) (5.69) (0.01) (15.10) (0.00) (6.28)
Age of mother 0.01 6.85 0.06∗∗∗ 60.77∗∗∗ 0.08 92.57 0.06∗∗∗ 66.82∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.48) (0.02) (22.02) (0.06) (77.36) (0.02) (25.24)
Age mother square 0.00 0.03 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -0.00 -1.27 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗
(0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (1.20) (0.00) (0.43)
Married -0.52∗ -1322.04∗∗ -0.42 -1213.61∗ -0.37 -1149.68 -0.41 -1201.45∗
(0.27) (611.50) (0.31) (657.87) (0.36) (713.23) (0.32) (665.81)
Urban -0.14∗∗∗ -130.83∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -135.74∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -138.64∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -136.29∗∗∗
(0.02) (36.96) (0.02) (37.80) (0.02) (39.77) (0.02) (38.05)
Childhood in urban -0.01 -8.13 -0.02 -19.64 -0.03 -26.42 -0.02 -20.93
(0.03) (43.01) (0.03) (43.88) (0.03) (47.50) (0.03) (44.09)
Primary 0.02 9.37 0.03 27.61 0.04 38.36 0.03 29.65
(0.03) (43.32) (0.03) (44.88) (0.04) (54.03) (0.04) (45.56)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -68.82∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -88.66∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -100.36∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -90.89∗∗
(0.03) (39.00) (0.03) (39.63) (0.04) (48.84) (0.03) (40.01)
Post sec. education -0.05 -17.00 -0.08∗ -47.72 -0.09∗ -65.83 -0.08∗ -51.17
(0.04) (64.73) (0.04) (65.13) (0.05) (80.90) (0.04) (66.21)
Graduate education 0.09 331.74∗∗∗ 0.07 305.98∗∗ 0.05 290.79∗∗ 0.06 303.09∗∗
(0.06) (121.07) (0.06) (124.21) (0.07) (134.23) (0.06) (125.29)
Brahmin -0.04 -45.55 -0.04 -44.51 -0.04 -43.90 -0.04 -44.39
(0.05) (70.65) (0.06) (70.49) (0.06) (73.10) (0.06) (70.85)
Forward -0.12∗∗∗ -156.19∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -167.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -173.58∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -168.36∗∗∗
(0.03) (41.91) (0.03) (43.96) (0.04) (50.63) (0.03) (44.78)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗ 105.22∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 111.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 114.50∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 111.71∗∗∗
(0.03) (38.16) (0.03) (38.77) (0.03) (40.17) (0.03) (38.86)
Muslim -0.12∗∗∗ -90.30∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -62.37 -0.08∗ -45.91 -0.09∗∗∗ -59.24
(0.03) (40.49) (0.03) (41.57) (0.04) (57.80) (0.03) (42.35)
Christian and others -0.11 -59.62 -0.16∗ -115.86 -0.19∗ -149.03 -0.16∗∗ -122.18
(0.08) (155.61) (0.08) (157.41) (0.10) (175.54) (0.08) (157.88)
Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665
R-squared 0.106 0.076 0.015 0.023 0.138 0.109 0.219 0.0102
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorce or widow), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments:
primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward
class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the
regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western. First stage regression results are presented in Ap-
pendix Table A3.39.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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The OLS results on Table 3.10 reveals in a nuclear family setting, an additional school-aged
child increases women’s labour market participation by a percentage point (statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level). This empirical result provides an evidence of a positive association
between school-aged children and women’s labour market participation in a nuclear family
setting.
However, using an IV approach, the studies find a null effect of school-aged children on
female labour market outcomes in a nuclear family setting.
The table further reveals that, for a woman with school-aged children in a nuclear family
setting a 1% increase in the wage rate increases the probability of female labour market
participation by 0.67 of a percentage point (see second column of the table), and it increases
the annual labour supply by 11 hours on average (see third column of the table). These results
are statistically significant at the 1% level.
For a woman with school-aged children in a nuclear family setting, land ownership reduces
female labour market participation by 8 percentage points (see second column of the table),
and it reduces the annual labour supply by 209 hours on average (see third column of the
table). These results are statistically significant at the 1% level.
It is interesting to note that in a nuclear family setting, women with young children do not
respond to increase in market wage or to land ownership but women with older school-aged
children do. This results are fairly reasonable because childcare responsibilities are priori-
tised by women which is more of a compulsory requirement in a family setting where there
are inadequate helping hands for household chores.
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Table 3.10: 2SLS: Effect of school-aged children on female labour market outcomes in the
nuclear family setting















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01∗ -13.17 0.03 18.09 0.06 62.83 0.05 43.60
(0.01) (11.02) (0.05) (73.09) (0.04) (69.88) (0.03) (51.28)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.67∗∗∗ 1144.55∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1187.09∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 1247.98∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 1221.81∗∗∗
(0.10) (169.96) (0.12) (198.84) (0.11) (194.73) (0.11) (184.60)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.08∗∗∗ -208.91∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -209.42∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -210.17∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -209.85∗∗∗
(0.01) (23.54) (0.01) (23.51) (0.01) (23.61) (0.01) (23.54)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗∗ -4.42 -0.00 -3.87 -0.00 -3.08 -0.00 -3.42
(0.00) (3.17) (0.00) (3.38) (0.00) (3.43) (0.00) (3.30)
Age of mother 0.01 38.07∗∗ -0.00 30.22 -0.01 18.99 -0.01 23.82
(0.01) (15.79) (0.01) (23.79) (0.01) (23.64) (0.01) (20.19)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.44∗∗ 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -0.24
(0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.27)
Married -0.35∗∗∗ -816.98∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -825.30∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -837.20∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -832.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (67.60) (0.03) (69.93) (0.03) (70.24) (0.03) (68.83)
Urban -0.18∗∗∗ -179.00∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -177.83∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -176.17∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -176.88∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.32) (0.02) (27.39) (0.02) (27.54) (0.02) (27.40)
Childhood in urban -0.06∗∗∗ -85.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -85.12∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -85.15∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -85.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.73) (0.02) (27.72) (0.02) (27.85) (0.02) (27.78)
Primary -0.07∗∗∗ -41.73 -0.06∗∗∗ -37.32 -0.06∗∗∗ -31.00 -0.06∗∗∗ -33.71
(0.02) (28.81) (0.02) (30.53) (0.02) (30.18) (0.02) (29.52)
Secondary -0.18∗∗∗ -165.00∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -158.95∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -150.30∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -154.02∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.50) (0.02) (30.50) (0.02) (30.38) (0.02) (28.89)
Post sec. education -0.16∗∗∗ -89.16∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -77.47 -0.14∗∗∗ -60.73 -0.14∗∗∗ -67.92
(0.03) (49.58) (0.03) (55.69) (0.03) (56.39) (0.03) (52.96)
Graduate education 0.03 284.40∗∗∗ 0.05 297.68∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 316.69∗∗∗ 0.06 308.52∗∗∗
(0.03) (67.39) (0.04) (74.26) (0.04) (73.89) (0.03) (71.00)
Brahmin -0.11∗∗∗ -49.83 -0.11∗∗∗ -48.63 -0.11∗∗∗ -46.91 -0.11∗∗∗ -47.65
(0.03) (49.89) (0.03) (49.97) (0.03) (50.33) (0.03) (50.13)
Forward -0.10∗∗∗ -96.61∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -92.55∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -86.73∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -89.23∗∗∗
(0.02) (28.84) (0.02) (30.44) (0.02) (30.26) (0.02) (29.64)
SC and ST 0.14∗∗∗ 201.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 198.74∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 195.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 196.74∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.96) (0.02) (26.54) (0.02) (26.45) (0.02) (26.20)
Muslim -0.15∗∗∗ -160.31∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -172.20∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -189.22∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -181.90∗∗∗
(0.02) (32.71) (0.03) (42.22) (0.03) (42.82) (0.02) (38.15)
Christian and others -0.12∗∗∗ -107.48 -0.12∗∗∗ -103.00 -0.11∗∗∗ -96.58 -0.11∗∗∗ -99.34
(0.04) (75.89) (0.04) (77.04) (0.04) (77.02) (0.04) (76.68)
Observations 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358
R-squared 0.213 0.164 0.206 0.163 0.197 0.157 0.201 0.160
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments:
primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward
class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the re-
gions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western. First stage regression results are presented in Appendix
Table A3.39.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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Table 3.11 reveals that in an extended family setting, an additional young child reduces the
annual labour supply of women by 25 hours on average (statistically significant at the 5%
level although there is null effect on participation. Thus, the OLS result provides an evidence
of a negative association between young children and female labour supply hours within an
extended family setting.
Using an IV approach, the table reveals that, in an extended family setting, an additional
young child reduces the annual labour supply of women by 182 (145) hours on average
using twins (combined instrument) although, it show null effect on female labour market
participation. The results are statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of such
a reduction in the hours of labour supply is smaller than in nuclear families. This is potentially
due to the additional assistance in household chores or childcare responsibilities that women
are likely to receive from other members in extended family settings.
The table further reveals that in an extended family setting, for a woman with young children,
a 1% increase in the wage rate increases the probability of female labour market participa-
tion by 0.37 of a percentage point and it increases the annual labour supply by 6 hours on
average. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. This provides and evidence
that women in extended family setting do respond to wage rate increases when they are in
an extended family settings where there are additional members who are likely to support
women’s participation in the labour market and work for longer hours. Such wage effect on
women’s labour supply is absent in nuclear family setting with young children (see Table
3.9).
For women with young children in extended family setting, wealth in the form of land own-
ership reduces the annual labour supply by 45 hours but it has null effect on female labour
market participation. The result is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3.11: 2SLS: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes in the ex-
tended family setting















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01 -24.63∗∗ -0.07 -182.25∗∗∗ 0.02 -27.30 -0.04 -144.74∗∗∗
(0.01) (12.33) (0.04) (36.70) (0.09) (141.34) (0.04) (44.09)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.37∗∗∗ 620.66∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 626.58∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 620.76∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 625.17∗∗∗
(0.09) (146.18) (0.09) (147.10) (0.09) (146.05) (0.09) (146.52)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.01 -45.49∗∗ -0.01 -45.08∗∗ -0.01 -45.48∗∗ -0.01 -45.18∗∗
(0.01) (19.20) (0.01) (19.43) (0.01) (19.17) (0.01) (19.32)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗ -3.44 -0.01∗∗ -11.89∗∗∗ -0.00 -3.58 -0.01∗∗ -9.88∗∗∗
(0.00) (2.87) (0.00) (3.43) (0.01) (7.98) (0.00) (3.61)
Age of mother 0.01 15.75 0.03∗ 59.11∗∗∗ 0.00 16.48 0.02 48.79∗∗
(0.01) (18.05) (0.02) (20.06) (0.03) (43.84) (0.02) (21.74)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.71∗∗ 0.00 -0.07 -0.00 -0.56
(0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.39)
Married -0.21∗∗∗ -282.28∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -225.47∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -281.32∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -238.99∗∗∗
(0.05) (82.56) (0.06) (82.91) (0.06) (93.26) (0.06) (82.41)
Urban -0.04∗∗∗ -12.30 -0.04∗∗∗ -17.56 -0.04∗∗∗ -12.39 -0.04∗∗∗ -16.30
(0.01) (22.32) (0.01) (22.49) (0.01) (22.62) (0.01) (22.37)
Childhood in urban -0.01 -9.77 -0.01 -5.98 -0.01 -9.70 -0.01 -6.88
(0.01) (20.52) (0.01) (20.75) (0.01) (20.45) (0.01) (20.58)
Primary -0.01 -6.99 -0.01 -10.24 -0.01 -7.04 -0.01 -9.47
(0.02) (25.81) (0.02) (26.31) (0.02) (26.00) (0.02) (26.09)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -85.93∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -100.66∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -86.18∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -97.15∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.95) (0.02) (20.63) (0.02) (24.57) (0.02) (20.77)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ -77.37∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -108.79∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -77.90∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -101.31∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.06) (0.02) (28.01) (0.02) (40.46) (0.02) (28.81)
Graduate education 0.00 134.31∗∗∗ -0.01 93.13∗∗ 0.01 133.61∗∗ -0.01 102.93∗∗
(0.02) (40.66) (0.02) (40.56) (0.03) (54.74) (0.02) (41.30)
Brahmin -0.03 -59.46∗ -0.03 -63.07∗ -0.02 -59.52∗ -0.03 -62.21∗
(0.02) (32.18) (0.02) (32.33) (0.02) (32.08) (0.02) (32.14)
Forward -0.00 -10.40 -0.00 -2.81 -0.01 -10.27 -0.00 -4.61
(0.01) (22.75) (0.01) (23.00) (0.01) (23.92) (0.01) (22.98)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 47.22∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 55.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 47.35∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 53.20∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.70) (0.01) (20.04) (0.01) (21.16) (0.01) (20.02)
Muslim -0.05∗∗∗ -52.72∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -32.07 -0.06∗∗∗ -52.37∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -36.98
(0.01) (25.02) (0.01) (26.18) (0.02) (30.82) (0.01) (26.05)
Christian and others -0.00 19.46 -0.00 20.07 -0.00 19.47 -0.00 19.93
(0.03) (57.49) (0.03) (57.24) (0.03) (57.34) (0.03) (57.19)
Observations 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612
R-squared 0.073 0.058 0.064 0.030 0.071 0.058 0.069 0.042
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu
Forward class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth)
and the regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western. First stage regression results are presented
in Appendix Table A3.39.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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We will now look at the final sample of women with school-aged children residing in ex-
tended family settings. Table 3.11 reveals that in an extended family setting, school-aged
children do not affect female labour market outcomes; however, the wage rate continues to
encourage female participation in the labour market and working longer hours in the market.
The table further shows that, for a woman with school-aged children, a 1% increase in the
wage rate increases female labour market participation by 0.37 of a percentage point, and
it increases the annual labour supply by 11 hours on average. The results are statistically
significant at the 1% level.
The magnitude of the impacts of wage rate on female supply market outcomes are higher in
a nuclear family setting (see Table 3.10) than in an extended family setting. The empirical
evidences in this study thus show that women is nuclear families with school-aged children
are likely to respond more to market wage rates to supplement economic needs of their fami-
lies compared to those in extended family settings where women receive benefits from other
working members.
For a woman with school-aged children, in an extended family setting, the ownership of land
as wealth reduces women’s annual labour supply by 224 hours on average (see third column
of Table 3.12). The result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The empirical findings
reveal that the magnitude of the negative effect of wealth on female supply hours are higher in
an extended family setting (see Table 3.12) than in nuclear family setting (see Table 3.10), as
it should be expected due to joint effort that are more likely from other male family members.
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Table 3.12: 2SLS: Effect of school-aged children on female labour market outcomes in the
extended family setting















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
Main variable:
No. of children -0.01 -10.13 0.04 113.23 0.03 105.40 0.04 108.43
(0.01) (12.26) (0.06) (125.75) (0.05) (87.84) (0.04) (74.97)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.37∗∗∗ 1057.27∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1205.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1196.30∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1199.94∗∗∗
(0.09) (197.75) (0.13) (252.65) (0.13) (225.58) (0.12) (219.82)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.01 -224.37∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.07∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.03∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -225.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (31.18) (0.02) (31.41) (0.02) (31.35) (0.02) (31.37)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗ -2.78 -0.00 3.08 -0.00 2.71 -0.00 2.85
(0.00) (3.88) (0.00) (7.10) (0.00) (5.61) (0.00) (5.20)
Age of mother 0.01 49.81∗∗∗ 0.01 10.19 0.01 12.70 0.01 11.73
(0.01) (17.08) (0.02) (43.08) (0.02) (33.18) (0.02) (29.21)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.62∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 -0.13 -0.00 -0.12
(0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.39)
Married -0.21∗∗∗ -470.81∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -518.04∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -515.05∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -516.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (67.89) (0.04) (83.21) (0.04) (77.13) (0.03) (74.57)
Urban -0.04∗∗∗ -139.60∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -134.38∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -134.71∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -134.58∗∗∗
(0.01) (34.07) (0.02) (34.62) (0.02) (34.48) (0.02) (34.40)
Childhood in urban -0.01 -12.68 -0.01 -15.49 -0.01 -15.31 -0.01 -15.38
(0.01) (30.38) (0.02) (30.59) (0.02) (30.29) (0.02) (30.36)
Primary -0.01 -91.96∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -84.30∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -84.78∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -84.60∗∗
(0.02) (34.36) (0.02) (35.24) (0.02) (35.26) (0.02) (34.97)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -232.10∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -210.12∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -211.51∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -210.97∗∗∗
(0.01) (29.75) (0.02) (36.63) (0.02) (33.18) (0.02) (32.06)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ -28.49 -0.12∗∗∗ 13.91 -0.12∗∗∗ 11.22 -0.12∗∗∗ 12.26
(0.02) (54.88) (0.03) (69.80) (0.03) (61.77) (0.03) (60.05)
Graduate education 0.00 220.00∗∗∗ 0.01 263.25∗∗∗ 0.00 260.51∗∗∗ 0.01 261.57∗∗∗
(0.02) (69.48) (0.04) (82.11) (0.04) (76.31) (0.04) (74.40)
Brahmin -0.03 -124.89∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -118.90∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -119.28∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -119.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (43.05) (0.02) (44.00) (0.02) (43.92) (0.02) (43.81)
Forward -0.00 -75.28∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -57.65∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -58.77∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -58.33∗
(0.01) (30.32) (0.02) (34.91) (0.02) (33.19) (0.02) (32.25)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 169.88∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 158.77∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 159.47∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 159.20∗∗∗
(0.01) (30.56) (0.02) (32.50) (0.02) (31.42) (0.02) (31.17)
Muslim -0.05∗∗∗ -106.44∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -151.50∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -148.64∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -149.74∗∗∗
(0.01) (41.70) (0.03) (62.80) (0.03) (53.35) (0.03) (50.72)
Christian and others -0.00 -102.83 -0.10∗∗∗ -88.42 -0.10∗∗∗ -89.33 -0.10∗∗∗ -88.98
(0.03) (66.74) (0.03) (67.99) (0.03) (67.43) (0.03) (67.12)
Observations 4,612 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
R-squared 0.172 0.141 0.166 0.123 0.169 0.125 0.168 0.124
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average district level ln wage rate, marital status (mar-
ried versus divorced or widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attainments:
primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Hindu Brahmin, Hindu Forward
class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the re-
gions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western. First stage regression results are presented in Appendix
Table A3.39.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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3.7. Discussion and conclusions
Studies in the past have examined the impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes in
both developed and developing countries. Some of these studies have also investigated how
wage rate and unearned family income influence female time-allocation in different activities,
such as housework, market-work and leisure. This broad division of time into the three types
of regular activities is known as the trichotomy of time allocation in the labour economics
literature. Theoretical study based on the trichotomy of time allocation by married women
has been motivated by Gronau (1977).
Gronau assumes that in a developed country setting, a woman may choose to spend zero
hours at home and may allocate her total time between market-work and leisure. To reflect a
more realistic context, I assume that a woman spares some compulsory minimum amount of
time at home such that hours spent at home is strictly positive, instead of a zero possibility.
Therefore, I have redefined the equilibrium time-allocation as house-work time (which is
strictly positive hours and it is made possible by introduction of an additional time-constraint,
compulsory house-work time requirement, into the original Gronau framework), market-work
time and leisure time. Under this amendment, I show how the optimal hours of labour supply
in the market may decline below Gronau-equilibrium hours of labour supply. I further show
that, depending on the relative magnitude of a shift in the additional time-constraint from
its reference point due to an exogenous fertility shock, there could be a possibility of a sub-
optimal solution that may cause a working woman to exit the labour market or an optimal
solution with a decline in the labour market time. In the theoretical models, I demonstrate
the direction (not the magnitude) of change in the hours of labour supply due to the fertility
shock.
Following this theoretical demonstration, I empirically test whether the exogenous fertility
shock (i.e., having a young child below the age of six) has negative impacts on female labour
market outcomes.
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Due to the endogenous nature of fertility I instrument fertility using twins (i.e., whether or not
a mother has twins) for a causal analysis. I also use an alternative instrument: first-born girl
(i.e., whether or not the first-born child is a girl). This is the first study in India that examines
the causal impact of fertility on female labour market outcomes
Using the IHDS-II dataset and twins as instruments for fertility, I find an additional young
child (below the age of six) reduces the probability of female labour market participation
by 11 percentage point on average, while it reduces the annual labour supply by 200 hours
on average. The negative impact of young children on female labour market participation is
evident in the urban area and in the nuclear family setting. The negative impact of young
children on hours of work in the market is relevant to both the types of settlement (urban
and rural) and to both the types of family setting (extended and nuclear). In contrast, school-
aged child, on average, increases the chances of female labour market participation by four
percentage points, although they have null effect on women’s average hours of labour supply.
In contrast, school-aged child, on average, increases the chances of female labour market
participation by four percentage points although they have null effect on women’s average
hours of labour supply.
The economic variables, such as wage rate and unearned family wealth are the key features
of the theoretical model as wage rate captures the opportunity cost of engaging in domestic
household production activity by the woman. Therefore, it is relevant to comment on the
impacts of the wage rate on female labour market outcomes. The findings in this study reveal
that hourly wage encourages female labour market participation and work for longer hours
in the market, but it has null effect for those women who are residing in the nuclear family
setting and have young children. In contrast, family wealth restrains women from the labour
market participation and working longer hours in the market. These findings are consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), which are typically relevant
for a developed country context.
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From a policy perspective, although the related studies in the literature have emphasised
the need to increase employment opportunities for females in the face of a rising number
of highly educated women in both urban and rural areas (Klasen and Pieters, 2015; Sarkar
et al., 2019; Afridi et al., 2018), the principal findings in this study suggest that the female
labour market outcomes (i.e., participation and hours of labour supply) are sensitive to the age
categories of children (i.e., 0–5 and 6–17), hourly regional wages, unearned family wealth
and other demographic factors, such as women’s age, education, caste etc.
The average hourly wage in India is very low. The recent GOI (2019) annual report on peri-
odic labour force survey reveals that, during 2017-18, females have worked for 52 (50) hours
on average on a weekly basis in urban (rural) areas as regular wage or salaried employees. As
casual labourers, they have worked for 42 (39) hours per week in urban (rural) areas. As self-
employees, they have worked for 42 (40) hours per week in urban (rural) areas. The average
monthly earnings for female regular wage or salaried employees is Rs. 14,487 (Rs. 9,895)
in urban (rural) areas. Therefore, higher wage incentives may be considered as one of the
crucial elements in the future policy agenda to encourage female labour market participation
in India.
Regarding the need to increase the wage rate for women, Afridi et al. (2018) have emphasised
that even when women achieve a higher educational qualification, if the returns to women’s
home production are greater than the returns in the labour market, women are likely to with-
draw from the labour force and engage in domestic work. However, an empirical measure-
ment of returns to women’s home production may be challenging; it requires further research.
Cultural practices also play an important role in female labour market participation decisions.
For example, there is a common conservative attitude among people that married women
working with men outside the household is frowned upon, even in contemporary Indian so-
ciety (Eswaran et al., 2013). Therefore, women are not allowed to participate in the labour
market unless there is a need to augment economic-status of a family. This could be one of
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the major causes behind low female participation in the Indian labour market.
In addition to the need to expand employment opportunities through a policy such as the Na-
tional Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 (guaranteeing at least 100 days of work to
all) and to provide higher wage incentives to wage or salaried employees and casual labour-
ers, there is a need to improve the quality of childcare facilities. The empirical findings in
this paper reveal that fertility restrains female labour market participation when children are
young. A woman who is employed could face conflict between her roles as a mother and
a worker, especially when her children are young (i.e., below the age of six). This conflict
could be severe in the absence of an affordable and a qualitative childcare provision. This
may inevitably encourage a woman to choose the mother role at the cost of a worker role.
Availability of a poor-quality childcare facility is not only a concern in a developing country
like India but is also a concern for a developed country like Quebec (Baker et al., 2019).
Therefore, there is a need to expand childcare provisions in India, not only in terms of its
affordability but also in terms of its quality, to encourage more female participation in the
labour market. However, improving the quality of childcare facilities may require a large
public investment. Singh and Masters (2017) perform an experimental study in Chandigarh,
India to show that incentives in the form of performance pay and bonuses to government
childcare workers could be an effective tool in improving childcare quality. Whether such an
investment would be cost effective at the national level requires further research.
There are some limitations of this study. The study focuses solely on those women who
are working in paid jobs outside home. However, there are many unpaid work that women
routinely do at home in family enterprises. By engaging in these activities, women indirectly
contributes to economic activity. However, it is not feasible to provide empirical insights
for this set of women due to data limitation. In addition, the study uses two alternative
instruments. Using first born girl as instrument, the study finds null impact of fertility on
female labour market outcomes. These results are, therefore, different from what is observed
using twins. This difference is due to a local average treatment effect pertaining to a chosen
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instrument.
As an agenda for further research, this analysis could be extended to understand the impact of
fertility on the trichotomy of time allocation by women in a developing country context. Such
a study would require precise information on time spent by women on at least three of the
core activities namely, housework, market work and leisure (if sleep-time is excluded from
the leisure time). This would be similar to what Gronau has done in the developed country
context, such as in Israel and in the USA. In addition, complete information on husbands’
labour market outcomes could make the study even more interesting as this will enable the
comparison of labour market outcomes by gender, as motivated by Becker (1985).
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Chapter 4. The Impact of Caste Certificates on Standard of Living: Evidence from
Indian Slums
(with Sugata Bag and Suman Seth)
4.1. Introduction
Affirmative Action is variously known as positive-, protective- or compensatory-discrimination
and its variants have been pursued in different countries, such as India, South Africa, Brazil,
Northern Ireland, Malaysia and the United States (Darity et al., 2011) to combat social dis-
crimination in the form of caste, race, ethnicity or religion. In the early twentieth century,
practice of untouchability, that has been seen as a major social disability in India, has arisen
out of the caste system. Consequently, reservation was introduced in administrative positions
since the first quarter of twentieth century by the princely states in India, such as Baroda,
Kolhapur and Travancore, for the socially disadvantaged group of people (see Deshpande,
2013, Chapter 2, p.46). Reservation is seen as the core of India’s Affirmative Action (AA)
Programme and is primarily caste based.
The need of AA Programme divides the entire Indian population in the available national
data (such as the National Sample Survey (NSS)) into four broad groups (see Deshpande,
2013, Chapter 1, p.18): (i) Schedule Caste (SC: who are known as ex-untouchable jatis and
several members of this jati self-identify themselves as ‘Dalit’), (ii) Schedule Tribe (ST: This
group mostly comprises of tribal people, but more specifically geographically isolated groups
of people. So, some non-tribal people are also included in this category, particularly those
residing in the hills (includes ‘Himachali Brahmins’)), (iii) Other Backward Class (OBC: a
heterogenous collection of Hindu low caste, some non-Hindu communities, and some tribal
people who are not included in ST category), (iv) Others or General (the residual of the
population that is further divided into two groups: Brahmins and Forward Class (includes all
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religions)).
In 1950, for the upliftment of SC and ST groups, Article 46, under the Directive Principles of
State Policy, the Constitution of India pronounced that the state shall promote, with special
care, the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and protect
them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. For the identification of OBC people,
the Mandal Commission was set up in 1978. OBCs have finally obtained a legal recognition
through Supreme Court order of 1995. Subsequently, implementation of OBC reservation for
government job has been initiated in 1998 and it has been extended for education in 2006.
In this study, we focus on SC/ST and OBC eligible groups of households that qualify for
reservation benefits.50 The terms eligible and disadvantaged group are used interchangeably.
Even in the 2000s, the disadvantaged groups often trail behind in various socio-economic
outcomes, namely consumption, education, health and employment. Let us first look at one
of these aspects, namely consumption expenditure across all social groups (see Table 4.1).
The monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) data are collected from the recent
national sample survey (NSS, 2015). MPCE continued to remain lower for SC, ST and OBC
groups compared to General group in both rural and urban areas and in both the periods
2004–05 and 2011–12.
50The list of candidates who are scheduled as disadvantaged groups in the Constitution of India are eligible
groups. It is to be noted that among OBC groups, there is a ‘creamy layer’ OBC group of people who have
better economic conditions and are not eligible for government-sponsored educational and professional benefit
programmes that are implemented for disadvantaged groups.
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Table 4.1: Monthly per capita consumption expenditure by the caste categories
ST SC OBC General All
2004–05
Rural
Population share (by column) 91.40 79.80 78.00 62.30 74.40
Average MPCE (in INR)2 426.19 474.72 556.72 685.31 558.78
Poverty Rate - 53.50 39.80 27.10 41.80
Urban
Population share (by column) 8.60 20.20 22.00 37.70 25.30
Average MPCE (in INR)2 857.46 758.38 870.93 1306.10 1052.36
Poverty Rate - 40.60 30.60 16.10 25.70
2011–12
Rural
Population share (by column) 89.00 80.00 75.00 60.00 72.96
Average MPCE (in INR)2 1,122 1,252 1,439 1,719 1,430
Poverty Rate - 31.50 22.60 15.30 25.70
Urban
Population share (by column) 11.00 20.00 25.00 40.00 27.04
Average MPCE (in INR)2 2,193 2,028 2,275 3,242 2,630
Poverty Rate - 21.70 15.40 8.20 13.70
Notes: 1Monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE).
Source: Adopted from NSS (2007) and NSS (2015)
A graphical illustration of MPCE of the caste groups in different deciles is presented in Ap-
pendix Figure A4.1. Here we divide the entire (urban and rural) population into ten equal
groups (i.e., decile) of MPCE, such that each decile contains 10% of the sample population.
The first decile forms the poorest group in terms of MPCE, whereas the tenth decile forms
the richest group. Then for each social group (i.e., SC, ST, OBC and Others/General), the
distribution of the sample population is computed across these ten deciles. The distributions
of population within different social groups across deciles of MPCE are presented in Ap-
pendix Figure A4.1. The figure reveals that, compared to the rest of the Indian population,
ST, SC and OBC are more likely to fall in the poorer deciles of MPCE distributions within
both rural and urban areas. In addition, the GOI (2016) reports that the poverty rate continued
to remain higher within SC, ST and OBC groups than within the General group (see Table
4.1). The study by Howard and Prakash (2012) reveals that in 1999-2000, the proportion of
SC people living below the poverty line has been 45.9% in rural areas and 38.3% in urban
142
areas, while it has been 36.2% in rural areas and 35.6% in urban areas for ST. SC and ST
also suffer from deprivation in many other spheres; for example, the infant mortality rate for
SC and ST is 109 per 1,000, while it is 54 per 1,000 for non-minorities. Zacharias and Vaku-
labharanam (2011) discuss the existing wealth inequality between the disadvantaged and the
non-disadvantaged groups in India. Not only are disadvantaged groups left behind in the
monetary measure of living standard, they are also lagging behind in several non-monetary
aspects of living standard, including schooling, mortality, nutrition, access to electricity, sani-
tation, water, housing, cooking fuel and asset ownership (Alkire and Seth, 2015; Alkire et al.,
2018). These recent studies confirm that the difference in the standard of living, measured by
monetary (i.e., MPCE) and non-monetary measures, continues to exist between the disadvan-
taged and the General groups. Deshpande and Ramachandran (2019), in their recent study,
observe that the difference in wages between eligible groups and the rest of the population
above median wage has in fact diverged over time.
In order to improve the standard of living of eligible groups and bring them to a level playing
field with the rest of the population, the Indian government has undertaken compensatory
discrimination measures; these include the reservation of places in higher education, central
and state government jobs and political arena. There have been many research studies delving
into the effect of these compensatory discrimination measures on education, employment,
earnings and political representation of eligible groups.51 While some of these studies find
positive impacts of these measures, others find null impact. For example, Chin and Prakash
(2011) and Kaletski and Prakash (2016) find that reservations for ST significantly reduce
their poverty and the incidence of child labour respectively.
However, eligible groups are not automatically entitled to the benefits offered through AA
Programme. To avail the reservation benefit, an eligible beneficiary must possess a valid
51See, for example, Pande (2003a), Banerjee and Somanathan (2007), Bertrand et al. (2010), Chin and Prakash
(2011), Howard and Prakash (2012), Deshpande and Weisskopf (2014), Kaletski and Prakash (2016), Kaletski
and Prakash (2017), Girard (2018) and Deshpande and Ramachandran (2019).
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caste certificate issued by the state government of his/her state of origin.52,53 Therefore, one
needs to register for a caste certificate only if s/he wants to avail the reservation channel.
Hence, registration for a caste certificate is a choice and therefore it is endogenous. Even after
registering for a valid caste certificate within the beneficiary’s state of origin, it is possible
that an eligible beneficiary is deprived of the mandated benefits if s/he does not reside in
his/her state of origin. This particular problem becomes even more relevant for those eligible
beneficiaries who are required to relocate (i.e., migrate) outside their state of origin.
Thus, a question that naturally follows is, whether the possession of a valid caste certificate
by the eligible groups has any relevance towards improvement in their living standard com-
pared to similar eligible households that do not possess one. This is a primary question for
investigation in this chapter.
Given that the registration for a caste certificate by an eligible beneficiary is driven by the
beneficiary’s choice, we therefore use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for
the endogeneity. We, exploit the available information on whether an eligible household is
residing in its state of origin to instrument for the caste certificate possession. The reason for
considering the state of origin as an instrument is as follows. Registration for caste certificate
can only be done in the state of origin where a parental property (such as parental house)
is located because the official verification is done in that property. Thus, residing in a state
where parental property is located makes it economical (i.e., in term of time and effort), given
the bureaucratic government procedures followed at the local levels during the registration
process. Consequently, residing in the state of origin increases the chance of possessing of a
valid caste certificate. In addition, residing in one’s ancestral state of origin is unlikely to be
influence by unobserved choices of an individual, especially when people are living in their
52See Clause 2 of document number 35/1/72-R.U. (SCT.V) dated 2nd May 1975 issued by the Ministry of
Home Affairs of the Government of India. Available at http://socialjustice.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/
guide-certificate636017830879050722.pdf (accessed in December 2019).
53In contrast, to avail of the benefits offered by the national (i.e., the central) government, a beneficiary’s caste
must be listed in the national (i.e., the central) government’s list of eligible castes. In this case, the beneficiary
does not need to re-register their caste certificate for working in central government jobs during their migration
to a new city in a different state.
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ancestral states for generations. Furthermore, the instrument controls for the possibility of
holding a valid caste certificate, which cannot be directly known from the dataset.54
To investigate the primary research question in this study, i.e., whether the eligible house-
holds have better standard of living for possessing a caste certificate compared to similar
eligible households that do not possess one, we focus on the eligible households that reside
in the urban slums of two Indian metro cities: Kolkata (a city in the state of West Bengal)
and Mumbai (a city in the state of Maharashtra). The 2011 Census report reveals that, with
India’s rapid economic growth, the slums of these two metro cities have witnessed an in-
evitable influx of poor migrants. These two cities, among all Indian cities, have the largest
shares of population residing in slums: 41.8% and 31.4% in the municipal corporations of
Greater Mumbai and Kolkata respectively.55 Our focus on slum households is of interest for
two key reasons. First, the poorest sections of the Indian population are historically under-
studied. Bertrand et al. (2010) have emphasised that the impacts of reservation policies are
usually beneficial to those that are from relatively richer backgrounds within disadvantaged
groups, while those from poorer backgrounds within disadvantaged groups are deprived of
the positive impacts. Second, many poor migrants who relocate to the city slums of Kolkata
and Mumbai from other states, either do not possess caste certificates or are unable to use
their caste certificates (issued by the state governments of their states of origin) in migrating
states.
The percentage of eligible households possessing a caste certificate in our sample is presented
in Table 4.2 below. Within the sample of SC/ST households 53% of the households have caste
certificates while it is 42% within OBC households.
54A valid certificate means a caste certificate that can be used only if it is registered within a state of origin.
We acknowledge that during the survey it has not been asked whether the households have caste certificates
registered within the state of residence. This is clearly something that requires investigation as part of an
agenda for future research.
55The figures on the shares of slum populations for Mumbai and Kolkata have been collected in Decem-
ber 2019 from the Census 2011 websites, https://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/365-mumbai.html and
https://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/215-kolkata.html, respectively. Total slum dwelling populations in
Greater Mumbai and Kolkata in 2011 have been 5.2 million and 1.4 million, respectively.
145












General households 666 666
[49.2]
Eligible SC/ST households 193 219 412 412
Share of CC status (by column) (54.67) (65.56) (59.97) [30.5]
Rate of CC status (by row) 〈46.84〉 〈53.16〉 〈100〉
Eligible OBC households 160 115 275 275
Share of CC status (by column) (45.33) (34.43) (40.03) [20.3]
Rate of CC status (by row) 〈58.18〉 〈41.82〉 〈100〉
Eligible Sample 353 334 687
(100) (100) (100)
Overall rate of CC status
for all eligible households {51.38} {48.62} {100.00}
Total Sample 1,019 334 687 1,353
[100]
Notes: This tables provides information on the proportion of non-eligible (i.e., General) and eligible households in the
sample under study. It also provided information on the share of caste certificate holding across and within the eligible
household.
Figures in parentheses are shares of caste certificates (holding or non-holding) across eligible households (by columns).
Figures in angular brackets are shares of caste certificate (holding or non-holding) within caste groups (by row).
Figures in curly brackets are shares of caste certificate holding across caste groups.
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ own computations using own survey data.
To measure the standard of living of slum dwelling households, we use a composite measure;
we refer to this as the multidimensional index of attainment (MIA), consisting of ten attain-
ment indicators.56 The MIA score for each household ranges between zero and one. A larger
MIA score represents a higher standard of living. The average MIA score for all eligible
households is 0.54, while it is 0.60 for OBC households and 0.50 for SC/ST households (see
Table 4.6).
Using an IV approach, the primary findings in this study reveal that, on average, a one per-
centage point increase in the caste certificate rate increases the MIA score for OBC house-
holds by 0.0017 of a unit. To understand the mechanism for such positive impact of a caste
certificate on the living standards of eligible households, we explore whether the procure-
56MIA is based on the well-known counting approach framework (Atkinson, 2003; Alkire and Foster, 2011).
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ment of government job by household members could be an explanatory channel. It is al-
ready known from the literature that the cornerstone of AA schemes have been to provide
representation of eligible groups through reservation, such as in government jobs (Bertrand
et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2019; Deshpande and Ramachandran, 2019). The procurement of
government jobs has it own positive impact on the standard of living of disadvantaged groups
(Thorat et al., 2016). We therefore investigate whether government job holdings could medi-
ate the positive impact of caste certificates on the living standards of slum-households. Our
findings reveal that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the caste certificate rate
increases the chance of holding a government job by 0.24 of a percentage point for all eligible
households and 0.39 of a percentage point for OBC households. Consequently, on average,
a one percentage point increase in the government job rate increases the MIA score for all
eligible households by 0.12 of a unit and for OBC households by 0.11 of a unit.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the background of the
Indian caste system, the studies that motivate this research and contribution to the literature.
Section 4.3 describes our data and provides the relevant descriptive statistics. Section 4.4
discusses the empirical strategy and identification. Section 4.5 presents the main results.
Finally, Section 4.6 discusses the key findings, caveats of the study and concludes with policy
implications and avenues for future research.
4.2. Contextual background
Historical systems of social stratification by caste in India and race or ethnicity in the United
States and Africa has remained a marker of identity in contemporary societies (Deshpande
and Ramachandran, 2019). Discrimination in various aspects of life continues to exist either
in the form of colour or creed within both developing and developed countries. For exam-
ple, the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) reveals racial discrimination in the USA
labour market where white names receive higher callbacks from the USA labour market than
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African-American names. Similarly, in the context of the USA, Alesina et al. (1999) study
that high levels of ethnic diversity are associated with 25% lower local funding for schools
and other public goods in the municipalities. Lee (2012) studies that the affirmative action
targeted towards the Bumiputera (a disadvantaged group) in Malaysia increases their repre-
sentation in tertiary education (i.e., graduate education), although this predominantly occurs
in low quality and less regarded public institutions. In recent years, sub-Saharan Africa,
which is the most ethnically diverse and the poorest region of the world, has experienced a
series of destructive ethnic conflicts. Such ethnic diversities and continuous conflicts have
affected public-school funding at primary level (Miguel, 2000). In terms of social class con-
flicts, India is not the exception.
4.2.1. Caste system in India
In India, social discrimination exists in the form of differences across castes (or jatis) and
religions. Caste system in India has two distinct concepts–the varna system (that divided the
ancient Hindu society) and the jati system (that determines the contemporary social code).
In its ancient manifestation, the varna system is roughly 2,500 years old (see Deshpande,
2013, Chapter 1, p.11) and this system has divided the ancient Hindu society into four dis-
tinct varnas that are mutually exclusive, hereditary, endogamous and occupation specific (see
Deshpande, 2011, Chapter 2, p.19): Brahmin (i.e, priests and teachers), Kshatryia (i.e., kings
and warriors), Vaisya (i.e., traders, merchants, moneylenders) and Shudra (those engages in
menial, lowly jobs).
Outside the varna system were those that used to do most despicable menial jobs. Today they
are called Atishudra or the former ‘untouchables’. This is because they were considered unfit
in the past for even to be given a varna. Hence, the Atishudras (i.e. ex-untouchables) are also
called Avarnas and are excluded from the varna system. Such a practice of ‘untouchability’
had existed since 1020 AD. Over time, as the economy grew more complex, and as new
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castes emerged through fission, fusion, intermarriage, migration, and through the emergence
of new occupations, the historical varna system gets transformed into the contemporary jati
system, which is essentially a system of regional caste grouping. Although the jati system
shares many similarities with the varna system, it is not a clear subset of varnas. Under each
caste category there are several jatis. In the contemporary society, the exact number of jati is
not known with certainty but the count is close to 7,000 communities with a wide variation
in size; while some communities have more than a million members, others have less than
1,000 members (see Deshpande, 2013, Chapter 1, p.12).
Just as the varna-jati link is not strictly defined (although, contemporary jatis try to align
themselves with the varna scale), except at the top and bottom of the system, the jati-occupation
link is less straight forward than the ancient varna-occupation link (Deshpande, 2013). The
contemporary jati system should be understood as a system of graded inequality rather than
a simple dichotomous hierarchy between upper castes and lower castes. This is because the
caste system has not remained static: migration, emulation, isolation, segregation, occupa-
tional specialization, conversion, and incorporation of tribal groups have resulted in a change
in the relative standing of the contemporary jatis. There has been a significant shift from
the traditional jati occupations which has lead to improvement of jatis’ economic condition
but the existing caste system has continued to shape social and religious practices. Today,
the varna symbolises status scale; while jatis try to align themselves with the varna scale
although they follow a very complex system of hierarchy and rules of conduct towards each
other in the contemporary India (Deshpande, 2011).
In the early twentieth century, the practice of untouchability was seen as a major social dis-
ability arising out of caste system. Therefore, in the first quarter of twentieth century reser-
vation was introduced for the disadvantaged groups of people in administrative positions.
Reservation is considered as the core of India’s Affirmative Action (AA) Programme, which
is viewed as a compensatory discrimination measure and is primarily caste based.
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The need of AA Programme divides the entire Indian population in the available national
data (such as the National Sample Survey (NSS)) into four broad groups: (i) Schedule Caste
(SC: who are known as ex-untouchable jatis and several members of this jati self-identify
themselves as ‘Dalit’ and are also called avarnas), (ii) Schedule Tribe (ST: This group mostly
comprises of tribal people, but more specifically geographically isolated groups of people.
So, some non-tribal people are also included in this category, particularly those residing in
the hills (includes ‘Himachali Brahmins’)), (iii) Other Backward Class (OBC: a heterogenous
collection of Hindu low caste, some non-Hindu communities, and some tribal people who
are not included in ST category), (iv) Others or General (the residual of the population that
is further divided into two groups: Brahmins and Forward Class (includes all religions)).
Today’s Brahmins can be aligned to Brahmin scale in the varna system while OBCs can be
aligned to Shudra scale in the varna system.
In 1950, Article 46, under the Directive Principles of State Policy, the Constitution of India
pronounced that the state shall promote, with special care, the educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people (particularly, SC and ST) and protect them
from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. For the identification of OBC people,
the Mandal Commission was set up in 1978. OBCs have finally obtained a legal recognition
through Supreme Court order of 1995. Subsequently, implementation of OBC reservation for
government job has been initiated in 1998 and it has been extended for education in 2006.
Therefore, the eligible group of people who qualify for reservation benefits are SC/ST and
OBC. The list of eligibility criteria for SC, ST and OBC are defined in government schedule
since 1936. The list reflected a combination of economic and educational criteria to determine
untouchability. In addition, territory and religion are two other factors that were proposed to
be included for identification of SCs (Deshpande, 2013). The designation of a group as ST
has been much less controversial than the designation of SC and OBC. The criteria for ST are
supposed to include all tribal characteristics, such as social, religious, linguistic and cultural
distinctiveness, who are spatially and culturally isolated from the mainstream. However, the
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demarcation of tribals and non-tribals is not unambiguous. Indeed during the 1950s, some
groups which were earlier classified as SCs were reclassified as STs. The formal mechanism
of being listed as a ST is the same as for SCs. After SCs were listed as a separate category,
the term backward classes started being used in two senses: as a group of all communities
which needed preferential treatment and as a caste low in socio-economic hierarchy but not as
low as untouchables (presumably the erstwhile Shudras). The exact identification of groups
and communities which should be counted as OBCs has been fraught with a great deal of
controversy. The final agreement on the identification of backward class had been designated
at the local levels (Deshpande, 2013).
4.2.2. Literature review
While the disparity between the disadvantaged category and the General category has con-
tinued to remain static in some welfare dimensions, it has diverged in many other welfare
dimensions (NSS, 2015, 2007; Zacharias and Vakulabharanam, 2011; Alkire and Seth, 2015;
Alkire et al., 2018). Within the political sphere, over the last two decades, there has been a
gradual transformation where the lower caste groups have acquired a greater say because of
their electoral representation through quotas in local elections. However, the absolute gaps in
the years of schooling and high-skilled jobs have remained static across eligible and General
groups. In addition, the difference in wages, between eligible and General groups, above the
median wage has diverged over time (Deshpande and Ramachandran, 2019).
In order to improve the standard of living of eligible groups and bring them to a level playing
field with the rest of the population, the Indian government has undertaken compensatory
discrimination measures; these include the reservation of places in higher education, central
and state government jobs and political arena. The benefits of such reservation in India on
several dimensions of well-being have been examined in a number of studies. For example,
Howard and Prakash (2012) study the impact of employment quotas on occupational choices
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of disadvantaged groups. By exploiting an exogenous variation in the quota they find that SC
groups are more likely to choose high-skilled occupations, while ST groups are more likely
to choose low-skilled occupations.57 The identification of minority reservation using quota
system (following Prakash (2009)) is also exploited by Chin and Prakash (2011) to examine
its impact on poverty reduction.58 Using the NSS and census data from 1951–2001, they find
that SC reservation has no impact on the incidence of poverty in rural areas but ST reservation
has negative and significant impact on poverty. In terms of intensity of poverty, in both urban
and rural areas, ST reservation reduces both the depth and severity of poverty.
These findings reveal that affirmative action policies are accompanied by substantial inter-
caste disparities, albeit its impacts are mixed. Such inter-caste disparity is also revealed in
the study by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). They have used two years of panel data for
rural India from the census years 1971 and 1991 to study how public goods get allocated by
a centralised state. Using 15 indicators for public goods, they find that SC groups benefit
from access to public goods while ST groups experience a decline in the access to public
goods. This is because SC groups formed their own political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party
(i.e., BSP which exists in the cow belt of North India i.e., in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana), in the mid-1980s, while ST groups had limited political success.
Several other studies have examined the impacts of affirmative actions on various outcomes.
For example, Kaletski and Prakash (2016) find such policies reduce incidence of child labour
for ST groups. While Deshpande and Weisskopf (2014) find a higher proportion of SC and ST
employees have positively contributed to an increase in productivity in the Indian railways.
57Prakash (2009) explains the identification of quota as follows: in each state, the percentage of employment
quota for each minority group is constructed using the minority share of respective state’s total population
taken from the recent census of population. This policy rule, which is set by the Constitution of India, in-
corporates a lag in revision of the share of respective state’s total population in census because this revision
undergoes a complex administrative procedure. Therefore, due to the lag in revision, this policy rule generates
an exogenous variation in public sector quota at the state level and permits identification of the effect of quotas
on government sector employments.
58Poverty is measured using three measures. First, incidence of poverty is measured by the headcount ratio,
defined as the proportion of people below the poverty line. Second, the intensity of poverty is measured by
the poverty gap index. Third, squared poverty gap index is a variant of the poverty gap index that gives more
weight to the poor.
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Girard (2018) finds such policies reduce street exclusions for SC. She examines whether
affirmative action in the form of quotas affects caste-based discrimination. Discrimination
is measured in terms of street exclusion, which is a dummy variable: equal to one if the
household head in village declares to have been excluded from streets during the year, zero
otherwise. Using the Rural Economic and Development Survey (REDS) dataset and linear
probability model, the result shows that, in 2006, SC households living in a village with an
SC quota have been 10 percentage points less likely to suffer from caste-based discrimina-
tion; this is statistically significant. The result is based on five Hindi belt states (i.e., Bihar,
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh). The result also reveals that the
effect is not persistent: it disappears with the end of the SC quota.
The impact of affirmative action policy, in the form of quota, on several outcomes variables
for SC and ST groups are therefore mixed. While all these studies have been conducted
either at the national or state level, none have focused on the poorest sections of Indian
society where the living conditions of disadvantaged groups are worst. For example, those
who reside in the city slums of India. Bertrand et al. (2010) have emphasised that the impacts
of quotas are effective in getting higher education and higher earnings from white-collar
jobs when the disadvantaged groups are from relatively richer backgrounds. Those who
are from poorer backgrounds are still deprived of the positive impacts of affirmative action
policies.59 Similarly, Pande (2003a) finds that the political representation of disadvantaged
groups increases the welfare spending by government for disadvantaged groups, although the
59Bertrand et al. (2010) examine the causal impact of engineering degree (i.e., attending engineering college
in 1996) on future earnings and job opportunities. The study explores different types of jobs, such as work
as engineers, government jobs, private jobs and self-employed. OLS estimates suggest that there are positive
and statistically significant earnings associated with attending engineering college for both upper and lower
caste groups but the impact is larger for upper caste groups. The decision to attend engineering college may
be influenced by unobserved preferences of the applicants which requires identification. The entrance exam
score threshold (i.e., cut-off score) dummy for respective caste groups is used as an instrument for attending
engineering college. The findings reveal that attending engineering college increases the likelihood of working
as engineers for both upper and lower caste groups, but the likelihood is higher for the upper caste group than
for lower caste group. They further examine whether family background affects the estimated future returns
and find that the better-off lower-caste groups (as well as upper caste) benefited more from the affirmative
action policy than worse-off lower caste groups.
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study does not emphasise whether that government spending has direct impact on the living
standard of disadvantaged households that belong to the economically poorest sections of
society.
While none of the earlier studies have focused on the poorest section of society, to fill some
of the gaps in the existing studies, we focus on some of the poorest sections of society i.e.,
exclusively on the urban slum households that are residing in the two metro cities in India,
namely Mumbai and Kolkata. In our sample, we consider the eligible households and we
examine whether the possession of a caste certificates has a relevance in improving a house-
hold’s standard of living. We further investigate empirically whether holding a government
job position could be the relevant channel for the observed outcome.
4.2.3. Contribution
First, we use uniquely collected datasets comprising of 1,361 households from the slums
of Mumbai and Kolkata. We especially consider these two metro cities because they have
witnessed the larger shares of population residing in slums among all other Indian cities.
Using this dataset, we examine the impact of the possession of caste certificates on the living
standard of urban slum-households. Such a slum-level study has never been done before.
Second, this is a novel study that examines a causal impact of caste certificate on the stan-
dard of living of the eligible slum households. Earlier studies have examined the impact of
AA policy on various aspects of living, such as higher education, government job opportuni-
ties, welfare spending, child labour, public goods access, health provision, productivity and
growth, political empowerment of women, discrimination, employment and poverty. How-
ever, getting adequately represented through quota system is outside the purview for slum
households. Nevertheless, slum households can have access to low-skilled government jobs
by using their caste certificates. Even though these jobs are low-skilled but having govern-
ment job increases the certainty and predictability of income streams and thus reduces risk
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and uncertainty of losing the job or being low-paid which is common in private contractual
menial jobs (Kumar et al., 2019). Using the same dataset, which used in this study, Bag and
Seth (2017) have examined a possible correlation between caste certificate holding and the
standard of living for slum-dwelling households while leaving a scope for a causal analysis
in future.
Third, this study contributes to the literature a casual mediation analysis to investigate whether
a positive impact of a caste certificate on a household’s standard of living could be mediated
through the procurement of government jobs by at least a member of the household.
4.3. Data collection, sampling frame and descriptive statistics
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the agency for human
settlements, has been assigned a mandated task, following the United Nations Millennium
Declaration, of improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020.
Following this declaration, UN-HABITAT (2003) defines a slum household as a group of
individuals living under the same roof, who are lacking any of five criteria, namely access to
improved water, improved sanitation facilities, sufficient living area, a durable dwelling struc-
ture and a secured tenure. The choice of criteria, however, can be strengthened through an
appropriate understanding of the type of adversities that slum inhabitants encounter. There-
fore, this definition may be broadened in the context of a specific country (Bag and Seth,
2017).
In the Indian context, we first elaborate on slum typology and then discuss the sampling
design based on the typology. Subsequently, we discuss the data that have been collected
from two metro cities, namely Mumbai and Kolkata, followed by a description of the sam-
ple considered under this study. To measure the standard of living, we have constructed
a multidimensional attainment index using ten different attainment indicators. We plot the
distributions of the MIA score by the eligible households’ caste certificate possession status
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to see whether there is any statistically significant difference between the two distributions.
Finally, we present the descriptive statistics of the sample households.
4.3.1. Slum typology
In the Indian context, the term ‘slum’ loosely applies to two distinct settlement types, namely
tenement settlement and squatter settlement.60 Tenement settlements were mostly created
during the colonial period by local landlords to provide shelters for migrant workers on the
basis of a long-term lease agreement. Since the mid-ninetieth century in the colonial phase,
both Mumbai and Kolkata observed a spurt of large-scale industrialization and urbanization
sustained by a large number of migrant labourers (Bag and Seth, 2017). Landowners have
either have rented out lands to these migrants to construct their own houses i.e., ‘shanties’
or have directly rented out quasi-permanent shanties on a long-term lease, usually with an
upfront payment followed by a small rent. These lease agreements are known as thika in
Kolkata and pagri in Mumbai.
Whereas, Squatter settlements have come into existence in the post-colonial period and are
illegally occupied by clusters of quasi-permanent habitations along canals, railway tracks or
roads or vacant degraded lands. From the legal viewpoint, under the Slum Areas Improve-
ment and Clearance Act (1956) of India, squatter settlements are primarily classified into
two categories: registered and unregistered. This typology is important as each has implica-
tions in terms of entitlements to basic services. Registered squatter settlements are declared
as slums by the local authorities and thus their dwellers deserve basic shelter requirements
with some form of tenure security and access to certain civic facilities. Unregistered squatter
settlements are however considered illegal and their dwellers are bereft of any entitlement to
basic civic services and are under constant threat of eviction.
In both types of slum-settlements, the possession of houses is classified into two main cate-
60The tenement housing settlement is referred to as Basti in Kolkata and Chawal in Mumbai.
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gories: owned houses and rented tenancy. The rented tenancy is sub-categorised into thika/pagri
tenancy, informal tenancy (oral and unspecified tenure) and other tenancies, such as a short-
lease or a shared tenancy.
In the post-colonial period, various acts and bills were passed towards protecting the shelter
rights of the tenement settlements’ residents, which prevented their further proliferation.61
Tenement settlements in Kolkata and Mumbai are integral part of the cities’ legal housing
stock. As the tenement settlements are prevented from proliferation, two distinct factors
have caused a rapid increase in squatter settlements, i.e., (i) a deluge of migrant labourers
following the contemporaneously growing industrial bases and (ii) spill over from the existing
tenement settlements due to the natural growth of the population.
4.3.2. Sampling frame
For ensuring the representativeness of the population, the survey employs a two-stage strati-
fied sampling procedure. For the design of the survey, various slum-level information is used
that is either available in the public domain or acquired through different government agen-
cies. For Kolkata, the slum-level information has been collected from Basti data compiled
by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) in March 2008. There are 1,236 slum clusters
across 122 of 144 wards that have 360,000 households. For Mumbai, the ward-wise popula-
tion distribution from the 2009 Mumbai Human Development Report (Municipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai, 2010) has been used.
In the first stage of the survey, in each city, the municipal corporation areas have been strat-
61The Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act of India (a Union Act) has been created in 1956 (accessed
in April 2017; website: http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/P-ACT/1956/A1956-96.pdf). In Kolkata, the first Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act was created in 1949, the Calcutta Slum Clearance Bill was proposed in 1957 offering
subsidised flats to evictees, and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Bill was brought in
1981 to enhance the protection status further by enabling provision of basic amenities to the inhabitants and
are directly under the purview of the local municipal corporation. In Mumbai, the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act was passed in 1971, by which most tenement housing
settlements constructed before 1956 were censused and declared as slums.
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ified according to the largest possible administrative divisions, for example, at the borough
level in Kolkata and at the ward level in Mumbai. In the second stage of the survey, a number
of slums have been randomly selected from each stratum, then from each selected slum, a col-
lection of households has been randomly selected to be interviewed. In Kolkata, 63 slums are
randomly selected from 15 boroughs, out of which 808 households have been interviewed.
In Mumbai, 77 slums are randomly selected from 23 wards, out of which 1086 households
have been interviewed. The design of the survey questionnaire is based on the latest round of
the National Sample Survey (NSS) household questionnaire. Further details regarding data
collection is available in Bag and Seth (2017) and Bag et al. (2020).
4.3.3. Data collection
The survey has been conducted during 2013-14 in the slums of the municipal corporation
areas of the three Indian metro cities, namely Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi (the capital city
of India).62 This dataset is suitable for this particular study as compared to the publicly
available nationally representative datasets, such as National Sample Surveys (NSS), National
Family Health Surveys (NFHS) and Indian Human Development Surveys (IHDS), because
existing Indian nationally representative household surveys are either not representative at
the slum level (Ahluwalia, 2011; Carr-Hill, 2013) or have not collected any information on
the possession of caste certificates.
The survey has collected information at both the individual level and at the household-level
by primarily interviewing the household heads. In the absence of a household head, an avail-
able adult member has been interviewed. At the household level, the survey has collected
information on religion, caste, possession of various public-benefit cards, type of housing,
access to basic facilities, access to government schemes, possession of assets, land and house
ownership details and related incomes, consumption and expenditure details on basic food
items and fuel. At the individual level, it has collected information on age, gender, marital
62This survey is a part of “NOPOOR” project and is funded by the European Commission.
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status, age at marriage, education, migration, employment (including information of earning
and past occupations), savings and insurance and some health related information.
4.3.4. Sample
In this analysis, we restrict our sample to Kolkata and Mumbai and to non-Muslim and non-
Christian households only, in order to preserve the strength of the causal inference. We
exclude Delhi from our analysis because Delhi offers different prospects to eligible bene-
ficiaries. The city of Delhi does not belong to any states of India: it is a union territory
administered by the central government of India. Unlike in Mumbai and Kolkata, an eligible
beneficiary in Delhi is entitled to avail of the reservation benefit offered by the central gov-
ernment without needing to re-register the caste certificate with the Delhi authority, provided
the caste of the beneficiary is listed in the central government list of eligible beneficiaries.
We do not include Muslim and Christian households in our sample because the available
provisions for religion-based minority benefits may contaminate the impact of the caste cer-
tificate. The sample under study therefore includes households belonging to the Hindu, Sikhs,
Jains, Buddhists and other religions of Indian origin.
Our final sample comprises of 1,353 households belonging to General, SC/ST and OBC
categories. Table 4.2 in Section 4.1 presents the distribution of our final sample across eligible
and non-eligible households by the possession and non-possession of the caste certificate.
Nearly half the households (i.e., 49%) in our sample do not belong to the disadvantaged
groups and are not eligible for a caste certificate. The other half of the sample (i.e., 51%)
belongs to the disadvantaged groups and are eligible for a caste certificate.
There are 687 eligible households within the sample (see Table 4.2). Among the eligible
households 60% are SC/ST and 40% are OBC. Within SC/ST households 53% have caste
certificate while it is 42% within OBC households.
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4.3.5. Standard of living
There are broadly two approaches that can be used for measuring the standard of living: a
monetary approach and a non-monetary approach. The generally used indicators for the mon-
etary approach include per capita income or per capita consumption expenditure. Among
these two widely used monetary indicators, consumption expenditure is the preferred indi-
cator for measuring the standard of living in developing countries rather than the income
measure, this is because the income measure often tends to be less reliable and fails to cap-
ture the long-run standard of living (Deaton, 1997; Meyer and Sullivan, 2003). In our context,
however, consumption expenditure may not capture the variations in the standard of living
across slum-households effectively. This is fairly reasonable for the following reasons: within
our sample, 59% of the 1,353 households and 58% of the 687 eligible households avail of
rationed commodities through public distribution systems at prices that are lower than mar-
ket prices. These households may incur lower consumption expenditure and this may not
necessarily translate to a lower standard of living in terms of food intake. There is also a
supporting argument in the literature that monetary measures may not accurately capture the
standard of living, especially among the poor (see, for example, Sen, 1999; Whelan et al.,
2004; Drèze and Sen, 2011). In Table 4.3 we present the monthly per capita expenditure on
food and the monthly per capita total consumption expenditure based on food and fuel for
households belonging to disadvantaged groups using the caste certificate possession status.
We do not observe any statistically significant differences in the monetary measures.63
Therefore, we pursue the direct approach to assess the standard of living using non-monetary
indicators, i.e., multidimensional index of attainment. To construct the multi-dimensional
index of attainment scores, we create a composite measure by combining each household’s
attainments in the different indicators applying a counting approach framework (Atkinson,
63The lack of statistical significance in the mean difference for the monetary measures could be due to a small
sample. A large sample may be needed to examine the robustness of the estimates.
160








Monthly per capita expend. on food (in INR) 1,167 1,195 -28 (0.575)
Monthly total consumption expend. (in INR) 2,076 1,997 79 (0.438)
Monthly per capita total earning (in INR) 3,955 3,583 372 (0.103)
Monthly per capita labour earning (in INR) 3,847 3,522 325 (0.151)
MIA Score (0-1) 0.58 0.51 0.07 (0.000)
Observations 334 353 687
Notes: In the final column, p-values for the differences in means are reported in parentheses. Table presents the
mean difference in monetary and non-monetary measures of the living standard for the eligible households by
caste certificate possession status.
No statistically significant difference in earnings is observed for a sample size of 687 data points (with approx-
imate 300 in each groups). A statistical power analysis reveals that a sample size of at least 2,612 (with 1,306
per group) is required to observe a statistically significant earnings difference of 325 rupees with the 5% critical
value. In other word, our sample size does not have enough power to conclude a statistically significant mean
difference of the observed magnitude (i.e., in income) across these two groups (i.e., with and without caste cer-
tificate).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ own computations using the survey data.
2003; Alkire and Foster, 2011).64 We select a set of ten attainment indicators, adapting from
Bag and Seth (2017). These include having access to (1) improved water facilities, (2) a
personal toilet facility, (3) quality of a house, (4) a leak-proof house, (5) a room without
over-crowding, (6) no exposure to health hazards, (7) not having a chronic disease or dis-
ability, (8) have access to a saving instrument (bank account), (9) have at least one of the
essential assets (such as washing machine, refrigerator, air conditioning machine, computer,
four-wheeler and additional rent generating property in city), (10) have at least a land-line
phone for communication (refer to the summary in Table 4.4).
Note that an attainment condition for an indicator reflects a lack of deprivation in that indica-
tor (i.e., one minus a deprivation condition). We define a deprivation (i.e., an attainment fail-
ing) condition for each indicator such that if a household cannot fulfil an attainment condition
for an indicator, then the household is assigned a value of one for that indicator; otherwise,
the household is assigned a value of zero for that indicator (refer to Table 4.4). Table 4.5
64For further details about the counting approach framework and its comparison with the social welfare ap-
proach, see Atkinson (2003). An axiomatisation of the approach to multidimensional poverty measurement
has been presented by Alkire and Foster (2011). Also, refer to Alkire et al. (2015, Chapter 4) for various
applications of the counting approach.
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presents the descriptive statistics for each of the attainment indicators.
Table 4.4: MIA components
Components Deprivation/attainment failing condition(s) equal to one if:
(1) Unimproved water facility The water source is non-improveda (UN-MDG); or, the source is
stand-piped but time to fetch from source is 30 min or more; or, the
source is stand-piped but access duration is less than 2 hours per
day.
(2) No personal toilet facility There is no personal facility; or, the personal facility is shared with
others.
(3) Unimproved house type The wall or the roof or the floor of the house is built with unim-
proved materialsb.
(4) Leakage in house Water enters in the house through roof or ground or both.
(5) Over-crowding More than three persons live per bedroom (UN-HABITAT)
(6) Exposure to health hazard Biomass fuel is used; or, cooking is done inside sleeping room with
no smoke outlet.c
(7) Chronic disease/disability Any member suffers from chronic disease or there is a disabled
member of the household and no one in the household has any health
insurance scheme.
(8) No bank access No member in the household has any instrument for savingsd.
(9) No asset ownership The household does not have any of the assets: washing machine,
refrigerator, air conditioning machine, computer, four-wheeler and
additional rent generating property in city.e
(10) No phone access The household does not have a land-line phone and the number of
mobile phones is less than the number of adults (aged 15 years or
more).
Notes: aUnimproved sources include tanker truck, small cart, non-mineral bottled water, surface water (river/pond/lake)
and other sources.
bUnimproved floor materials: mud, dung, sand, loose brick, stone slab, bamboo and raw wood planks. Unimproved wall
materials: thatch, palm leaf, grass, wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, unburned brick, loosely packed stones
and tin-shed. Unimproved roof materials: thatch, palm leaf, wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, unburned
brick, cardboard and tin. Or, there is no house, people living under some kind of shed made of poor materials.
cBiomass fuel is used; or, cooking is done inside sleeping room with no smoke outlet.
dSavings instruments: savings account or recurring deposit in banks, savings account in post office, life insurance account,
private provident fund account or contributory provident fund account.
eAssets include washing machine, refrigerator, air conditioning machine, computer, four-wheeler and additional rent gener-
ating property in city.
Source: The indicators and the attainment failing conditions are adopted from Bag and Seth (2017).
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Table 4.5: Attainment indicators for the eligible households









(1) Improved water 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.04 (0.160)
(2) Personal toilet 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.02 (0.465)
(3) Improved house-type1 0.32 0.45 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.04 (0.236)
(4) No house-leak 0.35 0.54 0.43 0.47 0.39 0.09 (0.020)
(5) No over-crowding 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.47 -0.02 (0.688)
(6) No exposure to health hazard2 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.73 0.11 (0.000)
(7) No chronic disease or disability 0.69 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.11 (0.001)
(8) Bank account 0.82 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.81 0.09 (0.000)
(9) Asset3 0.45 0.63 0.52 0.58 0.46 0.11 (0.003)
(10) Have phone access 0.26 0.43 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.09 (0.014)
Observations 412 275 687 334 353 687
Notes: We present the proportion of attainments for each MIA indicator and a mean difference (in percentage points)
for each indicator, differenced by the household’s caste certificate possession status. In the final column, p-values for
the mean differences are reported in parentheses.
1The wall or roof or floor of the house is built with unimproved materials. Unimproved floor materials include mud,
dung, sand, loose brick, stone slab, bamboo and raw wood planks. Unimproved wall materials: thatch, palm leaf, grass,
wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, unburned brick, loosely packed stones and tin-shed. Unimproved roof
materials: thatch, palm leaf, wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, unburned brick, cardboard and tin. Or,
there is no house, people living under some kind of shed made of poor materials. 2Biomass fuel is used; or, cooking is
done inside sleeping room with no smoke outlet. 3Assets include washing machine, refrigerator, air conditioning ma-
chine, computer, four-wheeler and additional rent generating property in city. 5All means SC, ST and OBC households.
5CC: abbreviation for caste certificate.
Source: Estimates are based authors’ calculations using the survey data.
We obtain a multidimensional index of attainment (MIA) score for each household by simply
counting the number of attainments in the ten different indicators and then dividing the attain-
ment count by the maximum feasible number of the attainments (which is ten in this case).
This implies that we use an equal weighting system for each indicator. By construction, the
MIA-score for every household ranges between zero and one. Intuitively, an MIA-score of
zero signifies that a household has been unsuccessful in meeting all the ten attainment condi-
tions simultaneously, and therefore experiences the worst possible standard of living among
the slum dwellers. On the other hand, an MIA-score of one implies that a household has
successfully attained all the ten attainment conditions, and therefore experiences the highest
possible standard of living among the slum dwellers. The average MIA score for the eligible
households by the status of caste certificate holding is reported in Table 4.3. Clearly, the
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average MIA score for the eligible households with caste certificates is significantly higher
than for the eligible households without caste certificates.
Figure 4.1, Panel A, plots the distributions of MIA scores for the eligible households by their
caste certificate possession status. Figure 4.1, Panel B, plots the differences in these MIA
scores by the household’s caste certificate possession status within 90% confidence intervals
to show whether these differences are statistically significant.
Figure 4.1: Distributions of the MIA-scores by the eligible households’ caste certificate pos-
session status
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Notes: Panel A plots proportion of households with MIA score by households that possess caste certificate (solid
line) and households that do not possess caste certificate (dashed line). The average MIA score for each group is
reported within parentheses in the legend. The ‘difference’ in Panel B is the proportion of households with caste
certificates minus the proportion of households without caste certificates. CC: Caste Certificate.
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
The horizontal axes in both the diagrams present the MIA score. In Panel A, the vertical axis
presents the proportion of households with at most a certain MIA score; whereas, in Panel
B, the vertical axis presents the difference in two proportions (i.e., the proportion of house-
holds with caste certificates minus the proportion of households without caste certificates).
We notice from Panel A that the MIA score distribution for households with caste certificates
lies mostly to the right of the same for those without caste certificates. Equivalently, the
difference curve in Panel B lies above zero, except for the extreme MIA scores. The differ-
ence between the two distributions is not statistically significant, which may be attributed to a
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small sample size. However, the average MIA score of the households with caste certificates
is still 0.07 point higher (statistically significant at the 1% level) than the average MIA score
of households without caste certificates (see Table 4.3). Table 4.6 presents the average MIA
score for different sub-samples of the eligible households.
4.3.6. Descriptive statistics
The selected household characteristics that are considered in this analysis include average
age and average education of all adult members of a household who are between the ages of
18–65, gender of the head of a household, size of a household, child dependency ratio (i.e.,
total number of dependent children below the age of 15 divided by total household size), adult
dependency ratio (i.e., total number of adults aged 65 or above divided by total household
size). Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables and their mean
differences by caste certificate possession status.
The majority of non-migrant (i.e., native people from a own state of origin) households are
likely to possess caste certificates to avail the reservation benefit which is apparent from the
data descriptive statistics. Table 4.6 shows that the proportion of non-migrant households
with caste certificates is higher by 21 percentage points compared to the proportion of non-
migrant households without caste certificates.
The average education of household heads is 1.82 years higher in households that have caste
certificates compared to those that do not possess caste certificates. Similarly, the average
education of all adult members in a household is 1.70 years higher in households with caste
certificate compared to those that do not have caste certificates.
A government job is one of the primary variables in this study. In this sample, govern-
ment occupations include accountant, airport or railway worker, Angarwadi worker (i.e., one
who works in rural child-care and health-care centres in India), artist, musician, assistant,
165
bank employee, employees in the telecommunication industry, business construction, busi-
ness shop owner, cleaning staff, clerk, peon (who provides menial service in an office), office
boy (who provides menial service), commission agent/broker, computer or data entry oper-
ator, cook/catering chef, delivery/courier service, domestic helper, auto-driver, taxi drivers,
casual labourer, midwife, nurse, hospital staff, pharmacist, Ministry, carpenter, Ministry elec-
trician/welder/plumber, security guard, sweeper, teacher, gardener, etc.65
For analytical purposes, we define a government job being held by a household as a binary
variable, such that we assign a value of one if at least one member in a household (between
the ages of 18-65) is working in a government sector occupation; otherwise it is assigned as
value of zero. In the full sample, 14% of households have at least one member working in
a government sector occupation. The proportion of government job being held by at least
one member of the household is higher by 7 percentage points for eligible households that
possess caste certificates compared to households that do not have caste certificates (refer to
Table 4.6 below).
65Our dataset does not have information on whether the government jobs are offered by a state government or
by the central government. We assume that these jobs are potentially related to state governments because the
central government jobs are likely to demand high educational qualifications.
166
Table 4.6: Eligible household characteristics









MIA Score 0.54 0.50 0.60 0.58 0.51 0.07 (0.000)
Mediator variable
At least one member has govt. job1 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.07 (0.007)
Explanatory variable:
Caste certificate 0.49 0.53 0.42 - - -
Non-migrants (instrument) 0.52 0.54 0.49 0.63 0.42 0.21 (0.000)
Head education 6.22 5.54 7.24 7.15 5.33 1.82 (0.000)
Average adult education2 7.61 6.98 8.55 8.48 6.78 1.70 (0.000)
Average age of adult2 36.61 36.53 36.74 36.19 37.01 -0.82 (0.104)
Head’s age 48.70 48.45 49.09 48.79 48.62 0.17 (0.851)
Head is female 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.21 -0.02 (0.430)
Household size 4.85 4.80 4.93 4.96 4.75 0.21 (0.191)
Child dependency ratio3 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 -0.00 (0.972)
Adult dependency ratio4 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.00 (0.718)
Observations 687 412 275 334 353 687
Notes: In the final column, p-values for the differences in means are reported in parentheses.
All means SC, ST and OBC households together. 1Household members having a government job are aged between 18-65 years.
The government occupations primarily include accountant, airport or railway worker, Angarwadi worker, artist, musician, as-
sistant, bank employee, business process outsourcing (BPO) employees or telecommunication industry, business construction,
business shop owner, cleaning staff, clerk, peon, office boy (provides menial service), commission agent/broker, computer
or data entry operator, cook/catering chef, delivery/courier service, domestic help, auto-driver, taxi drivers, casual labourer,
midwife, nurse, hospital staff, pharmacist, Ministry, carpenter, Ministry electrician/welder/plumber, security guard, sweeper,
teacher, gardener, etc.
2All adult members are between the ages 18–65.
3Child dependency ratio (i.e., total number of dependent children below the age of 15 divided by total household size).
4Adult dependency ratio (i.e., total number of adults aged 65 or above divided by total household size).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
4.4. Empirical strategy and identification
We start with an OLS estimation procedure to examine the correlation between the possession
of a caste certificate and the standard of living of an eligible household using the following
equation:
MIAi = α0 + β0CCi + Θ0X
′
i + δ0Ci + ε0i, (4.1)
where MIAi denotes MIA score for the ith household; CCi is a binary variable, such that a
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value of one is assigned whenever the ith household possesses a caste certificate and a value
of zero is assigned otherwise; vector Xi comprises of various household-level characteristics
and vector Θ0 is the set of coefficients corresponding to the covariates in Xi; Ci is a city-level
binary variable, such that a value of one is assigned whenever the ith household belongs to the
city of Kolkata and a value of zero is assigned whenever the household belongs to the city of
Mumbai; ε0i is the error term. We are primarily interested in testing the proposition that the
possession of a caste certificate is associated with a higher standard of living for an eligible
household. This means, we test whether β0 = 0 against β0 > 0.
The OLS estimate may suffer from either a downward or an upward bias in the β0 estimate
in Equation 4.1. This is because, whether to register for a caste certificate cannot be prede-
termined by birth although, caste is determined by birth. Therefore, registering for a caste
certificate involves an individual choice which is often unknown. Such an unobserved factor
may be individual stigma which may play a significant role in not choosing to applying one
(Gille, 2013). Thus, stigma may reduce the chance of holding a valid caste certificate. How-
ever, stigma may have either a positive or a negative impact on the selected outcome variable
(i.e., standard of living). This is because some eligible households may achieve a higher stan-
dard of living without considering the reservation benefits, while others may achieve a lower
standard of living for not considering the reservation benefits; this is due to stigma attached
to using a caste certificate. In this case, the direction of bias is ambiguous. Similarly, an-
other unobserved factor, such as an awareness regarding the benefits of a caste certificate can
increase the chance of holding a valid caste certificate; Awareness also increases the chance
attaining higher standard of living. Therefore, the estimate of β0 is likely to have an upward
bias.
To control for this endogeneity in the possession of a caste certificate, we use an instrumental
variable approach. We use the information on whether an eligible household is residing in
a city within its state of origin (i.e., a non-migrant household) to instrument whether an
eligible household possesses a caste certificate. We use the terms ‘non-migrant’ and ‘native’
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interchangeably.
We now proceed to elaborate on the validity of the instrumental variable. We define a non-
migrant household as one that is relocated to a new city for a job or for other reasons but
residing in the same state of origin. If a household remains in the same state of origin and
it possesses a caste certificate then that household has a valid caste certificate. Therefore,
residing in the state of origin increases the chance of the possession of a valid caste certificate.
However, the instrument may not be free of caveats. Being a native to a state may have its own
positive impact on SOL. We therefore, undertake an empirical test to examine whether the
instrument, conditional on a set of control variables X, has any direct impact on the outcomes
of interest (i.e., MIA score and government job holding). In Appendix Table A4.4, we present
the results of this test. The null effects of the instrument of the outcomes of interest guarantee
that the instrument is a fairly reliable fit for the purpose of our study. We have also tested
the impact of the instrument on each individual component of MIA measure. The results are
presented in Appendix Table A4.5. Given that the instrument has direct positive impact on
two out of the ten indicators of MIA measure, namely ‘No chronic disease or disability’ and
‘Number of asset ownership’, we have dropped those two components from the regression
analysis.
We denote our instrument by S, such that Si = 1 for the ith household whenever the household
has relocated within its state of origin and Si = 0 otherwise. We use a 2SLS procedure to
estimate the impact of the possession of a caste certificate on an eligible household’s standard
of living (i.e., MIA scores).
The first stage equation for a 2SLS procedure is given by:
CCi = α1 + γ1Si + Θ1X
′
i + δ1Ci + ε1i. (4.2)
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We predict ĈC from Equation 4.2. The second stage equation can be written as:
MIAi = α2 + β2ĈCi + Θ2X
′
i + δ2Ci + ε2i. (4.3)
The key coefficient of interest is β2. We are interested in testing the proposition whether
the possession of a caste certificate improves an eligible household’s standard of living. We,
therefore, examine whether β2 = 0 against β2 > 0.
The government policies provide representation to all eligible groups through reservation in
government jobs. The procurement of government jobs under reservation has a direct impact
on earnings and on overall well-being of the disadvantaged groups (Bertrand et al., 2010;
Thorat et al., 2016; Kumar et al., 2019; Deshpande and Ramachandran, 2019). In addition,
Government jobs are highly sought after in India. It is not just income but a sense of job
security achieved through having a government job, which enables households to invest more
on house maintenance and repair activities to improve their standard of living given the multi-
dimensional welfare metric used in this study. Thus, having a government job increases
the certainty and predictability of income streams and thus reducing risk and uncertainty
when making decisions about improving household residence. We therefore, consider the
procurement of a government job by at least one household member as one of the possible
channels for the relevant impact of the possession of a caste certificate on a household’s
standard of living.
While there are several studies in the literature that have used causal mediation analysis, such
as Conti et al. (2016), Moya and Carter (2018) and Hörner et al. (2019), we follow Hörner
et al. (2019).
We define a binary variable G, such that Gi = 1 whenever the ith household has at least one
member between the age of 18–65 with a government job, and Gi = 0 otherwise. We use
a 2SLS procedure for a mediation analysis. In the first step, we evaluate a causal impact of
the possession of a caste certificate on the probability of government job holding by at least
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a member of a household using the following equation,
Gi = α3 + β3ĈCi + Θ3X
′
i + δ3Ci + ε3i, (4.4)
where ĈC is estimated using Equation 4.2. In this case, we examine whether β3 = 0 against
β3 > 0. We estimate the predicted values of Ĝ from Equation 4.4 and evaluate the mediation
impact on the standard of living using the following equation:
MIAi = α4 + η1Ĝi + Θ4X
′
i + δ4Ci + ε4i. (4.5)
The predicted value ofG (i.e., a mediating variable) is assumed to be independent of the error
term ε4i. This implies that no unobserved factors exist that may affect the outcome (MIAi)
and the mediator (G). Hence, the correlation between ε3i and ε4i is zero. In Equation 4.5,
the estimated value of η1 captures the impact of the mediator G on an eligible household’s
standard of living. In this case, we examine whether η1 = 0 against η1 > 0. We use the
bootstrap method with 1,000 replications to obtain precise standard errors of the estimate of
η1.
4.5. Results
We first descriptively examine whether there are any differences in the two outcomes of in-
terest, namely standard of living and in the rates of securing government jobs between the
slum-households belonging to different caste groups. The pairwise comparison is made be-
tween all the eligible and the General households; between the eligible households that do not
possess a caste certificate and the General households; between the eligible households that
possess a caste certificate and the General households; and within the eligible households—
between those that possess and those that do not possess a caste certificate. In these pairwise
comparisons, we find that the eligible slum-households that have caste certificates experience
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a higher standard of living (marginally significant at the 10% level) and a higher rate of secur-
ing government jobs. For a causal analysis, we consider the sample of eligible (i.e., SC/ST,
OBC) households only.
4.5.1. Descriptive regression analysis
In Table 4.7, we pairwise compare the households by their caste categories to examine
whether there exist any differences in the two outcomes. We construct four binary vari-
ables for each of the four categories defined above to facilitate the pairwise comparison. The
regression results for each pairwise comparison is presented in the four adjacent rows of Ta-
ble 4.7. The second and third columns of the table stand for the two outcome variables of
interest: MIA score and government job.
In the first column of the table, we do not observe any statistically significant difference in the
average MIA scores between the eligible and the General category households. However, the
difference becomes conspicuous when we compare within the eligible households, between
those that possess caste certificates and those that do not possess caste certificates (see the
first column and the last row of Table 4.7). The result shows that the eligible households that
possess caste certificates have a higher MIA score of 0.022, on average, than the households
that do not possess caste certificates (marginally significant at the 10% level). Similarly, the
third row and the second column of the table reveal that the possession of caste certificates
by the eligible households increases the rate of procurement of government jobs by at least
one member per household by 5.5 percentage points compared to the General category slum-
household. In the last column and the last row of the table, the result further reveals, within
the eligible households, the possession of caste certificates increases the rate of procurement
of government jobs by at least one member per household by 5.8 percentage points. These
results are statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, these findings descriptively
reveal that the eligible households with caste certificates experience a higher standard of
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living and a higher chance of securing government jobs.


























Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
R2 are reported in square brackets. Observations are reported in angular brackets.
Eligible category includes SC/ST and OBC households. This table descriptively shows whether possession or non-
possession of a caste certificate makes any difference in MIA scores and in the procurement of government jobs
within the pairwise groups. The household level characteristics include average education of all working aged
members of the household (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its square, average age of all work-
ing aged members of a household and its square, gender of household head, household size, adult dependency ratio,
child dependency ratio, city dummy variable for Kolkata (considering Mumbai as a base dummy).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
4.5.2. Impact of caste certificate on standard of living of eligible households
OLS results in Table 4.8 reveal that the possession of caste certificates, on average, increases
the MIA score by 0.028 of a unit (i.e., from the mean of 0.54 unit to 0.568 unit) for all eligible
households and by 0.043 of a unit (i.e., from the mean of 0.60 unit to 0.643 unit) for OBC
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households (both the results are statistically significant at the 5% level).
If we look at the individual components of the attainment index, we find that the possession
of caste certificates, on average, increases the rate of access to a bank (i.e., saving) facility
by 6.5 percentage points for all eligible households (average is 85%, see Table 4.5), by 7.7
percentage points for SC households (average is 82%) and by 4.5 percentage points for OBC
households (average is 90%). While the rate of house-leak for OBC households reduces by
8.6 percentage points (average is 54%), the rate of exposure to health hazard reduces by 11.5
percentage points for OBC households (average is 80%), and it reduces by 7.1 percentage
points for all eligible households (average is 79%).
Before proceeding with a causal analysis, we first examine the validity of the instrument for
the possession of a caste certificate. The first row in Appendix Table A4.3 shows that being a
non-migrant increases the probability of the possession of caste certificates by 16.5 percent-
age points for SC households, by 20.1 percentage points for OBC households and by 17.4
percentage points for all eligible households. The third row of Appendix Table A4.3 shows
that the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics for SC/ST, OBC and all eligible households are
12, 11 and 22 respectively. It is noteworthy that the dependent variable in the first stage re-
gression equation is a binary variable (i.e., whether or not a household has a caste certificate).
Therefore, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics should be interpreted with some caution
here.
The use of the ‘ivreg’ command reports Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument critical
values. The F-test values (see Appendix Table A4.3) suggest that the relative finite sample
bias for the sample of SC/ST households is roughly 8% (i.e., 1/12, which is below 20%
maximal IV relative bias but above 10% bias). However, for OBC households, the relative
finite sample bias is roughly 9% (i.e., 1/11, which is slightly less than 10% maximal IV
relative bias but above 5% bias). However, for the whole sample of eligible households,
the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics is 22; this means that the relative finite sample bias is
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roughly 4.5% (i.e., 1/22, which is less than the maximal IV relative bias of 5%). Therefore,
the instrument can still be reliable for the samples of all eligible and OBC households.
In order to shed light on the orthogonality of the instrument, we consider the fact that resid-
ing in a state of origin (i.e., an ancestral state) is unlikely to be influenced by any unobserved
decisions consciously made by a household, especially when people are living in their an-
cestral states for generations. In addition, an instrument should influence the outcome vari-
ables through the problematic endogenous regressor (i.e., possession of a caste certificate)
but should not directly influence the outcome variables of interest (such as the MIA score
and the components of the attainment index). The empirical results reveal there are no sta-
tistically significant impacts of the instrument on the outcome variables of interest (refer to
Appendix Tables A4.4 and A4.5). The third column of Appendix Table A4.4 shows that the
instrument does not have any direct impact on the MIA score (which is based on all 10 indi-
cators discussed in Section 4.3.5). We further test the direct impact of the instrument on each
of the 10 attainments (refer to Appendix Table A4.5). We find the instrument does not have
a statistically significant impact on eight out of the ten indicators, while it has a statistically
significant positive impact on two of these indicators, namely not having chronic disease or
disability and asset ownership. Therefore, we drop these two attainment components from
the regression analyses that are based on the individual attainment components (see Table
4.8).
The causal findings in Table 4.8 show that, on average, a one percentage point increase in
the rate of caste certificate possession increases the MIA score by 0.0017 of a unit for OBC
households. The result is statistically significant at the 10% level. The average MIA score
for OBC households is 0.60 (see Table 4.6).
Among the eight components of the attainment index, we find that, on average, a one percent-
age point increase in the possession of the caste certificate rate reduces the rate of house-leak
by 0.38 of a percentage point for all eligible households (statistically significant at the 5%
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level). The average rate of no house-leak for all eligible households is 43% (see Table 4.5).
Similarly, on average, a one percentage point increase in the rate of caste certificate pos-
session reduces the rate of house-leak by 0.43 of a percentage point for OBC households
(statistically significant at the 10% level). The average rate of no house-leak for OBC house-
holds is 54% (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.8 further reveals that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the rate of
caste certificate possession increases the rate of non-exposure to a health hazard by 0.35 of a
percentage point for OBC households (marginally significant at the 10% level). The average
rate of non-exposure to a health hazard for OBC households is 80% (see Table 4.5).
These findings suggest that the impacts of a caste certificate on MIA score and on the attain-
ment indicators are predominantly relevant to OBC slum-households.
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Table 4.8: Effect of caste certificate on the MIA scores and the attainment components
OLS 2SLS
SC/ST OBC SC/ST & OBC SC/ST OBC SC/ST & OBC
MIA score 0.017 0.043∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.016 0.172∗ 0.081
One-tail p-value (0.171) (0.024) (0.020) (0.435) (0.071) (0.148)
R2 0.285 0.254 0.304 0.285 0.155 0.288
Attainment indicators: LPM 2SLS
Improved water facility 0.013 -0.005 0.009 -0.001 -0.132 -0.016
One-tail p-value (0.379) (0.551) (0.387) (0.502) (0.739) (0.536)
R2 0.076 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.040 0.074
Personal Toilet 0.001 -0.010 -0.002 0.092 -0.156 -0.017
One-tail p-value (0.487) (0.583) (0.535) (0.329) (0.744) (0.545)
R2 0.048 0.038 0.036 0.031 -0.001 0.036
Bank 0.077∗∗ 0.045 0.065∗∗∗ -0.158 -0.133 -0.150
One-tail p-value (0.027) (0.101) (0.009) (0.750) (0.732) (0.818)
R2 0.095 0.066 0.086 0.013 -0.011 0.005
Improved house-type -0.048 0.016 -0.021 -0.099 0.065 -0.028
One-tail p-value (0.851) (0.399) (0.709) (0.649) (0.419) (0.554)
R2 0.169 0.028 0.114 0.167 0.026 0.114
No House Leak 0.025 0.086∗ 0.047 0.321 0.428∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.310) (0.086) (0.113) (0.133) (0.097) (0.045)
R2 0.097 0.060 0.096 0.014 -0.045 -0.004
No Over Crowding 0.020 -0.052 -0.008 -0.075 -0.036 -0.109
One-tail p-value (0.336) (0.821) (0.586) (0.610) (0.552) (0.709)
R2 0.247 0.283 0.250 0.239 0.283 0.241
No health hazard 0.040 0.115∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ -0.336 0.346∗ -0.093
One-tail p-value (0.167) (0.006) (0.012) (0.894) (0.095) (0.693)
R2 0.046 0.081 0.047 -0.134 0.007 0.012
At least a land-line -0.024 0.121∗∗ 0.037 -0.349 0.032 -0.176
One-tail p-value (0.705) (0.023) (0.147) (0.906) (0.456) (0.814)
R2 0.184 0.204 0.204 0.066 0.197 0.158
Observations 412 275 687 412 275 687
F-Statistic 12 11 22
Notes: One sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
Controls for household level analysis include average education of all working aged household members (i.e., who are be-
tween the ages of 18–65 years) and its square, average age of all working aged members of household (18-65 years) and its
square, gender of household head, household size, adult dependency ratio, child dependency ratio, city dummy variable for
Kolkata (considering Mumbai as a base dummy).
First stage regression results are presented in Appendix Table A4.3.
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
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4.5.3. Mediation analysis
For a mediation analysis, we empirically examine a causal impact of the possession of a caste
certificate on the probability of government job procurement. The results presented in Panel
I of Table 4.9 show that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the caste certificate
possession rate for all eligible households increases the rate of procurement of government
jobs by at least one member per household by 0.24 of a percentage point (statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level). The average rate of government job holding for all eligible households
is 14% (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.9: Impact of caste certificate mediated through a government job
Panel I. Dep. variable: Govt. Job: 2SLS
SC/ST & OBC OBC SC/ST
Caste Certificate (ĈC) 0.238∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.086
(0.062) (0.044) (0.341)
Panel II. Dep. variable: Mediation Analysis: MIA Score
Govt. Job (Mediator Ĝ) 0.121∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.193
(0.019) (0.019) (0.175)
Observations 687 275 412
Notes: One sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel I presents regression of caste certificate on government job holding by
at least a member in an eligible household and a set of control variables. The
predicted value of government job is obtained from the regression equations
for SC/ST, OBC and combined groups.
Panel II presents regression results for having a government job on MIA
components. The predicted value of government job obtained in Panel I is
used in Panel II regressions. The estimates are computed using a bootstrap
method with 1,000 replications.
Controls for household level analysis include average education of all work-
ing aged household members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65
years) and its square, average age of all working aged household members
and its square, gender of household head, household size, adult dependency
ratio, child dependency ratio, city dummy variable for Kolkata (considering
Mumbai as a base dummy) and a caste dummy for the overall (SC and OBC)
group. First stage regression results are presented in Appendix Table A4.3.
Mediation analysis for all other components of MIA are reported in Ap-
pendix Table A4.6.
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
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Similarly, on average, a one percentage point increase in the caste certificate possession rate
for OBC households increases the rate of procurement of government jobs by at least one
member per household by 0.40 of a percentage point (statistically significant at the 10%
level). The average rate of government job holding for OBC households is 12% (see Table
4.6).
These results reveal that the possession of caste certificates indeed increases the rate of gov-
ernment job holdings for the sample of all eligible households and for the sample of OBC
households.
In Panel II of Table 4.9, we empirically test whether government jobs act as a mediator for
the observed positive impact of the possession of caste certificates on the living standard of
the eligible households, as seen in Table 4.8. Our findings in Table 4.9 show that, on average,
a one percentage point increase in the government job rate increases the MIA score for all
eligible households by 0.12 of a unit (statistically significant at the 5% level). The average
MIA score for all eligible households is 0.54 of a unit (see Table 4.6). Similarly, on average,
a one percentage point increase in the government job rate increases the MIA score for OBC
households by 0.11 of a unit (statistically significant at the 5% level). The average MIA score
for OBC households is 0.60 unit (see Table 4.6).
These findings suggest that the impact of caste certificate on the standard of living of slum-
households mediated through government job positions is predominantly relevant for the
sample of OBC households.
The reason for considering government jobs as a mediation channel is that the government
jobs are highly sought-after jobs in India. It is not just the income but also the sense of job
security and prestige achieved through having a government job. Thus, having a government
job increases the certainty and predictability of earnings streams and thus the reducing risk
and uncertainty when making decisions about improving household residence. In addition, if
one has a government job, it is necessary to open a bank account. Thus, having a government
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job (than not having one) increases the chance of a household’s access to a bank account
(see the row numbered as (3) in Table A4.6). By holding a bank account, one can expect a
positive impact on SoL. For instance, a bank account may enable an individual to secure bank
loans for investment purposes. According to Nandhi (2012), there are several new schemes
launched in 2009 to improve access to finance for the economically weaker sections of the
community, such as migrant workers, slum dwellers, street hawkers, daily wage labourers,
vegetable/fruit sellers, petty traders, housewives and students. These new schemes include
the SBI Mini Saving Bank account (i.e., mobile banking in partnership with the State Bank
of India (SBI)), the Apna Savings Account scheme in partnership with the ICICI Bank and
Tatkal (a remittance facility) introduced by the SBI in the 2010s. These mobile banking
facilities have many benefits, such as they provide easy access of credit to economically poor
people, have very low transaction cost and provide secured banking services with a 3.5%
interest rate per annum. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) also explain how brick-by-brick savings
in bank account helps economically poor people to meet unforeseen emergencies, such as
buying medicines and in finishing the construction of at least one entire room with a roof in
one go. In addition, commercial (state-owned) banks provide micro-credit to economically
weaker sections of people in India through Self-Help Groups since the launching of Bank
Self-help Group Linkage programme in the early 1990s.66 This programme established link
between commercial banks, NGOs and self-help groups (see Basu and Srivastava (2005)).
These bank-credits are provided for activities, such as income generation, housing, education,
marriage etc.67 Banerjee and Duflo (2011) explain that the SHG and Saving clubs that give
loans to their members (who belong to economically weaker sections, out of the accumulated
saving of the group) are very popular in India.
66SHG is a financial intermediary committee usually composed of 10 to 20 local women or men between 18 to
40 years.
67Government of India has also been using the SHGs for Credit Linked Subsidy Scheme (CLSS) for
the poor. CLSS is a benefit under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana which focuses on helping the
middle-income groups, economically weaker sections and lower income groups in India by bringing
down their housing loan by offering an interest subsidy. (this information is available in the website:
https://www.indianeconomy.net/splclassroom/what-is-self-help-group-shg-bank-linkage-programme/
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4.6. Discussion and conclusions
In India, social discrimination exists in the form of differences across castes (or jatis) and
religions. Since independence, the Constitution of Indian has aimed to completely restructure
Indian society in pursuit of the complete abolition of the ancient hierarchy. Although such
abolition has never been feasible, it has been able to extend the reservation benefits beyond
those that existed in the constitutional text. The disadvantaged groups often trail behind in
various socio-economic outcomes, namely consumption, education, health and employment.
In order to improve the standard of living of the eligible groups and to bring them to a level
playing field with the rest of the population, the Indian government has undertaken various
protective discrimination policies, such as reservation of places in higher education, in central
and state government jobs and in the legislature.
Many recent studies have looked at the effect of these protective discrimination policies on
the attainment of higher levels of education, securing government employment, earnings and
political representations of disadvantaged groups. While all these studies have been con-
ducted either at the national level or at a state level, none of them has focused on the poorest
sections of Indian society, such as those disadvantaged groups that are residing in the city-
slums. To fill some of the gaps in the existing literature, we have examined whether the
benefits of reservation policies are percolating down to the poorest corners of society. We
have examined the policy effect through caste certificate possession information, which is
available from the unique slum-level dataset that has been collected during 2013-14. We
have especially focused on the eligible non-Muslim and non-Christian households that reside
in the urban slums of two Indian metro cities, namely Kolkata and Mumbai, to purge the
possible effects of religion-based benefits from contaminating our results.
We have used a composite measure, namely the multidimensional index of attainment (MIA);
this has been constructed using ten attainment indicators to capture the standard of living of
the slum-dwelling households. Given that the possession of a caste certificate may be en-
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dogenously determined by unobserved factors (such as willingness to access the reservation
benefits by registering for one or not registering for one due to to social stigma attached with
the use of a caste certificate), we have used an instrumental variable approach to instrument
whether a household has a caste certificate by whether the household is residing in its state
of origin.
Our primary findings have revealed that a one percentage point increase in the caste certifi-
cate rate increases the MIA score for OBC households by 0.0017 of a unit on average. We
have further found that the benefits of caste certificates are mediated through government job
procurements by at least one member of slum-dwelling households. The results show that a
one percentage point increase in the caste certificate rate increases the government job hold-
ing rate by 0.24 of a percentage point for all eligible households and 0.39 of a percentage
point for OBC households. Consequently, on average, a one percentage point increase in the
government job rate increases the MIA score for all eligible households by 0.12 of a unit and
for OBC households by 0.11 of a unit.
The findings reveal that the benefits of a caste certificate are predominantly relevant to the
sample of OBC households but not for the sample of SC/ST households. This implies that
the possession of a caste certificate is primarily improving the access to government jobs for
OBC households. This may widen the inter-caste disparity. While we find such possibility
of inter-caste disparity at the slum-level, Deshpande and Ramachandran (2019) find a similar
possibility at the national level.
In addition, a household’s inter-state migration could potentially be motivated by its aspira-
tion to improve its standard of living through finding secured jobs for its members. Therefore,
if the rigidity in the state policy (i.e., a caste certificate issued by a given state cannot be used
in another state) is not relaxed, then improvement of the living standard for the disadvan-
taged slum-dwelling, and especially for SC/ST households, will be even more challenging.68
68SC/ST households are lagging behind OBC households within the disadvantaged groups in many aspects of
welfare. See Table 4.1.
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Therefore, liberalisation of such rigidity may be considered as an important agenda for future
policies, which may widen the access to the relevant government benefits for the disadvan-
taged groups. However, such a reformation may be prone to debate.
The primary limitation of this study is that we do not know whether or not a household mem-
ber’s government job holding is secured through a reservation channel or an open channel. In
addition, in the instrumental variable analysis, some caution is required given that the F-test
values from first stage regressions are not very high. Therefore, further research on relevant
instruments may be essential.
In this paper, we have explored only one mediation channel, i.e., the procurement of gov-
ernment jobs through which caste certificate works effectively in improving the standard of
living within slums. As a future research agenda, it would also be interesting to explore an




This thesis investigates three socio-economic challenges experienced by the Indian house-
holds over the past decades: first, whether a large family size affects education and health out-
comes of the children; second, whether fertility affects female labour market outcomes (such
as the market participation and hours of labour supply in the market); and third, whether the
possession of a caste certificate improves the standard of living of disadvantaged households
(namely Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Class (OBC))
that are residing in the urban slums. Here, I summarise the contributions of my thesis to the
literature, the key findings of each research question and suggest potential avenues for future
research.
Chapter 2 investigates the possibility of a trade-off between child-quantity and child-quality
in the Indian context and contributes to the literature by considering multiple measures for
child-quality that includes both the schooling and health outcomes for all age groups of chil-
dren: 1–4 (young) and 5–18 (school-aged). Child-quantity is measured by the number of
children born to a family. The schooling outcomes include five indicators, namely completed
years of schooling, school attendance, delay in years of schooling, ratio of actual years of
schooling to expected years of schooling (ERT), age-standardised schooling index. I also use
the test scores in reading, writing and arithmetic that are available for 8–11 year old chil-
dren. The health outcomes include indicators, namely weight-for-age z-score, height-for-age
z-score and BMI-for-age z-score. This study also examines the heterogeneity across differ-
ent family sizes (i.e., how the difference in the number of children per family affects the
outcomes), gender of children, types of settlement (urban versus rural) and types of family
setting (extended versus nuclear).69 The nationally representative household level dataset,
69In the earlier studies, child-quality has not been consistently studied using both education and health indi-
cators. For examples, Kumar and Kugler (2017) have used schooling indicators for school-aged children.
Sarin (2004), in his unpublished dissertation, uses quality indicators, such as height-for-age z-score, height-
to-weight ratio and immunization (i.e., chance of receiving Measles vaccine) for below five year old children,
born during the 1990s. He has not studied health outcomes for school-aged children. Azam and Saing (2018)
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of the 2011 India Human Development Survey (IHDS-II) allows for such a comprehensive
analysis. To strengthen the causal analysis, three alternative instruments are used for child-
quantity such as twin-births, nth delivery of twins and same gender composition of the first
two children. The empirical findings reveal there are negative sibling impacts on children’s
schooling and health outcomes. The negative impacts of an additional child on average years
of schooling completion and ERT are relevant to the urban settlement and in the nuclear
family setting, whereas the impacts on health outcomes of children are relevant to the rural
settlement and to both the extended and the nuclear family settings. The regression mod-
els based on different family sizes reveal that these negative impacts of child-quantity on
the schooling outcomes of children primarily emerge from the families having at least five
children. These findings are robust to birth order of children. Twin-birth and same-gender
composition, as instruments, have picked up slightly different magnitudes of trade-off; this
is potentially because of the local average treatment effect that may vary by the choice of
an instrument. This study tries to address the birth spacing concern related to twin-births by
controlling for age gap between the first and last child born to a woman.70 A limitation of this
study is that this study could not empirically investigate the resource reallocation possibilities
by parents towards non-twin children. This will require a suitable dataset and is beyond the
scope of the current investigation. As a future research agenda, it would be interesting to
study how parents reallocate their resources among children after twin births by the types of
parents (i.e., urban parents, who might be more compensating in nature versus rural parents,
who might be reinforcing in nature) to examine how such resource reallocation can influence
child-quality.71
(2018) have only used height-for-age z-scores for 6–18 year old children but not for those who are below the
age of five. Besides weight-for-age is also an important indicator of a child’s health in the initial years of birth.
In addition, these studies have neither examined heterogeneity in the Q-Q trade-off by different family sizes
and types of family setting nor have used all the health indicators consistently for all age groups of children.
This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.
70Birth spacing refers to age gap between the children. Smaller age gap between last two children has a direct
negative impact on schooling outcomes of previous born children. Therefore, I control for this age-spacing
between the first and last children in the regression models which controls for the care taken by the oldest
child for younger siblings in a family.
71Compensating parents are likely to allocate resources evenly among all children whereas reinforcing parents
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Chapter 3 contributes to the labour market economics literature both theoretically as well as
empirically. It contributes to the theoretical model of Gronau (1977) by revising the Gronau-
optimal time allocation by introducing a concept of compulsory hours of housework time.
Using the theoretical framework, this study illustrates how an exogenous fertility shock may
influence female labour market participation and hours of labour supply in the market. The
endogeneity of fertility is controlled by using instruments (i.e., twins and first girl). The
causal impacts of fertility on the labour market outcomes have never been examined in the
earlier studies in the Indian context. Using twins from the IHDS-II dataset, the empirical
findings reveal that fertility discourages female labour market participation and longer hours
of labour supply, particularly when children are young (under the age of six) but school-aged
children increases the likelihood of female labour market participation. This study focuses
solely on those women who are working in paid jobs outside home. However, there are
many unpaid work that women routinely do at home in family enterprises (such as livestock
or poultry farming, fishing, supplying production in neighbourhood grocery stores, making
small items for sale, growing fruit and vegetables for sale etc.). By engaging in these activi-
ties, women indirectly contributes to economic activity. It is not feasible to provide empirical
insights for this set of women due to data limitation. As an agenda for further research, this
analysis could be extended to understand the impact of fertility on the female trichotomy of
time allocation in a developing country context. Such a study would require precise infor-
mation on time spent by women on at least three of the core activities, namely housework,
market-work and leisure (if sleep-time is excluded from the leisure time). This would be
similar to what Gronau has done in a developed country context, i.e., in Israel and in the
USA. In addition, complete information on husbands’ labour market outcomes could make
the study even more interesting as this will enable the comparison of labour market outcomes
by gender, as motivated by Becker (1985).
Chapter 4 discusses on the Affirmative Action (AA) programme in India that intends to raise
are likely to allocate more resources on non-twin (better quality) children.
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the likelihood of representation for the historically oppressed caste (SC) and tribal minor-
ity (ST) groups through obtaining a government job or getting into academic institutions
(school/college). Belonging to the said communities does not automatically enable the mem-
bers to benefit from the various central and state AA schemes. Rather, these disadvantaged
groups are required to have a caste certificate from the government of their native state domi-
cile.72 This chapter investigates whether the possession of a caste certificate by an eligible
member of a slum-dwelling household improves the household’s standard of living, compared
to similar eligible households that do not possess one. This slum-level study is a novel contri-
bution to the literature on AA programmes and socio-economic well-being of disadvantaged
groups of people in the India. We have used unique dataset comprising of 1,361 households
residing in the urban slums of Mumbai and Kolkata, where larger shares of population re-
siding in slums among all other Indian cities. The study controls for the endogeneity in the
possession of caste certificates by using an instrument (i.e., whether the household is residing
within its state of origin, where the registration of caste certificate is feasible).73 The findings
reveal that the benefits of the possession of a caste certificate on an eligible household’s the
standard of living are relevant to OBC households. The benefit of a caste certificate on an
eligible household’s standard of living is mediated through the procurement of government
jobs, potentially through a reservation channel, by at least a household member. The primary
limitation of this study is that we do not know whether or not government job holdings by
the household members are secured through a reservation channel. In addition, this study
has explored only one mediation channel, i.e., the procurement of government jobs through
which caste certificate works effectively in improving the standard of living within a slum
setting. As a future research agenda, it would also be interesting to explore an alternative
mediation channel, such as reservation in higher education, within a slum setting.
72For one to be eligible for a caste certificate, a beneficiary’s caste must be listed in the central or a state
government’s list of identified caste groups (or jatis) that are broadly classified into SC, ST and OBC.
73The need to register for a caste certificate is driven by the choice of an eligible candidate on whether to access
government benefits through a reservation channel.
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Panel A: Twins             
Author   Country   Outcome   Results 
Black et al. (2010)  Norway  
IQ (Standardized 1-9)  Negative Trade-off 




  Private School Attendance   Negative Trade-off 
    Educational Attainment   No Trade-off 
Li et al. (2008)  China  
Education Categories  Trade-off in Rural areas 
  Education Enrolment  
Ponczek and Souza (2012)   Brazil   
Years of Education 
(Female)   
Negative Trade-off 
    Years of Education (Male)   No Trade-off 
Sanhueza (2009)  Chile  Years of Education  Negative Trade-off 
Angrist et al. (2005, 2010) 
  
Israel 
  Years of Education   
No Trade-off   Some College  
    College Grad   
Black et al. (2005)   Norway   Years of Education   No result with birth order 
Dayioglu et al. (2009)   Turkey   Attendance   No Trade-off 
Fitzsimons and Malde (2014)   Mexico   
Years of Education 
(Female)   No Trade-off 








Source: Summarised by the author.
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Panel B: Gender Composition              
Author   Country   Outcome   Results 
Becker et al. (2010)   Prussia   Enrolment   Negative Trade-off 
Conley and Glauber (2006)  USA  
Private School 
Attendance 
 Negative Trade-off (Second 
born boy) 
  Grade Repetition 
 No Association 




Held Back Grades   
Positive impact on grade 
retention with higher no. of 
persons per room 
Angrist et al. (2010) 
 
Israel 
 Years of Education 
 
No Trade-off   Some College 
 
    College Graduation   
Black et al. (2005)   Norway   Years of Education    No Trade-off (positive result) 
Panel C: Gender of First Child 
Kumar & Kugler (2017) 
 
India 






Lee (2008)   Taiwan   
Total ln (Educational 
Spend) 
  
Positive relation between 
dependent and outcome, 
especially when fertility is too 
high. 




  Year of Education    








Panel E: Fertility Shock (Policy Effect) 
Bougma et al. (2015) 
  
Burkina 
Faso   
Years of Education   Negative Trade-off 
Dang and Rogers (2013) 
  
Vietnam 
  Years of Education   No Trade-off 
  Private Tutoring 
 Negative Trade-off 






  No Trade-off 
 Source: Summarised by the author.
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A2.2. Sample
Out of 111,193 children in the birth history file, there are 79,073 children who are living with
the eligible women respondent. The survey provides no additional information for children
who are either dead or are living outside the household and hence are not considered in this
analysis. The birth history file provided detail information on the month and the year of birth
of children. I have dropped 39 children whose ages are negative, thus arriving at 79,034
children. Nineteen children are dropped due to missing information on households’ religion,
remaining with 79,015 children. One individual is misreported as a child and hence, the age
has been corrected. This leads to 79,014 children. The information on education of children
are available from the individual records and are merged with eligible women record. While
merging the individual education file with eligible women file, two children are dropped due
to mismatches, remaining with 79,012 children. Out of 79,012 children, 12,133 children
(i.e., 15%) are not considered in this analysis because the age of these of children are not
compatible with their completed years of schooling.74 Twelve children have no information
on completed years of schooling between the ages of 5–18. Besides, the data have missing
information on medical treatment location. Dropping households with missing information,
I finally consider a sample to 43,721 children between the ages of 5–18. This age cut-off is
used to avoid sample selection problem, especially for girls, who generally get married at the
age of 18. Out of 43,731 children 828 children have twin siblings and 42,903 children have
non-twin siblings.
74Whether ages or the educational attainments are misspecified, it is difficult to analyse. Hence, I have dropped
these households remaining with 66,879 children.
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15–24 2.20 0.02 2011 2.3
25-34 2.86 0.01 2001 3.1
35-44 3.56 0.01 1991 3.8
45-54 4.13 0.02 1981 4.7
55-64 4.39 0.04 1971 5.4
Notes:1Data has been collected from The United Nations World Fertility Pat-
terns 2013 accessed from https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2013.pdf on August 06, 2020.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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for child age 5-14
Standard
error
States with average two children per woman 4.22 0.04
States with average three children per woman 3.79 0.02
States with average more than four per woman 2.65 0.03





for child age 15-18
Standard
error
States with average two children per woman 9.93 0.04
States with average three children per woman 8.77 0.03
States with average more than four per woman 7.49 0.06
Total number of children 11,638
Notes:pairwise differences in average education by average fertility within each age group are statisti-
cally significant. Fertility by state is presented in Appendix Table A2.5 below.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.5. State-wise average fertility rates
Indian states Average fertility Standard error
Maharashtra 2.95 0.02
Andhra Pradesh 2.81 0.02
Goa 2.38 0.05
Kerala 2.46 0.02






Jammu & Kashmir 3.76 0.04





Arunachal Pradesh 3.80 0.10
Mizoram 3.07 0.20
Assam 3.17 0.04




Madhya Pradesh 3.72 0.02
Gujarat 3.24 0.03
Daman & Diu 3.74 0.11
Dadra & Nagar Havel 3.40 0.15
Karnataka 3.12 0.02
Rajasthan 4.08 0.03




Total number of women 63,427
Notes: All IHDS-II women are considered for this table.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II
dataset.
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A2.6. LMS z-score calculation
The calculation of z-score by WHO for all the growth indicators are based on LMS method
(Cole and Green, 1992). The Z-scores are the standardized measures of growth indicators (y)
and are used to identify whether a child has normal growth, or a child is at a risk of a health





Where y is a growth indicator, M(t) is median at age t and SD(t) is coefficient of variation
or standard deviation at age t. For a child, when the z-score for a growth indicator is below
−3 or above 3 then distribution of z-score may be skewed. LMS method is used to transform
the skewed data to normal distribution for analytical simplification. Therefore, z-score is




Zind if− 3 ≥ Zind ≤ 3
3 + y−SD3pos
SD23pos
if Zind > 3
−3 + y−SD3neg
SD23neg
if Zind < −3.
(5.2)
where,
SD3pos is the cut-off 3 SD calculated at age t by the LMS method;
SD3neg is the cut-off -3 SD calculated at age t by the LMS method;
SD23pos is the difference between the cut-offs 3 SD and 2 SD calculated at age t by LMS
method;
SD23neg is the difference between the cut-offs -2 SD and -3 SD calculated at age t by LMS
method;
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For empirical analysis, I have used WHO Anthro and macros to calculate the z-scores of the
children’s nutritional variables.75 This software uses LMS method as discussed above. IHDS-
II dataset has anthropometry information for all eligible women and their children. Weight
is reported in kilograms and height is given in centimetre. Therefore, to calculate BMI, all
heights have been converted in metres. Using the WHO Anthro and macros, I have calculated
the followings for all the growth indicators: i) z-scores, ii) whether z-scores are more than 2
standard deviation below median, and iii) whether z-scores are more than 3 standard deviation
below median. These are calculated for two age categories of children namely 0-5 and 5-18.




Years of Schooling 
Completed   
3 Child Family  4 Child Family  5 Child Family 
Child 1a  0.078 
**  0.279 ***  -0.031  
Child 1 and 2b  
   0.155 ***  0.071  
Child 1, 2 and 3c 
 
      0.070 
 
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.Significance of coefficients is based on robust standard error. All regression 
includes indicators for child age, child gender, child gender*child age, mother's age, squared age of mother, 
mother education, social groups, state dummies, medical treatment location and age gaps of last two children. 
To tackle this birth spacing effect on education of children, I control for age gap between first and last child as 
an additional control in regression. I also control for contraceptive use as a robustness check. aFirst child’s 
years of schooling. bFirst and second child’s years of schooling, cFirst, second and third child’s years of 
schooling.  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A2.9. First stage regression results: Twin birth order is used as instrument for number
of children
Edu.
Yrs. Attend1. Delay ERT2 EDT3
Families with 2 or more children: Effect of second order twin births on No. of children
Second order twins 0.787∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.122) (0.122)
No. of twins 62 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.396 0.396 0.396 0.385 0.385
Observations 12,037 12,037 12,037 12,037 12,037
Families with 3 or more children: Effect of third order twin births on No. of children
Third order twins 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129)
No. of twins 67 67 67 67 67
R-squared 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335 0.335
Observations 11,668 11,668 11,668 11,668 11,668
Families with 4 or more children: Effect of fourth order twin births on No. of children
Fourth order twins 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210)
No. of twins 27 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.276 0.276 0.276 0.275 0.275
Observations 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,795 6,795
Families with 5 or more children: Effect of fifth order twin births on No. of children
Fourth order twins 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.187) (0.187)
No. of twins 14 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262
Observations 3,377 3,377 3,377 3,377 3,377
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance of coefficients is based on robust standard error. 1Attendance is dummy variable: if children are
absent for less than 15 days, attendance=1, provided they are enrolled in school. 2ERT is completed years
of schooling relative to expected years of schooling at any given age. 3EDT is age standardised schooling
index including twins. Regressions include age of child, age of mother, squared age of mother, education
of mother, child gender, child gender*child age, state dummies, age gaps between twins and children born
before twin birth, communities include Brahmin, FC-General, disadvantaged groups (SC, ST and OBC), FC-
Muslim and Others (Christians, Sikhs and Jains) are considered as base categories. F-statistic is Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F-statistic. Different size of family is considered to study the non-linear effect of family size on
children’s educational outcomes. In addition, the families that desire more children after the nthh twin birth
may differ in characteristics depending upon whether the parents will end up with singletons or another pair
of twins. To examine this possible differential effects, this table studies the effect of higher order twin births
on all earlier children’s education.
First stage regression results are reported in Appendix Table A2.9.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A2.17. Included versus missing z-scores for 1–4 year children’s weight-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: weight-for-age 2,350 -1.58 1.35
Age of child (in years) 2,350 4.34 0.32 369 4.37 0.33 0.02 (0.21)
Boy proportion 2,350 0.54 0.50 369 0.50 0.50 -0.04 (0.15)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 2,350 29.14 5.03 369 28.68 4.82 -0.46 (0.10)
Education (in years) 2,350 5.43 4.94 369 6.14 4.76 0.71 (0.01)
Number of children 2,350 2.85 1.49 369 2.57 1.13 -0.28 (0.00)
From urban area 2,350 0.30 0.46 369 0.30 0.46 0.01 (0.84)
Household characteristics
Household size1 2,350 6.34 2.53 369 6.89 3.02 0.55 (0.00)
Medical treatment location2 2,350 1.71 0.97 369 1.76 0.94 0.05 (0.38)
Household assets3 2,349 14.48 6.58 369 15.38 6.12 0.90 (0.01)
Income per capita (in INR)4 2,350 19,858 33,931 369 18,944 18,428 - 914 (0.61)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 2,349 18,773 15,262 369 18,838 13,679 65 (0.94)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 2,350 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.15 -0.02 (0.06)
FC (0/1) 2,350 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.04 (0.04)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 2,350 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.49 -0.06 (0.02)
Muslims (0/1) 2,350 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.04 (0.04)
Others (0/1)6 2,350 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.00 (0.66)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household.
2Medical treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain
information on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of
January 19, 2020. 5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.18. Included versus missing z-scores for 1–4 year children’s height-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: height-for-age 2,173 -1.55 1.29
Age of child (in years) 2,184 4.35 0.32 535 4.35 0.32 0.01 (0.66)
Boy proportion 2,184 0.54 0.50 535 0.49 0.50 -0.06 (0.02)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 2,184 29.14 5.07 535 28.79 4.74 -0.35 (0.15)
Education (in years) 2,184 5.35 4.95 535 6.23 4.77 0.88 (0.00)
Number of children 2,184 2.87 1.49 535 2.58 1.23 -0.29 (0.00)
From urban area 2,184 0.30 0.46 535 0.31 0.46 0.01 (0.53)
Household characteristics
Household size1 2,184 6.37 2.56 535 6.59 2.77 0.22 (0.08)
Medical treatment location2 2,184 1.70 0.95 535 1.79 1.00 0.09 (0.06)
Household assets3 2,183 14.43 6.61 535 15.30 6.13 0.88 (0.01)
Income per capita (in INR)4 2,184 19,732 34,751 535 19,739 19,028 7 (1.00)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 2,183 18,762 15,503 535 18,863 13,081 101 (0.89)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 2,184 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.15 -0.02 (0.04)
FC (0/1) 2,184 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.36 0.03 (0.05)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 2,184 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.61 0.49 -0.04 (0.07)
Muslims (0/1) 2,184 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.02 (0.17)
Others (0/1)6 2,184 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.00 (0.48)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household.
2Medical treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain
information on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of
January 19, 2020. 5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.19. Included versus missing z-scores for 1–4 year children’s BMI-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: BMI-for-age 2,160 -1.64 1.18
Age of child (in years) 2,161 4.35 0.32 558 4.34 0.32 -0.01 (0.41)
Boy proportion 2,161 0.53 0.50 558 0.52 0.50 -0.02 (0.44)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 2,161 29.15 5.07 558 28.78 4.75 -0.38 (0.11)
Education (in years) 2,161 5.34 4.94 558 6.24 4.78 0.91 (0.00)
Number of children 2,161 2.89 1.51 558 2.51 1.15 -0.38 (0.00)
From urban area 2,161 0.29 0.45 558 0.33 0.47 0.04 (0.09)
Household characteristics
Household size1 2,161 6.37 2.55 558 6.59 2.79 0.22 (0.07)
Medical treatment location2 2,161 1.71 0.96 558 1.73 0.97 0.02 (0.70)
Household assets3 2,160 14.35 6.61 558 15.57 6.10 1.22 (0.00)
Income per capita (in INR)4 2,161 19,264 33,456 558 21,555 27,120 2,291 (0.13)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 2,160 18,651 15,490 558 19,287 13,235 636 (0.37)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 2,161 0.04 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.15 -0.02 (0.03)
FC (0/1) 2,161 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.04 (0.02)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 2,161 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.61 0.49 -0.05 (0.03)
Muslims (0/1) 2,161 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.03 (0.10)
Others (0/1)6 2,161 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.00 (0.59)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household.
2Medical treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain
information on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of
January 19, 2020. 5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.20. Included versus missing z-scores for 5–18 year children’s weight-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: weight-for-age 14,336 -1.55 1.40
Age of child (in years) 14,336 7.58 1.56 2,421 7.55 1.56 -0.03 (0.33)
Boy proportion 14,336 0.52 0.50 2,421 0.52 0.50 0.00 (0.92)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 14,336 32.46 5.69 2,421 31.83 5.42 -0.63 (0.00)
Education (in years) 14,336 4.63 4.78 2,421 5.03 4.89 0.40 (0.00)
Number of children 14,336 3.29 1.59 2,421 3.07 1.48 -0.21 (0.00)
From urban area 14,336 0.28 0.45 2,421 0.31 0.46 0.03 (0.01)
Household characteristics
Household size1 14,336 6.35 2.52 2,421 6.54 2.72 0.19 (0.00)
Medical treatment location2 14,336 1.69 0.94 2,421 1.69 0.94 0.00 (0.81)
Household assets3 14,332 14.10 6.51 2,420 14.65 6.45 0.56 (0.00)
Income per capita (in INR)4 14,336 18,323 27,752 2,421 20,125 26,755 1,802 (0.00)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 14,332 18,643 15,208 2,421 19,344 16,707 701 (0.04)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 14,336 0.04 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.17 -0.01 (0.01)
FC (0/1) 14,336 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.02 (0.02)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 14,336 0.66 0.47 0.47 0.61 0.49 -0.05 (0.00)
Muslims (0/1) 14,336 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.04 (0.00)
Others (0/1)6 14,336 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.00 (0.88)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household. 2Medical
treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain information
on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of January 19, 2020.
5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain. Source: Estimated are
based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.21. Included versus missing z-scores for 5–18 year children’s height-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: height-for-age 35,281 -1.55 1.44
Age of child (in years) 35,281 11.71 3.92 8,450 12.06 4.00 0.35 (0.00)
Boy proportion 35,281 0.51 0.50 8,450 0.57 0.49 0.06 (0.00)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 35,281 36.33 6.50 8450 36.65 6.82 0.32 (0.00)
Education (in years) 35,281 4.19 4.64 8450 4.37 4.73 0.18 (0.00)
Number of children 35,281 3.51 1.65 8450 3.43 1.65 -0.09 (0.00)
From urban area 35,281 0.31 0.46 8450 0.33 0.47 0.02 (0.00)
Household characteristics
Household size1 35,281 6.12 2.39 8450 6.17 2.52 0.05 (0.07)
Medical treatment location2 35,281 1.69 0.94 8450 1.69 0.94 0.00 (0.72)
Household assets3 35,275 14.76 6.41 8443 14.98 6.31 0.22 (0.01)
Income per capita (in INR)4 35,281 20,151 33,839 8450 22,273 44,909 2,122 (0.00)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 35,276 21,092 19,997 8447 21,785 24,048 692 (0.01)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 35,281 0.05 0.21 8450 0.03 0.17 -0.02 (0.00)
FC (0/1) 35,281 0.13 0.34 8450 0.14 0.35 0.01 (0.08)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 35,281 0.65 0.48 8450 0.61 0.49 -0.04 (0.00)
Muslims (0/1) 35,281 0.15 0.35 8450 0.19 0.39 0.04 (0.00)
Others (0/1)6 35,281 0.02 0.14 8450 0.02 0.15 0.00 (0.77)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household. 2Medical
treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain information
on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of January 19, 2020.
5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain. Source: Estimated are
based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A2.22. Included versus missing z-scores for 5–18 year children’s BMI-for-age
Included sample Missing sample




Child characteristics: Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD (p-values)
Z-score: BMI-for-age 34,849 -1.57 1.41
Age of child (in years) 35,278 11.72 3.91 8,453 12.01 4.04 0.29 (0.00)
Boy proportion 35,278 0.51 0.50 8,453 0.58 0.49 0.07 (0.00)
Mother characteristics:
Age of mother (in years) 35,278 36.34 6.49 8,453 36.60 6.83 0.25 (0.00)
Education (in years) 35,278 4.20 4.64 8,453 4.36 4.72 0.16 (0.01)
Number of children 35,278 3.51 1.65 8,453 3.43 1.65 -0.09 (0.00)
From urban area 35,278 0.31 0.46 8,453 0.33 0.47 0.02 (0.00)
Household characteristics
Household size1 35,278 6.11 2.38 8,453 6.18 2.54 0.07 (0.02)
Medical treatment location2 35,278 1.69 0.94 8,453 1.69 0.94 0.01 (0.62)
Household assets3 35,271 14.77 6.41 8,447 14.97 6.31 0.20 (0.01)
Income per capita (in INR)4 35,278 20,193 33,856 8,453 22,098 44,861 1,906 (0.00)
Consumption per capita (in INR) 35,272 21,086 19,998 8,451 21,808 24,042 722 (0.00)
Religious/social groups
Brahmins (0/1) 35,278 0.05 0.21 8,453 0.03 0.17 -0.02 (0.00)
FC (0/1) 35,278 0.13 0.34 8,453 0.14 0.35 0.01 (0.02)
Disadvantaged group (0/1) 5 35,278 0.65 0.48 8,453 0.61 0.49 -0.04 (0.00)
Muslims (0/1) 35,278 0.15 0.36 8,453 0.19 0.39 0.04 (0.00)
Others (0/1)6 35,278 0.02 0.14 8,453 0.02 0.14 0.00 (0.89)
Notes: In the last column, the figures within parentheses are p-values. 1Household size refers to number of members in a household. 2Medical
treatment location has 4 categories depending on its distance. Higher category means higher distance. 3Household Assets contain information
on number of assets that a household has. The number ranges from 0 to 33. 4One dollar is equal to 71.04 Indian rupees as of January 19, 2020.
5Disadvantaged group includes Other Backward Class, Dalit and Adivasi. 6Others include – Christian, Sikh and Jain. Source: Estimated are
based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.23. Derivation of first order conditions in the Gronau model
I derive the first order conditions for optimal time allocation. The choice variables in this
model are: XM , L,N ,H , λ and µ. The first order conditions for the unconstrained maximum
of L is given as follows:
Differentiating with respect to L:
∂L
∂L
= 0 =⇒ UL = µ (A3.1)
Differentiating with respect to XM :
∂L
∂XM
= 0 =⇒ UX = λ (A3.2)
Differentiating with respect to H where X = XM + f(H):
∂L
∂H
= 0 =⇒ UXfH = µ (A3.3)
Differentiating with respect to N:
∂L
∂N
= 0 =⇒ λW = µ (A3.4)









= MRSX,L which is the marginal rate of substitution betweenX and leisure hours
L.
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A3.24. Second order condition for Gronau-equilibrium
The second order condition for Gronau-equilibrium can be examined using Bordered Hessian
matrix for the constrained optimization exercise. Bordered Hessian matrix can be written as,
H̄ = H̄6 =

0 0 TXM TL TH TN
0 0 XMXM XML XMH XMN
TXM XMXM LXMXM LXML LXMH LXMN
TL XML LLXM LLL LLH LN
TH XMH LHXM LHL LHH LHN
TN XMN LNXM LNL LNH LNN

where XM is the income constraint and T is time constraint. In the above Lagrangian ex-
pression, there are four choice variables (n = 4) namely, XM , L, H , N and two constraints
(m = 2). Therefore, n −m = 2. To obtain maximum in constrained optimisation, the last
2 principal minors of the bordered Hessian matrix H̄ must alternate in signs, the first having
sign (−1)(m+ 1) i.e., condition for maximum requires the determinant of H̄5 < 0 and deter-
minant of H̄6 > 0. Similarly, condition for minimum requires the last n−m principal minors
must all be negative.
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A3.25. Female labour force participation in India since 1987
Urban (age 15-64)   
1987   1993   1999   2004   2009   2011 


























Urban (age 25-54)                         


























Rural (age 15-64)                         


























Rural (age 25-54)                         













PS + Subsidiary status   
60.0 
(0.57)   
69.9 
(0.58)   
74.0 
(0.55)   
90.4 
(0.59)   
77.3 




Notes: Numbers in millions and labour force participation rates in parenthesis. The principal status of a
person is the status on which a person has spent relatively long time during the 365 days. Any engagement in
subsidiary capacity may arise if a person may be engaged for a principal status and for a relatively small period,
which is not less than 30 days, in another economic activity.
Source: Figures are taken from Klasen and Pieters (2015), Appendix S1 Table S1.1.
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A3.26. Education of IHDS–II women by employment sectors
Overall
Employment
sector No edu (%) Primary (%) Sec. edu (%) Post sec. (%) Grad. (%)
Participation rate (%) 39.43 30.08 5.86 13.67 23.49
Agriculture 61.29 54.38 42.99 14.16
Business 22.02 21.14 16.79 12.39 3.96
Official 2.28 5.01 14.33 50.88 87.79
Manufacturing 7.73 11.13 15.19 8.41 2.64
Other 6.67 8.34 10.70 14.16 5.61
Total(%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total participation 1,798 719 935 226 303
Total by education 4,560 2,390 5,897 1,653 1,290
Urban
Employment
sector No edu (%) Primary (%) Sec. edu (%) Post sec. (%) Grad. (%)
Participation rate (%) 30.56 20.16 10.93 11.05 23.09
Agriculture 22.76 16.80 9.35 2.15
Business 19.92 17.60 10.57 7.53 4.74
Official 4.07 4.80 20.73 55.91 85.78
Manufacturing 19.92 25.60 31.71 12.90 3.79
Other 33.33 35.20 27.64 21.51 5.69
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total participation 246 125 246 93 211
Total by education 805 620 2,250 841 914
Rural
Employment
sector No edu (%) Primary (%) Sec. edu (%) Post sec. (%) Grad. (%)
Participation rate (%) 41.33 33.56 18.89 16.38 24.47
Agriculture 67.40 62.29 55.01 22.56
Business 22.36 21.89 19.01 15.79 2.17
Official 2.00 5.05 12.05 47.37 92.39
Manufacturing 5.80 8.08 9.29 5.26
Other 2.45 2.69 4.64 9.02 5.43
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total participation 1,552 594 689 133 92
Total by education 3,755 1,770 3,647 812 376
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculations using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.27. Hours of work and regional hourly wages for the IHDS-II women










Women with young children 1257 18.04
Women with school-aged children 1333 18.25
Urban
Women with young children 1916 20.30
Women with school-aged children 1845 19.31
Rural
Women with young children 1078 17.43
Women with school-aged children 1174 17.92
Nuclear
Women with young children 1164 17.67
Women with school-aged children 1299 18.21
Extended
Women with young children 1320 18.29
Women with school-aged children 1392 18.32
Notes: Women who are working in paid jobs outside their households. 1Rs. is Indian ru-
pees.
Source: Estimated are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of children 1.49 2.50 1.48 1.02 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.82 19.93 18.81 1.12 (0.26)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.45 0.41 0.45 -0.04 (0.51)
Age of mother 25.10 27.57 25.08 2.49 (0.00)
Age at marriage 19.42 20.35 19.41 0.94 (0.11)
Married 0.99 0.98 0.99 -0.01 (0.74)
Widowed & divorced 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 (0.74)
No education 0.21 0.17 0.21 -0.04 (0.43)
Primary 0.13 0.11 0.13 -0.02 (0.67)
Secondary 0.42 0.35 0.42 -0.07 (0.30)
Post sec. education 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.06 (0.27)
Graduate education 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.07 (0.20)
OBC 0.33 0.28 0.33 -0.05 (0.43)
Hindu Brahmin 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 (0.48)
Hindu Forward 0.16 0.24 0.16 0.08 (0.17)
SC and ST 0.31 0.28 0.31 -0.03 (0.59)
Muslim 0.13 0.09 0.13 -0.04 (0.37)
Christian and others 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 (0.67)
Urban 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.07 (0.32)
Childhood in urban 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.03 (0.63)
Market participation rate 0.15 0.06 0.15 -0.09 (0.01)
Observations 6,277 54 6,223 6,277
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of children 2.12 3.13 2.11 1.02 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.91 19.06 18.91 0.15 (0.80)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.45 0.38 0.45 -0.07 (0.12)
Age of mother 35.73 36.14 35.73 0.42 (0.40)
Age at marriage 18.04 18.28 18.03 0.25 (0.51)
Married 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.01 (0.76)
Widow & divorced 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.01 (0.76)
No education 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.01 (0.76)
Primary 0.17 0.13 0.17 -0.04 (0.21)
Secondary 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.01 (0.77)
Post sec. education 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.01 (0.62)
Graduate education 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.00 (0.96)
OBC 0.36 0.32 0.36 -0.04 (0.36)
Hindu Brahmin 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 (0.88)
Hindu Forward 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.01 (0.88)
SC and ST 0.27 0.25 0.27 -0.02 (0.67)
Muslim 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.04 (0.25)
Christian and others 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 (0.51)
Urban 0.36 0.34 0.36 -0.02 (0.66)
Childhood in urban 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.04 (0.32)
Market participation rate 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.04 (0.34)
Observations 9,513 118 9,395 9,513
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 1.43 2.52 1.41 1.11 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.87 20.52 18.85 1.66 (0.33)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.01 (0.90)
Age of mother 26.11 28.76 26.09 2.68 (0.09)
Age at marriage 20.65 20.95 20.64 0.31 (0.71)
Married 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.01 (0.00)
Widow & Divorced 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 (0.00)
No education 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.03 (0.70)
Primary 0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.04 (0.39)
Secondary 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.02 (0.87)
Post sec. education 0.20 0.10 0.20 -0.10 (0.14)
Graduate education 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.09 (0.37)
OBC 0.31 0.24 0.31 -0.07 (0.47)
Hindu Brahmin 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.02 (0.75)
Hindu Forward 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.10 (0.35)
SC and ST 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.01 (0.92)
Muslim 0.18 0.14 0.18 -0.03 (0.68)
Christian and others 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 (0.80)
Urban 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 (.)
Childhood in urban 0.32 0.29 0.32 -0.04 (0.71)
Market participation rate 0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.10 (0.00)
Observations 2,023 21 2,002 2,023
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 1.99 3.05 1.97 1.08 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 19.05 19.54 19.05 0.49 (0.62)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.10 0.07 0.11 -0.03 (0.48)
Age of mother 35.86 36.52 35.85 0.68 (0.39)
Age at marriage 19.32 19.60 19.32 0.28 (0.65)
Married 0.95 0.95 0.95 -0.00 (0.92)
Widow & Divorced 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 (0.92)
No education 0.17 0.28 0.17 0.11 (0.15)
Primary 0.13 0.05 0.13 -0.08 (0.03)
Secondary 0.42 0.40 0.42 -0.02 (0.83)
Post sec. education 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.02 (0.74)
Graduate education 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.03 (0.60)
OBC 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.03 (0.73)
Hindu Brahmin 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.02 (0.62)
Hindu Forward 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.02 (0.82)
SC and ST 0.21 0.07 0.21 -0.14 (0.00)
Muslim 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.08 (0.23)
Christian and others 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 (0.71)
Urban 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 (.)
Childhood in urban 0.31 0.30 0.31 -0.01 (0.94)
Market participation rate 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.01 (0.86)
Observations 3,407 40 3,367 3,407
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 1.52 2.48 1.51 0.98 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.79 19.55 18.78 0.77 (0.54)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.62 0.61 0.62 -0.01 (0.89)
Age of mother 24.62 26.82 24.60 2.22 (0.00)
Age at marriage 18.83 19.97 18.83 1.14 (0.15)
Married 0.99 0.97 0.99 -0.02 (0.53)
Widow & Divorced 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 (0.53)
No education 0.25 0.18 0.25 -0.07 (0.31)
Primary 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 (0.97)
Secondary 0.42 0.30 0.43 -0.12 (0.14)
Post sec. education 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.16 (0.06)
Graduate education 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.03 (0.51)
OBC 0.34 0.30 0.34 -0.03 (0.69)
Hindu Brahmin 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05 (0.34)
Hindu Forward 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.07 (0.35)
SC and ST 0.35 0.30 0.35 -0.05 (0.56)
Muslim 0.11 0.06 0.11 -0.05 (0.29)
Christian and others 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 (0.76)
Urban 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (.)
Childhood in urban 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.05 (0.48)
Market participation rate 0.17 0.09 0.17 -0.08 (0.13)
Observations 4,254 33 4,221 4,254
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 2.19 3.17 2.18 0.99 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.84 18.81 18.84 -0.02 (0.98)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.64 0.54 0.64 -0.11 (0.07)
Age of mother 35.67 35.95 35.66 0.29 (0.64)
Age at marriage 17.32 17.60 17.31 0.29 (0.53)
Married 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.01 (0.64)
Widow & Divorced 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.01 (0.64)
No education 0.44 0.40 0.44 -0.04 (0.45)
Primary 0.19 0.17 0.19 -0.02 (0.65)
Secondary 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.03 (0.55)
Post sec. education 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 (0.65)
Graduate education 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 (0.45)
OBC 0.38 0.31 0.38 -0.08 (0.16)
Hindu Brahmin 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 (0.78)
Hindu Forward 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.00 (0.96)
SC and ST 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.04 (0.46)
Muslim 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.02 (0.63)
Christian and others 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 (0.35)
Urban 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (.)
Childhood in urban 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.07 (0.13)
Market participation rate 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.05 (0.35)
Observations 6,106 78 6,028 6,106
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
240















No. of Children 1.44 2.44 1.43 1.01 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.87 20.26 18.86 1.40 (0.26)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.53 0.44 0.53 -0.09 (0.25)
Age of mother 25.00 27.17 24.98 2.19 (0.00)
Age at marriage 19.65 20.76 19.64 1.12 (0.11)
Married 0.98 0.98 0.98 -0.01 (0.73)
Widow & Divorced 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 (0.73)
No education 0.18 0.12 0.18 -0.06 (0.28)
Primary 0.12 0.05 0.12 -0.07 (0.05)
Secondary 0.42 0.39 0.42 -0.03 (0.67)
Post sec. education 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.06 (0.38)
Graduate education 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.10 (0.13)
OBC 0.33 0.29 0.33 -0.04 (0.61)
Hindu Brahmin 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.01 (0.85)
Hindu Forward 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.09 (0.21)
SC and ST 0.29 0.22 0.29 -0.07 (0.28)
Muslim 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.01 (0.89)
Christian and others 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 (0.59)
Urban 0.33 0.44 0.33 0.11 (0.17)
Childhood in urban 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.06 (0.36)
Market participation rate 0.12 0.07 0.12 -0.05 (0.26)
Observations 4,612 41 4,571 4,612
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 2.06 3.08 2.05 1.03 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.57 17.78 18.57 -0.79 (0.19)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.53 0.51 0.53 -0.02 (0.82)
Age of mother 35.07 35.72 35.06 0.65 (0.47)
Age at marriage 18.24 18.97 18.23 0.75 (0.27)
Married 0.94 0.92 0.94 -0.02 (0.67)
Widow & Divorced 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 (0.67)
No education 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.02 (0.74)
Primary 0.16 0.15 0.16 -0.01 (0.93)
Secondary 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.01 (0.93)
Post sec. education 0.10 0.03 0.10 -0.07 (0.01)
Graduate education 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.05 (0.41)
OBC 0.36 0.23 0.36 -0.13 (0.06)
Hindu Brahmin 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.07 (0.22)
Hindu Forward 0.22 0.21 0.22 -0.02 (0.80)
SC and ST 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.02 (0.76)
Muslim 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.07 (0.23)
Christian and others 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 (0.62)
Urban 0.36 0.33 0.36 -0.02 (0.78)
Childhood in urban 0.18 0.13 0.18 -0.06 (0.31)
Market participation rate 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.06 (0.41)
Observations 4,155 39 4,116 4,155
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 1.62 2.69 1.62 1.08 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 18.66 18.88 18.66 0.22 (0.88)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.07 (0.60)
Age of mother 25.37 28.85 25.34 3.50 (0.16)
Age at marriage 18.78 19.08 18.78 0.29 (0.76)
Married 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 (0.08)
Widow & Divorced 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 (0.08)
No education 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.02 (0.89)
Primary 0.17 0.31 0.16 0.14 (0.30)
Secondary 0.41 0.23 0.41 -0.18 (0.17)
Post sec. education 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.07 (0.53)
Graduate education 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.05 (0.00)
OBC 0.32 0.23 0.32 -0.09 (0.48)
Hindu Brahmin 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.12 (0.26)
Hindu Forward 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.05 (0.65)
SC and ST 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.09 (0.52)
Muslim 0.17 0.00 0.17 -0.17 (0.00)
Christian and others 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 (0.00)
Urban 0.30 0.23 0.30 -0.07 (0.58)
Childhood in urban 0.17 0.08 0.17 -0.09 (0.26)
Market participation rate 0.22 0.00 0.22 -0.22 (0.00)
Observations 1,665 13 1,652 1,665
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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No. of Children 2.16 3.15 2.15 1.00 (0.00)
Regional wage rate 19.18 19.69 19.17 0.52 (0.52)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.39 0.32 0.39 -0.07 (0.18)
Age of mother 36.25 36.35 36.25 0.11 (0.85)
Age at marriage 17.88 17.94 17.88 0.06 (0.90)
Married 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.01 (0.42)
Widow & Divorced 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 (0.42)
No education 0.39 0.38 0.39 -0.01 (0.87)
Primary 0.17 0.11 0.17 -0.06 (0.12)
Secondary 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.03 (0.63)
Post sec. education 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.06 (0.11)
Graduate education 0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.02 (0.36)
OBC 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.01 (0.92)
Hindu Brahmin 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.03 (0.14)
Hindu Forward 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.03 (0.57)
SC and ST 0.30 0.25 0.30 -0.05 (0.35)
Muslim 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.02 (0.67)
Christian and others 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 (0.28)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.39 0.32 0.39 -0.07 (0.18)
Urban 0.36 0.34 0.36 -0.02 (0.73)
Childhood in urban 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.09 (0.09)
Market participation rate 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.02 (0.75)
Observations 5,358 79 5,279 5,358
Note: Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
244
A3.38. First stage regression results: Full sample, urban and rural
Dep. variable:











Twin births 1.01∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
First girl 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 6,277 6,277 6,277 9,513 9,513 9,513
F-Statistic 195 51 119 167 239 204
Hansen J statistic (Hour) 0.655 0.156
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.418 0.693
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.358 0.062
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.550 0.803
Urban sample
Twin births 1.12∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
First girl 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2,023 2,023 2,023 3,407 3,407 3,407
F-Statistic 79 17 46 48 64 53
Hansen J statistic (Hour) 0.005 0.329
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.945 0.566
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.080 0.196
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.777 0.658
Rural sample
Twin births 0.94∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
First girl 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 4,254 4,254 4,254 6,106 6,106 6,106
F-Statistic 123 34 76 128 177 160
Hansen J statistic (Hour) 0.456 0.136
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.499 0.712
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.365 0.111
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.546 0.738
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.39. First stage regression results: Full sample, nuclear and extended
Dep. variable:











Twin births 1.01∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
First girl 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 6,277 6,277 6,277 9,513 9,513 9,513
F-Statistic 195 51 119 167 239 204
Hansen J statistic (Hour) 0.655 0.156
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.418 0.693
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.358 0.062
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.550 0.803
Nuclear family
Twin births 1.13∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10)
First girl 0.06 0.09∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 5,358 5,358 5,358
F-Statistic 63 9 36 97 142 118
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.665 0.655
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.252 0.174
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.616 0.677
Extended family
Twin births 0.98∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
First girl 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,155 4,155 4,155
F-Statistic 130 42 83 86 94 94
Hansen J statistic (Hour) 1.112 0.003
Chi-sq p-value (Hour) 0.292 0.958
Hansen J statistic (Part.) 0.832 0.018
Chi-sq p-value (Part.) 0.362 0.893
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.40. Probit & Tobit: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes
































No. of children -0.01∗ -18.52∗ -0.01 -14.52 -0.01 -18.07 -0.01 -14.16
(0.01) (10.06) (0.06) (89.78) (0.08) (118.99) (0.04) (66.08)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.22∗∗∗ 327.55∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 327.67∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 327.84∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 328.38∗∗∗
(0.07) (103.81) (0.07) (104.18) (0.07) (105.62) (0.07) (104.10)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.04∗∗∗ -68.88∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -68.58∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -68.77∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -68.41∗∗∗
(0.01) (14.14) (0.01) (14.66) (0.01) (14.92) (0.01) (14.48)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -7.42∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -7.38 -0.01 -7.40 -0.01∗∗ -7.33∗
(0.00) (2.12) (0.00) (5.12) (0.00) (6.56) (0.00) (4.03)
Age of mother 0.01∗ 21.06∗ 0.01 19.36 0.01 21.03 0.01 19.66
(0.01) (11.43) (0.02) (26.22) (0.02) (33.80) (0.01) (20.60)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 -0.13 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 -0.13
(0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.33)
Married -0.14∗∗∗ -192.52∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -194.91∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -192.34∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -193.99∗∗∗
(0.03) (41.23) (0.04) (53.09) (0.04) (59.25) (0.04) (47.35)
Urban -0.08∗∗∗ -98.35∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -98.00∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -98.35∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -98.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.10) (0.01) (18.42) (0.01) (18.96) (0.01) (18.15)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -22.77 -0.02 -22.03 -0.02 -22.77 -0.02 -22.21
(0.01) (17.56) (0.01) (17.60) (0.01) (17.61) (0.01) (17.61)
Primary 0.00 4.10 0.00 4.45 0.00 4.10 0.00 4.40
(0.01) (18.46) (0.01) (18.47) (0.01) (18.51) (0.01) (18.45)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -102.25∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -101.76∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -102.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -101.44∗∗∗
(0.01) (16.66) (0.01) (19.13) (0.01) (21.04) (0.01) (18.27)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ -111.97∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -110.83∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -111.84∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -110.73∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.36) (0.02) (31.32) (0.02) (35.75) (0.02) (29.15)
Graduate education 0.03 82.82∗∗∗ 0.03 84.57∗∗ 0.03 82.98∗∗ 0.03 84.63∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.16) (0.02) (33.94) (0.03) (38.83) (0.02) (30.88)
Brahmin -0.04∗∗ -66.26∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -66.39∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -66.37∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -66.61∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.62) (0.02) (25.70) (0.02) (25.68) (0.02) (25.66)
Forward -0.04∗∗∗ -51.36∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -51.38∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -51.30∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -51.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.48) (0.01) (17.76) (0.01) (17.83) (0.01) (17.70)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 88.52∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 88.03∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 88.61∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 88.35∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.21) (0.01) (18.04) (0.01) (18.63) (0.01) (17.75)
Muslim -0.07∗∗∗ -81.64∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -82.14∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -81.62∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -81.98∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.06) (0.01) (19.19) (0.01) (19.87) (0.01) (18.42)
Christian and others -0.03 -31.60 -0.03 -31.70 -0.03 -32.13 -0.03 -33.00
(0.02) (37.07) (0.02) (37.15) (0.03) (37.22) (0.02) (36.93)
Observations 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Uncensored 923 923 923 923
Pseudo-R2 0.097 0.023
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
First stage regression in Appendix Table 3.10.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.41. Probit & Tobit: Effect of school-aged children on female labour market out-
comes
































No. of children -0.00 -6.18 -0.00 -6.79 -0.01 -8.53 -0.01 -9.10
(0.00) (7.82) (0.04) (55.78) (0.03) (51.98) (0.02) (38.38)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.61∗∗∗ 933.49∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 931.99∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 926.68∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 925.56∗∗∗
(0.07) (111.64) (0.08) (132.91) (0.08) (130.31) (0.07) (122.13)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.09∗∗∗ -181.78∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -181.59∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -182.64∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -182.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (16.28) (0.01) (16.29) (0.01) (16.29) (0.01) (16.29)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗∗∗ -4.69∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -4.70∗ -0.00∗∗ -4.78∗ -0.00∗∗ -4.77∗
(0.00) (2.22) (0.00) (2.79) (0.00) (2.73) (0.00) (2.50)
Age of mother 0.02∗∗ 34.91∗∗∗ 0.02 34.94∗ 0.02 34.51∗ 0.02 34.68∗∗
(0.01) (10.70) (0.01) (18.99) (0.01) (18.21) (0.01) (15.22)
Age mother square -0.00∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.39 -0.00 -0.39 -0.00 -0.39∗
(0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.20)
Married -0.23∗∗∗ -413.31∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -413.16∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -411.07∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -411.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (28.36) (0.02) (33.84) (0.02) (33.68) (0.02) (31.25)
Urban -0.16∗∗∗ -211.62∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -211.37∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -212.50∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -211.77∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.51) (0.01) (19.76) (0.01) (19.78) (0.01) (19.71)
Childhood in urban -0.04∗∗∗ -65.22∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -65.31∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -65.12∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -65.32∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.58) (0.01) (21.61) (0.01) (21.58) (0.01) (21.59)
Primary -0.07∗∗∗ -73.98∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -73.92∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -73.88∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -73.80∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.18) (0.01) (20.06) (0.01) (19.89) (0.01) (19.56)
Secondary -0.18∗∗∗ -253.53∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -253.62∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -254.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -254.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.51) (0.01) (22.21) (0.01) (21.80) (0.01) (20.78)
Post sec. education -0.13∗∗∗ -120.61∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -120.87∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -121.42∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -121.71∗∗∗
(0.02) (35.93) (0.02) (41.37) (0.02) (40.73) (0.02) (38.56)
Graduate education 0.03 177.10∗∗∗ 0.03 176.85∗∗∗ 0.03 175.63∗∗∗ 0.03 175.53∗∗∗
(0.02) (39.44) (0.03) (45.27) (0.03) (44.75) (0.02) (42.34)
Brahmin -0.12∗∗∗ -168.76∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -168.85∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -168.99∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -169.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (31.38) (0.02) (31.53) (0.02) (31.54) (0.02) (31.52)
Forward -0.10∗∗∗ -134.26∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -134.38∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -134.54∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -134.71∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.63) (0.01) (20.41) (0.01) (20.43) (0.01) (20.09)
SC and ST 0.13∗∗∗ 204.86∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 204.89∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 204.75∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 204.83∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.13) (0.01) (19.99) (0.01) (19.74) (0.01) (19.46)
Muslim -0.12∗∗∗ -169.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -169.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -168.65∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -168.78∗∗∗
(0.02) (22.22) (0.02) (26.46) (0.02) (26.15) (0.02) (24.47)
Christian and others -0.12∗∗∗ -150.10∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -150.44∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -150.95∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -151.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (39.50) (0.02) (39.84) (0.02) (39.77) (0.02) (39.56)
Observations 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513 9,513
Uncensored 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
Pseudo-R2 0.169 0.029
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (unearned wealth) and the regions of In-
dia: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
First stage regression in Appendix Table 3.10.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.42. Probit & Tobit: Effect of young children on urban female labour market out-
comes
































No. of children -0.02∗∗ -46.58∗∗ -0.02 -37.63 -0.02 -44.61 -0.02 -36.03
(0.01) (23.01) (0.02) (38.72) (0.11) (269.82) (0.06) (176.75)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.35∗∗∗ 711.44∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 692.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 719.71∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 706.01∗∗
(0.12) (246.34) (0.12) (250.84) (0.17) (352.34) (0.14) (294.63)
Land ownership (0/1) 0.00 7.17 0.00 7.75 0.00 8.45 0.00 9.41
(0.02) (41.03) (0.02) (41.06) (0.02) (44.69) (0.02) (42.63)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00 -3.11 -0.00 -3.16 -0.00 -3.00 -0.00 -2.97
(0.00) (4.86) (0.00) (5.30) (0.01) (16.49) (0.00) (11.36)
Age of mother 0.01 19.93 0.00 12.12 0.01 19.57 0.01 13.47
(0.01) (21.25) (0.01) (22.66) (0.03) (62.21) (0.02) (42.82)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.02
(0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.63)
Married -0.14∗∗∗ -265.80∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -266.33∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -264.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -264.02∗∗∗
(0.04) (67.92) (0.04) (69.28) (0.04) (90.53) (0.04) (80.19)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -34.07 -0.02 -33.35 -0.02 -34.55 -0.02 -34.03
(0.01) (28.53) (0.01) (28.73) (0.01) (31.04) (0.01) (29.66)
Primary -0.02 -54.59 -0.03 -56.54 -0.02 -54.51 -0.03 -56.06
(0.03) (54.36) (0.03) (54.42) (0.03) (54.67) (0.03) (54.58)
Secondary -0.07∗∗∗ -153.84∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -153.67∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -152.49∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -151.69∗∗∗
(0.02) (44.23) (0.02) (45.85) (0.03) (57.97) (0.03) (51.18)
Post sec. education -0.09∗∗∗ -170.56∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -171.26∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -170.84∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -171.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (52.18) (0.03) (57.05) (0.04) (79.87) (0.03) (65.56)
Graduate education 0.00 24.57 0.01 26.65 0.01 26.10 0.01 28.38
(0.02) (48.97) (0.02) (49.42) (0.03) (73.81) (0.03) (61.04)
Brahmin -0.04 -83.60∗ -0.04 -83.57∗ -0.04 -84.75 -0.04 -85.09∗
(0.03) (50.55) (0.03) (50.65) (0.03) (52.14) (0.03) (50.88)
Forward -0.02 -39.91 -0.02 -37.88 -0.02 -39.66 -0.02 -37.81
(0.02) (41.28) (0.02) (41.58) (0.02) (42.12) (0.02) (41.95)
SC and ST -0.02 -31.24 -0.02 -30.58 -0.01 -30.17 -0.01 -29.30
(0.02) (39.41) (0.02) (39.42) (0.02) (40.31) (0.02) (39.86)
Muslim -0.05∗∗∗ -92.12∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -91.45∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -92.48∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -91.95∗∗
(0.02) (36.63) (0.02) (37.22) (0.02) (40.33) (0.02) (39.33)
Christian and others 0.01 21.19 0.01 19.38 0.01 18.82 0.01 17.17
(0.04) (73.92) (0.04) (73.73) (0.04) (74.49) (0.04) (73.93)
Observations 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023
Uncensored 198 198 198 198
Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.024
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
First stage regression in Appendix Table 3.10.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.43. Probit & Tobit: Effect of school-aged on urban female labour market outcomes
































No. of children -0.00 -5.68 -0.00 -5.92 -0.00 -8.75 -0.00 -8.82
(0.01) (16.63) (0.05) (98.02) (0.06) (126.53) (0.04) (76.98)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.64∗∗∗ 1364.35∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1364.19∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1358.48∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1360.28∗∗∗
(0.10) (213.46) (0.11) (226.98) (0.11) (234.97) (0.11) (222.89)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.04∗ -92.79∗∗ -0.04∗ -92.65∗∗ -0.04∗ -93.36∗∗ -0.04∗ -92.15∗∗
(0.02) (46.52) (0.02) (46.83) (0.02) (46.80) (0.02) (46.61)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00 -5.77 -0.00 -5.79 -0.00 -6.15 -0.00 -6.08
(0.00) (4.49) (0.00) (6.14) (0.00) (7.09) (0.00) (5.58)
Age of mother 0.04∗∗∗ 83.59∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 83.62∗∗ 0.04∗ 83.56∗ 0.04∗∗ 83.77∗∗
(0.01) (27.57) (0.02) (41.13) (0.02) (48.47) (0.02) (36.63)
Age mother square -0.00∗∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.96∗ -0.00 -0.96 -0.00∗ -0.96∗∗
(0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.48)
Married -0.26∗∗∗ -520.08∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -520.00∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -516.11∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -517.62∗∗∗
(0.03) (49.05) (0.03) (60.05) (0.03) (66.44) (0.03) (57.10)
Childhood in urban -0.03∗∗ -57.08∗ -0.03∗∗ -57.09∗ -0.03∗∗ -57.75∗ -0.03∗∗ -57.44∗
(0.01) (31.18) (0.01) (31.27) (0.01) (31.38) (0.01) (31.29)
Primary -0.10∗∗∗ -185.57∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -185.39∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -184.22∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -183.68∗∗∗
(0.02) (42.92) (0.02) (45.65) (0.02) (47.52) (0.02) (44.88)
Secondary -0.19∗∗∗ -345.47∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -345.36∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -346.67∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -345.31∗∗∗
(0.02) (37.09) (0.02) (42.89) (0.02) (45.27) (0.02) (41.13)
Post sec. education -0.15∗∗∗ -245.35∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -245.30∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -245.32∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -245.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (50.44) (0.03) (60.81) (0.03) (67.93) (0.03) (57.79)
Graduate education -0.03 12.06 -0.03 12.17 -0.03 9.87 -0.03 11.76
(0.03) (50.14) (0.03) (59.93) (0.03) (66.47) (0.03) (56.51)
Brahmin -0.07∗∗ -117.42∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -117.40∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -119.36∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -118.25∗∗
(0.03) (52.61) (0.03) (53.66) (0.03) (54.89) (0.03) (53.60)
Forward -0.06∗∗∗ -99.89∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -99.82∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -100.91∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -99.95∗∗∗
(0.02) (36.71) (0.02) (38.68) (0.02) (40.89) (0.02) (38.51)
SC and ST 0.07∗∗∗ 165.27∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 165.44∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 163.39∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 165.55∗∗∗
(0.02) (42.38) (0.02) (43.67) (0.02) (43.71) (0.02) (42.94)
Muslim -0.10∗∗∗ -170.15∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -170.07∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -170.82∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -169.92∗∗∗
(0.02) (37.02) (0.03) (46.88) (0.03) (51.31) (0.02) (43.39)
Christian and others 0.00 13.93 0.00 13.95 0.00 12.31 0.00 13.30
(0.04) (79.42) (0.04) (79.48) (0.04) (79.63) (0.04) (79.40)
Observations 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407
Uncensored 727 727 727 727
Pseudo-R2 0.132 0.029
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
First stage regression in Appendix Table 3.10.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.44. Probit & Tobit: Effect of young children on rural female labour market out-
comes
































No. of children -0.01 -12.57 -0.01 -10.26 -0.01 -12.38 -0.01 -10.14
(0.01) (11.06) (0.08) (96.29) (0.10) (129.58) (0.06) (73.16)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.17∗ 232.97∗∗ 0.18∗ 236.36∗∗ 0.17∗ 232.82∗∗ 0.17∗ 234.85∗∗
(0.09) (114.20) (0.09) (115.58) (0.09) (116.14) (0.09) (114.90)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.05∗∗∗ -74.96∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -74.81∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -74.93∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -74.74∗∗∗
(0.01) (14.46) (0.01) (14.84) (0.01) (15.00) (0.01) (14.72)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -9.44∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -9.39∗ -0.01 -9.43 -0.01∗∗ -9.36∗∗
(0.00) (2.35) (0.00) (5.36) (0.01) (6.85) (0.00) (4.31)
Age of mother 0.02∗ 26.35∗ 0.02 26.16 0.02 26.34 0.02 26.16
(0.01) (14.92) (0.03) (32.36) (0.03) (41.82) (0.02) (26.43)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.26 -0.00 -0.26 -0.00 -0.26 -0.00 -0.26
(0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.43)
Married -0.13∗∗∗ -157.59∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -160.24∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -157.54∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -159.34∗∗∗
(0.04) (47.49) (0.05) (63.84) (0.06) (73.62) (0.05) (56.76)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -22.16 -0.02 -21.40 -0.02 -22.13 -0.02 -21.52
(0.02) (21.49) (0.02) (21.66) (0.02) (21.79) (0.02) (21.57)
Primary 0.01 15.29 0.01 15.63 0.01 15.29 0.01 15.53
(0.02) (19.18) (0.02) (19.20) (0.02) (19.23) (0.02) (19.17)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -84.63∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -84.33∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -84.58∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -84.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.48) (0.02) (20.24) (0.02) (22.44) (0.02) (19.38)
Post sec. education -0.09∗∗∗ -83.85∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -82.56∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -83.74∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -82.46∗∗
(0.02) (29.43) (0.03) (35.51) (0.03) (42.24) (0.03) (34.08)
Graduate education -0.01 61.33∗ -0.00 62.45 -0.01 61.33 -0.00 62.15
(0.03) (36.46) (0.03) (42.44) (0.04) (47.81) (0.03) (39.73)
Brahmin -0.05∗ -55.90∗ -0.05∗ -55.73∗ -0.05∗ -55.89∗ -0.05∗ -55.72∗
(0.03) (29.88) (0.03) (29.95) (0.03) (29.89) (0.03) (29.97)
Forward -0.05∗∗∗ -62.85∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.86∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.83∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.76∗∗∗
(0.02) (17.46) (0.02) (17.72) (0.02) (17.71) (0.02) (17.62)
SC and ST 0.10∗∗∗ 115.32∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 114.88∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 115.33∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 115.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (18.25) (0.01) (19.48) (0.02) (20.14) (0.01) (18.98)
Muslim -0.07∗∗∗ -75.92∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -76.43∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -75.88∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -76.17∗∗∗
(0.02) (18.81) (0.02) (21.45) (0.02) (21.90) (0.02) (20.30)
Christian and others -0.06∗∗ -67.02∗ -0.06∗∗ -66.80∗ -0.06∗∗ -67.24∗ -0.07∗∗ -67.71∗
(0.03) (38.86) (0.03) (39.10) (0.03) (39.09) (0.03) (38.82)
Observations 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254 4,254
Uncensored 725 725 725 725
Pseudo-R2 0.111 0.027
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age of marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital sta-
tus (married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational
attainments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward
Class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions
of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.45. Probit & Tobit: Effect of school-aged on rural female labour market outcomes
































No. of children -0.01 -7.72 -0.01 -8.24 -0.01 -9.72 -0.01 -10.25
(0.01) (8.78) (0.05) (69.27) (0.04) (53.09) (0.03) (42.28)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.61∗∗∗ 743.11∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 741.48∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 736.36∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 734.84∗∗∗
(0.09) (132.57) (0.12) (177.69) (0.11) (160.92) (0.10) (151.63)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.10∗∗∗ -208.06∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -207.92∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -208.75∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -208.36∗∗∗
(0.01) (17.56) (0.01) (17.62) (0.01) (17.57) (0.01) (17.58)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗∗ -6.14∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -6.13∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -6.15∗∗ -0.00∗∗ -6.14∗∗
(0.00) (2.52) (0.00) (3.04) (0.00) (2.81) (0.00) (2.69)
Age of mother 0.01 24.13∗∗ 0.01 24.14 0.01 23.71 0.01 23.83
(0.01) (11.75) (0.02) (21.74) (0.01) (18.31) (0.01) (16.15)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.27∗ -0.00 -0.27 -0.00 -0.27 -0.00 -0.27
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.21)
Married -0.21∗∗∗ -345.06∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -344.96∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -343.42∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -343.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (32.44) (0.03) (40.13) (0.03) (37.54) (0.03) (35.57)
Childhood in urban -0.05∗∗∗ -73.48∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -73.62∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -72.81∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -73.21∗∗
(0.02) (28.46) (0.02) (28.69) (0.02) (28.56) (0.02) (28.49)
Primary -0.06∗∗∗ -45.47∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -45.53∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -45.68∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -45.75∗∗
(0.02) (21.55) (0.02) (22.84) (0.02) (22.19) (0.02) (21.98)
Secondary -0.17∗∗∗ -218.27∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -218.47∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -218.73∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -218.99∗∗∗
(0.01) (22.68) (0.02) (26.67) (0.02) (25.17) (0.02) (24.27)
Post sec. education -0.12∗∗∗ -40.86 -0.12∗∗∗ -41.23 -0.12∗∗∗ -42.36 -0.12∗∗∗ -42.71
(0.03) (52.07) (0.04) (59.78) (0.03) (55.86) (0.03) (54.62)
Graduate education 0.02 275.81∗∗∗ 0.02 275.28∗∗∗ 0.02 276.64∗∗∗ 0.02 275.51∗∗∗
(0.04) (76.05) (0.05) (82.88) (0.05) (80.20) (0.04) (78.67)
Brahmin -0.17∗∗∗ -190.68∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -190.75∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -190.29∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -190.48∗∗∗
(0.03) (39.46) (0.03) (39.72) (0.03) (39.58) (0.03) (39.60)
Forward -0.13∗∗∗ -157.44∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -157.64∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -157.44∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -157.79∗∗∗
(0.02) (22.67) (0.02) (23.36) (0.02) (23.07) (0.02) (22.96)
SC and ST 0.16∗∗∗ 219.43∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 219.31∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 219.72∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 219.45∗∗∗
(0.01) (20.89) (0.02) (21.98) (0.02) (21.52) (0.02) (21.27)
Muslim -0.14∗∗∗ -162.12∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -162.22∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -161.37∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -161.70∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.73) (0.02) (31.19) (0.02) (30.14) (0.02) (29.17)
Christian and others -0.21∗∗∗ -236.75∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -237.17∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -237.47∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -238.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (41.93) (0.03) (42.76) (0.03) (42.44) (0.03) (42.17)
Observations 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106 6,106
Uncensored 2,337 2,337 2,337 2,337
Pseudo-R2 0.169 0.031
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.46. Probit & Tobit: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes in
the nuclear family setting
Mother Age 18-54
































No. of children -0.04∗∗∗ -56.98∗∗∗ -0.04 -50.08 -0.04 -57.81 -0.04 -47.69
(0.02) (21.08) (0.02) (31.00) (0.15) (819.15) (0.08) (200.57)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate -0.05 -50.57 -0.05 -54.55 -0.05 -322.87 -0.05 -51.26
(0.18) (237.98) (0.18) (237.38) (0.18) (336.36) (0.18) (246.12)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.00 -12.46 -0.01 -13.67 -0.00 -12.03 -0.01 -13.07
(0.02) (31.47) (0.02) (31.47) (0.02) (37.38) (0.02) (31.80)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -10.95∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -10.94∗∗ -0.01 -11.17 -0.01∗∗ -10.64
(0.00) (4.64) (0.00) (4.90) (0.01) (37.96) (0.00) (10.38)
Age of mother 0.01 12.50 0.00 5.97 0.01 4.29 0.00 7.05
(0.02) (21.40) (0.02) (23.80) (0.04) (177.78) (0.03) (54.43)
Age mother square 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05
(0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (2.67) (0.00) (0.86)
Married -0.44∗∗ -703.14∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -703.16∗∗∗ -0.44∗ -756.94∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -697.31∗∗∗
(0.20) (220.41) (0.20) (221.05) (0.23) (265.65) (0.20) (230.53)
Urban -0.16∗∗∗ -205.81∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -204.54∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -204.30∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -206.61∗∗∗
(0.03) (38.98) (0.03) (41.14) (0.03) (53.51) (0.03) (41.20)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -18.36 -0.02 -18.98 -0.02 -19.55 -0.02 -18.49
(0.03) (40.67) (0.03) (40.59) (0.03) (60.63) (0.03) (41.73)
Primary 0.01 15.07 0.01 16.51 0.01 15.08 0.01 15.85
(0.03) (36.94) (0.03) (36.99) (0.03) (75.63) (0.03) (40.07)
Secondary -0.08∗∗∗ -97.00∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -96.30∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -100.02 -0.08∗∗∗ -96.41∗∗
(0.03) (35.83) (0.03) (36.54) (0.03) (93.55) (0.03) (40.74)
Post sec. education -0.05 -43.99 -0.05 -40.42 -0.05 -50.88 -0.04 -36.23
(0.04) (60.98) (0.04) (61.57) (0.05) (145.13) (0.04) (68.50)
Graduate education 0.11∗∗ 240.67∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 235.64∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 243.34∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 240.90∗∗∗
(0.05) (83.66) (0.05) (83.75) (0.06) (104.32) (0.06) (85.41)
Brahmin -0.04 -56.14 -0.03 -49.95 -0.04 -57.12 -0.03 -51.92
(0.06) (75.21) (0.06) (77.19) (0.06) (76.67) (0.06) (75.86)
Forward -0.14∗∗∗ -165.31∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -164.43∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -172.19∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -164.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (33.63) (0.03) (34.80) (0.03) (54.89) (0.03) (35.07)
SC and ST 0.06∗∗ 95.23∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 94.19∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 91.66∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 96.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (35.84) (0.03) (36.01) (0.03) (42.65) (0.03) (36.39)
Muslim -0.12∗∗∗ -137.07∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -138.93∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -141.50∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -139.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (34.86) (0.03) (35.45) (0.03) (51.64) (0.03) (37.46)
Christian and others -0.10 -97.70 -0.10 -100.91 -0.10 -94.45 -0.11 -110.43
(0.07) (108.95) (0.07) (107.47) (0.08) (194.27) (0.07) (106.12)
Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665
Uncensored 370 370 370 370
Pseudo-R2 0.112 0.024
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.47. Probit & Tobit: Effect of school-aged on female labour market outcomes in the
nuclear family setting
































No. of children -0.01 -12.22 -0.01 -12.78 -0.01 -14.91 -0.01 -15.42
(0.01) (10.68) (0.05) (70.24) (0.04) (67.51) (0.03) (49.37)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.64∗∗∗ 1002.84∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 1001.53∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 997.30∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 995.90∗∗∗
(0.09) (152.80) (0.11) (180.35) (0.11) (177.43) (0.10) (166.50)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.07∗∗∗ -157.16∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -157.02∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -158.23∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -157.55∗∗∗
(0.01) (21.48) (0.01) (21.50) (0.01) (21.50) (0.01) (21.49)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗ -4.54 -0.00 -4.53 -0.00∗ -4.68 -0.00∗ -4.61
(0.00) (2.93) (0.00) (3.18) (0.00) (3.19) (0.00) (3.07)
Age of mother 0.01 26.53∗ 0.01 26.53 0.01 26.09 0.01 26.24
(0.01) (14.61) (0.01) (22.74) (0.01) (22.45) (0.01) (19.15)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.29 -0.00 -0.29 -0.00 -0.28 -0.00 -0.29
(0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.25)
Married -0.33∗∗∗ -535.87∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -535.86∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -534.52∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -534.92∗∗∗
(0.03) (38.92) (0.03) (42.90) (0.03) (42.89) (0.03) (40.96)
Urban -0.18∗∗∗ -240.92∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -240.68∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -241.93∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -241.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (26.46) (0.01) (26.71) (0.02) (26.73) (0.01) (26.65)
Childhood in urban -0.06∗∗∗ -101.64∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -101.88∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -101.13∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -101.85∗∗∗
(0.02) (29.73) (0.02) (29.76) (0.02) (29.76) (0.02) (29.75)
Primary -0.06∗∗∗ -56.90∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -56.88∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -56.81∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -56.80∗∗
(0.02) (25.56) (0.02) (27.40) (0.02) (27.15) (0.02) (26.44)
Secondary -0.17∗∗∗ -225.66∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -225.82∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -226.47∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -226.59∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.10) (0.02) (30.10) (0.02) (29.91) (0.02) (28.54)
Post sec. education -0.15∗∗∗ -157.93∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -158.43∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -158.85∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -159.76∗∗∗
(0.03) (53.55) (0.03) (59.26) (0.03) (59.75) (0.03) (56.81)
Graduate education 0.06∗ 229.97∗∗∗ 0.06 229.80∗∗∗ 0.06 228.35∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 228.43∗∗∗
(0.03) (58.02) (0.04) (65.02) (0.04) (64.64) (0.03) (61.56)
Brahmin -0.12∗∗∗ -146.31∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -146.22∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -146.72∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -146.37∗∗∗
(0.03) (48.04) (0.03) (48.19) (0.03) (48.14) (0.03) (48.17)
Forward -0.11∗∗∗ -151.47∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -151.60∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -152.05∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -152.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.12) (0.02) (27.81) (0.02) (27.85) (0.02) (27.51)
SC and ST 0.13∗∗∗ 210.21∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 210.33∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 210.43∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 210.64∗∗∗
(0.02) (24.88) (0.02) (25.73) (0.02) (25.46) (0.02) (25.20)
Muslim -0.15∗∗∗ -197.23∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -197.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -196.85∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -196.67∗∗∗
(0.02) (29.15) (0.02) (34.14) (0.02) (34.11) (0.02) (31.90)
Christian and others -0.12∗∗∗ -144.40∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -144.92∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -145.65∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -146.51∗∗
(0.04) (61.90) (0.04) (62.29) (0.04) (62.15) (0.04) (61.77)
Observations 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358
Uncensored 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941
Pseudo-R2 0.180 0.029
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.48. Probit & Tobit: Effect of young children on female labour market outcomes in
the extended family setting
































No. of children -0.00 -9.13 -0.00 -6.13 -0.00 -9.33 -0.00 -6.49
(0.01) (11.55) (0.06) (85.82) (0.09) (129.67) (0.05) (65.42)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.27∗∗∗ 406.66∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 408.00∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 406.51∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 408.02∗∗∗
(0.07) (111.24) (0.07) (111.98) (0.07) (112.57) (0.07) (112.09)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.01 -27.52∗ -0.01 -27.38∗ -0.01 -27.56∗ -0.01 -27.29∗
(0.01) (16.58) (0.01) (16.56) (0.01) (16.59) (0.01) (16.58)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗ -4.16∗ -0.00 -4.12 -0.00 -4.17 -0.00 -4.12
(0.00) (2.39) (0.00) (5.15) (0.00) (7.29) (0.00) (4.17)
Age of mother 0.01 19.95 0.01 19.71 0.01 19.97 0.01 19.74
(0.01) (14.03) (0.02) (27.18) (0.03) (38.26) (0.02) (22.56)
Age mother square -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 -0.16 -0.00 -0.16
(0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.36)
Married -0.13∗∗∗ -174.61∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -176.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -174.67∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -175.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (36.10) (0.03) (47.83) (0.04) (57.23) (0.03) (42.99)
Urban -0.04∗∗∗ -38.73∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -38.62∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -38.76∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -38.57∗∗
(0.01) (19.14) (0.01) (19.71) (0.01) (19.94) (0.01) (19.58)
Childhood in urban -0.02 -20.48 -0.02 -19.66 -0.02 -20.49 -0.02 -19.94
(0.01) (18.85) (0.01) (18.97) (0.01) (19.05) (0.01) (18.93)
Primary -0.00 -2.36 -0.00 -2.14 -0.00 -2.38 -0.00 -2.14
(0.02) (21.66) (0.02) (21.76) (0.02) (21.87) (0.02) (21.73)
Secondary -0.07∗∗∗ -104.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -103.66∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -104.18∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -103.48∗∗∗
(0.01) (18.77) (0.01) (20.99) (0.01) (23.72) (0.01) (20.47)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ -124.31∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -123.51∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -124.30∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -123.80∗∗∗
(0.02) (27.32) (0.02) (33.16) (0.02) (39.81) (0.02) (31.52)
Graduate education 0.01 50.59∗ 0.01 52.13 0.01 50.58 0.01 51.69
(0.02) (27.38) (0.02) (34.69) (0.03) (42.95) (0.02) (31.69)
Brahmin -0.03∗ -52.95∗∗ -0.03∗ -53.25∗∗ -0.03∗ -52.93∗∗ -0.03∗ -53.19∗∗
(0.02) (26.56) (0.02) (26.64) (0.02) (26.69) (0.02) (26.68)
Forward -0.01 -13.03 -0.01 -13.27 -0.01 -13.06 -0.01 -13.06
(0.01) (19.88) (0.01) (20.21) (0.01) (20.67) (0.01) (20.08)
SC and ST 0.06∗∗∗ 84.48∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 84.01∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 84.49∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 84.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.33) (0.01) (20.38) (0.01) (21.27) (0.01) (20.17)
Muslim -0.05∗∗∗ -62.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.28∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.10∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -62.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (19.51) (0.01) (21.58) (0.02) (22.50) (0.01) (20.89)
Christian and others -0.01 -9.83 -0.01 -9.76 -0.01 -9.70 -0.01 -10.19
(0.02) (37.99) (0.02) (37.99) (0.02) (37.98) (0.02) (37.94)
Observations 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612 4,612
Uncensored 553 553 553 553
Pseudo-R2 0.097 0.024
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.49. Probit & Tobit: Effect of school-aged on female labour market outcomes in the
extended family setting
































No. of children 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.62 0.00 -1.69 0.00 -2.46
(0.01) (11.57) (0.06) (94.91) (0.05) (82.14) (0.04) (62.02)
Economic variables:
Log wage rate 0.55∗∗∗ 823.27∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 821.40∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 815.46∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 814.27∗∗∗
(0.10) (159.75) (0.12) (196.56) (0.11) (189.39) (0.11) (177.17)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.09∗∗∗ -178.38∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -178.15∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -178.96∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -178.55∗∗∗
(0.02) (25.87) (0.02) (25.95) (0.02) (25.96) (0.02) (25.95)
Demographic variables:
Age at marriage -0.00∗ -4.08 -0.00 -4.14 -0.00 -4.11 -0.00 -4.19
(0.00) (3.40) (0.00) (5.59) (0.00) (5.08) (0.00) (4.41)
Age of mother 0.02∗∗ 41.44∗∗ 0.02 41.57 0.02 41.09 0.02 41.33
(0.01) (16.44) (0.02) (34.38) (0.02) (31.00) (0.02) (25.68)
Age mother square -0.00∗ -0.50∗∗ -0.00 -0.50 -0.00 -0.49 -0.00 -0.50
(0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.34)
Married -0.17∗∗∗ -313.99∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -313.58∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -311.39∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -311.25∗∗∗
(0.03) (40.11) (0.03) (53.66) (0.03) (51.92) (0.03) (46.89)
Urban -0.13∗∗∗ -165.58∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -165.27∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -166.25∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -165.73∗∗∗
(0.02) (29.33) (0.02) (29.87) (0.02) (29.83) (0.02) (29.74)
Childhood in urban -0.01 -19.75 -0.01 -19.48 -0.01 -20.09 -0.01 -19.68
(0.02) (31.02) (0.02) (31.12) (0.02) (31.00) (0.02) (31.02)
Primary -0.07∗∗∗ -93.49∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -93.30∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -93.43∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -93.19∗∗∗
(0.02) (29.34) (0.02) (29.83) (0.02) (29.72) (0.02) (29.53)
Secondary -0.18∗∗∗ -272.28∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -272.22∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -272.73∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -272.56∗∗∗
(0.02) (28.23) (0.02) (32.94) (0.02) (31.71) (0.02) (30.35)
Post sec. education -0.11∗∗∗ -88.77∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -88.64 -0.11∗∗∗ -89.44 -0.11∗∗∗ -89.16∗
(0.03) (47.36) (0.03) (57.56) (0.03) (54.42) (0.03) (51.54)
Graduate education 0.02 137.69∗∗∗ 0.02 137.28∗∗ 0.02 136.37∗∗ 0.02 136.03∗∗
(0.03) (52.51) (0.04) (61.86) (0.03) (60.17) (0.03) (56.88)
Brahmin -0.12∗∗∗ -187.49∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -187.90∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -187.48∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -188.04∗∗∗
(0.03) (39.41) (0.03) (39.68) (0.03) (39.75) (0.03) (39.68)
Forward -0.08∗∗∗ -114.74∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -114.94∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -114.77∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -115.03∗∗∗
(0.02) (28.01) (0.02) (29.89) (0.02) (29.73) (0.02) (29.10)
SC and ST 0.12∗∗∗ 190.82∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 190.55∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 190.26∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 189.98∗∗∗
(0.02) (29.97) (0.02) (32.07) (0.02) (31.36) (0.02) (30.77)
Muslim -0.09∗∗∗ -125.25∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -125.62∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -124.63∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -125.23∗∗∗
(0.02) (35.02) (0.03) (43.94) (0.03) (42.05) (0.03) (39.30)
Christian and others -0.11∗∗∗ -143.38∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -143.63∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -143.93∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -144.17∗∗∗
(0.03) (50.34) (0.03) (50.90) (0.03) (50.77) (0.03) (50.56)
Observations 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
Uncensored 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123
Pseudo-R2 0.154 0.030
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital status
(married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educational attain-
ments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin, Forward Class, SC
and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth) and the regions of India:
Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
Refer to Appendix Table 3.10 for the first stage regression results.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.50. 2SLS: Effect of both type of children (0–5 year and 6–17 year) on female labour
market outcomes















Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours Part. Hours
No. of children 0.00 -7.98 -0.11∗∗∗ -105.68∗ 0.07 87.29 -0.03 -18.01
(0.01) (8.32) (0.04) (57.23) (0.05) (70.94) (0.03) (43.52)
Log wage rate 0.57∗∗∗ 823.98∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 729.87∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 915.74∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 814.31∗∗∗
(0.12) (196.60) (0.12) (204.98) (0.13) (207.56) (0.12) (200.08)
Land ownership (0/1) -0.08∗∗∗ -137.80∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -140.90∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -134.77∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -138.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (20.17) (0.01) (20.39) (0.01) (20.50) (0.01) (20.18)
Age at marriage -0.01∗∗∗ -4.60 -0.02∗∗∗ -12.40∗∗ -0.00 3.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -5.40
(0.00) (3.47) (0.00) (5.76) (0.00) (6.67) (0.00) (4.89)
Age of mother 0.03∗∗ 31.43∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 59.40∗∗∗ 0.01 4.16 0.03∗∗ 34.30∗
(0.01) (16.20) (0.02) (22.88) (0.02) (26.07) (0.01) (20.10)
Age mother square -0.00∗ -0.36 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗ -0.00 -0.08 -0.00∗∗ -0.39
(0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.27)
Married -0.17∗∗∗ -422.48∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -419.87∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -425.02∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -422.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (103.30) (0.06) (103.83) (0.06) (103.90) (0.06) (103.09)
Urban -0.16∗∗∗ -168.71∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -180.79∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -156.94∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -169.95∗∗∗
(0.01) (24.86) (0.02) (25.82) (0.02) (26.28) (0.02) (25.23)
Childhood in urban -0.04∗∗ -33.14 -0.04∗∗ -33.64 -0.04∗∗ -32.64 -0.04∗∗ -33.19
(0.01) (24.27) (0.02) (24.47) (0.01) (24.35) (0.01) (24.20)
Primary -0.04∗∗ -4.10 -0.07∗∗∗ -29.60 -0.02 20.76 -0.05∗∗ -6.72
(0.02) (24.65) (0.02) (28.96) (0.02) (31.27) (0.02) (27.06)
Secondary -0.13∗∗∗ -110.62∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -152.17∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -70.11∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -114.89∗∗∗
(0.02) (22.21) (0.02) (32.70) (0.03) (37.54) (0.02) (28.62)
Post sec. education -0.10∗∗∗ 27.34 -0.18∗∗∗ -40.67 -0.05 93.66 -0.12∗∗∗ 20.36
(0.02) (47.29) (0.04) (63.13) (0.04) (68.88) (0.03) (56.99)
Graduate education 0.02 258.74∗∗∗ -0.07 184.59∗∗ 0.07 331.04∗∗∗ -0.00 251.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (70.23) (0.04) (81.91) (0.05) (90.63) (0.04) (78.13)
Brahmin -0.06∗∗ -36.59 -0.07∗∗ -38.94 -0.06∗∗ -34.31 -0.06∗∗ -36.84
(0.03) (46.51) (0.03) (47.02) (0.03) (46.39) (0.03) (46.40)
Forward -0.04∗∗ -66.92∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -76.41∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -57.67∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -67.90∗∗
(0.02) (27.26) (0.02) (28.49) (0.02) (28.15) (0.02) (27.72)
SC and ST 0.15∗∗∗ 194.36∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 203.52∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 185.43∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 195.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (23.01) (0.02) (23.74) (0.02) (24.10) (0.02) (23.29)
Muslim -0.12∗∗∗ -99.65∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -53.48 -0.15∗∗∗ -144.68∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -94.91∗∗∗
(0.02) (23.88) (0.02) (36.32) (0.03) (40.60) (0.02) (31.06)
Christian and others -0.03 13.71 -0.04 6.04 -0.02 21.19 -0.03 12.92
(0.04) (75.53) (0.04) (75.51) (0.04) (76.02) (0.04) (75.29)
Observations 5,287 5,287 5,287 5,287 5,287 5,287 5,287 5,287
R-squared 0.141 0.099 0.087 0.080 0.118 0.081 0.138 0.099
F-statistics 59.76 59.76 90.50 90.50 74.58 74.58
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Woman specific control variables: age at marriage, age, age square, average regional natural log of wage rate, marital
status (married versus divorced and widowed), urban place of residence, childhood place of residence if urban, educa-
tional attainments: primary, secondary, post-secondary graduation and no education is base category, caste: Brahmin,
Forward Class, SC and ST, Muslim, Christian and others and OBC is considered as base category, land (i.e., wealth)
and the regions of India: Northern, North-Eastern, Central, Eastern, Western.
In the first stage regression, the effect of twins on fertility is 1.20, statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Estimates are based on author’s own calculation using the IHDS-II dataset.
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A3.51. Reasoning behind the decline in hours of labour supply for women due to in-
crease in fertility (or, increase in the compulsory housework time)
From the time constraint: 𝑁 = (𝑇 − 𝐿 − 𝐻)  where 𝐻 = ?̅?′ + 𝐻𝐻  and ?̅?
′ > 0 and 𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0 
Wage income:  𝑊𝑁 = 𝑊(𝑇 − 𝐿 − 𝐻) 
 
Income Effect: 
As 𝐻 increases due to increase in  ?̅? such that ?̅?′ > ?̅?, keeping other things unchanged, wage income declines 
As wage income declines, both 𝐿 and 𝑋 falls because both 𝑋 and 𝐿 are normal goods by assumption. 
 
Direction and magnitude of changes in 𝑳 and 𝑵: 
From the time constraint: (𝑁 + 𝐿) = (𝑇 − 𝐻). As 𝐻 increases, (𝑁 + 𝐿) declines. To understand the direction and the 
magnitude of the change in 𝑁 and 𝐿 corresponding to rise in 𝐻, I explore the following possibilities: 
Case a 
𝑁 remaining constant,  
decline in 𝐿 is equal to rise in 𝐻) 
Not Feasible 
As wage income declines, if 𝑋𝑀 remains constant 
due to constant 𝑁 then, 𝑋𝑀 becomes inferior good 
violating the assumption 
 
Case b 
Both 𝑁 & 𝐿 decline, but the 
magnitude of decline in each 𝑁 & 𝐿 is 
less than rise in 𝐻 
Feasible 
As wage income declines, if 𝑋𝑀 declines due to 
fall in 𝑁 then 𝑋𝑀 remains a normal good and 𝐿 
also declines, so, 𝐿 remains a normal good 
 
Case c 
𝑁 declines by the same amount of rise 
in 𝐻 but 𝐿 remains constant 
Not Feasible 
As wage income declines, if 𝑋𝑀 declines due to 
fall in 𝑁 then 𝑋𝑀 remains normal good but if 𝐿 
remains constant then it will not be a normal good 
but an inferior good violating the assumption 
 
Case d 
Corresponding to rise in 𝐻, if decline 
in 𝑁 is larger than the rise in 𝐿  
Not Feasible 
As wage income declines, if 𝑋𝑀 declines due to 
fall in 𝑁 then 𝑋𝑀 remains normal good but if 𝐿 




Corresponding to the rise in 𝐻, if rise 
in 𝑁 is less than the decline in 𝐿  
Not Feasible 
As wage income declines, if 𝑋𝑀 rises due to rise in 
𝑁 then  𝑋𝑀 will become an inferior good, violating 
the assumption, although 𝐿 remains a normal good  
 
Source: Author’s own presentation.
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A4.1. Distribution of population across deciles by social groups within the rural areas
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile
ST SC OBC Others All
Panel B: Urban areas
Notes: While generating each diagram (Panel A and Panel B), the respective sample population (All) is first divided
into ten deciles by Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditures (MPCE). For example, in Panel A, the entire ru-
ral sample population is first divided into ten equal groups by MPCE, so that each decile contains 10% of the sample
population. Decile 1 forms the poorest group, whereas decile 10 forms the richest group. The distribution of the sam-
ple population for each social group is computed across these ten deciles.
ST: Scheduled Tribes; SC: Scheduled Castes; OBC: Other Backward Classes; Others: General.
Source: The figures have been generated using the data available in Statement 3.5 of NSS (2015).
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Has caste certificate 0.63 0.42 0.20 (0.000)
Head’s age 48.28 48.64 -0.36 (0.759)
Head education 5.86 5.15 0.71 (0.108)
Average adult education age1 7.37 6.51 0.85 (0.009)
Average age of adult1 36.49 36.58 -0.09 (0.890)
Head is female 0.22 0.20 0.03 (0.513)
Household size 4.62 5.02 -0.40 (0.070)
Child dependency ratio 0.18 0.22 -0.05 (0.010)
Adult dependency ratio 0.04 0.04 0.00 (0.766)








Has caste certificate 0.53 0.31 0.21 (0.000)
Head’s age 51.78 46.50 5.28 (0.000)
Head education 6.72 7.74 -1.02 (0.055)
Average adult education age1 8.87 8.23 0.64 (0.086)
Average age of adult1 37.61 35.90 1.71 (0.030)
Head is female 0.26 0.10 0.16 (0.001)
Household size 4.74 5.11 -0.37 (0.131)
Child dependency ratio 0.17 0.21 -0.04 (0.080)
Adult dependency ratio 0.06 0.03 0.02 (0.064)








Has Caste Certificate 0.59 0.38 0.21 (0.000)
Head’s age 49.60 47.73 1.87 (0.042)
Head education 6.18 6.25 -0.07 (0.837)
Average adult education age1 7.93 7.25 0.69 (0.007)
Average age of adult1 36.91 36.29 0.62 (0.222)
Head is female 0.24 0.16 0.08 (0.007)
Household size 4.66 5.06 -0.39 (0.016)
Child dependency ratio 0.17 0.22 -0.05 (0.002)
Adult dependency ratio 0.05 0.03 0.01 (0.158)
Observations 359 328 687
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
This table presents descriptive statistics for households by their caste status. 1The adult members
are aged between 18–65 years.
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
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A4.3. Effect of the instrument on the possession of a caste certificate (First stage re-
gression)
Caste certificate
SC/ST OBC SC & OBC
Non-migrants (IV) 0.165∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
Observations 412 275 687
F-Statistic 12 11 22
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Two-sided p-values are
reported in parentheses.
This table presents the first stage regression results. Controls for
household level analysis include average education of all working
aged household members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65
years) and its square, average age of all working aged household
members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its
square, gender of household head, effective household size, adult
dependency ratio, child dependency ratio, city dummy variable for
Kolkata (considering Mumbai as a base dummy).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the sur-
vey data.
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A4.4. Determinants of the caste certificate holding and validity of the instrument:











Non-migrants (IV) 0.174*** 0.009 0.035
SC (base: OBC) 0.199*** -0.033* 0.065*
Average Adult Education Age 18-65 0.044* 0.016* -0.009
Avg. Adult Edu. Square -0.000 0.000 0.001
Average age of adult between 18-65 0.028 0.009 0.002
Avg. Adult Age Square -0.000 -0.000 0.000
Head is female -0.066 -0.019 0.011
Household size 0.010 -0.012*** 0.012
Child dependency ratio 0.060 -0.044 -0.056
Adult dependency ratio 0.012 -0.007 0.157
Kolkata -0.100* -0.102*** -0.074**
Has Caste Certificate 0.026 0.039
Observations 687 687 687
R2 0.144 0.305 0.042
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Two-sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
The first column of the table presents determinants of caste certificate. Second and third
columns show that the instrument (i.e., non-migrants or residing the a state of origin) has
no direct impact on outcome variables of interest, namely MIA scores and government jobs.
Controls for household level analysis include average education of all working aged house-
hold members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its square, average age of
all working aged household members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its
square, gender of household head, effective household size, adult dependency ratio, child de-
pendency ratio, city dummy variable for Kolkata (considering Mumbai as a base dummy).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A4.6. Mediation analysis: MIA components
Panel I. Dep. variables: Govt. Job: 2SLS
SC & OBC OBC SC
Caste Certificate 0.238∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.086
(0.062) (0.044) (0.341)
Panel II. Dep. variables: (1) Mediation Analysis: Improved water
Govt. Job (Mediator) 0.037 0.001 0.173
(0.390) (0.498) (0.372)
(2) Mediation Analysis: Have personal toilet
Govt. Job (Mediator) -0.005 -0.031 -0.018
(0.483) (0.407) (0.483)
(3) Mediation Analysis: Have bank account
Govt. Job (Mediator) 0.282∗∗∗ 0.134∗ 0.876∗∗
(0.008) (0.059) (0.032)
(4) Mediation Analysis: Improved house-type
Govt. Job (Mediator) -0.088 0.047 -0.556
(0.289) (0.386) (0.143)
(5) Mediation Analysis: MIA component (No house leak)
Govt. Job (Mediator) 0.197 0.213∗ 0.295
(0.114) (0.091) (0.312)
(6) Mediation Analysis: No over-crowd)
Govt. Job (Mediator) -0.034 -0.155 0.222
(0.415) (0.141) (0.337)
(7) Mediation Analysis: No health hazard
Govt. Job (Mediator) 0.302∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.461
(0.015) (0.005) (0.172)
(8) Mediation Analysis: At least a landline
Govt. Job (Mediator) 0.154 0.302∗∗ -0.267
(0.151) (0.025) (0.300)
Observations 687 275 412
Notes: Notes: One sided p-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel I presents regression of caste certificate on government job holding by at least a member in an el-
igible household and a set of control variables. The predicted value of government job is obtained from
the regression equations for SC/ST, OBC and combined groups.
Panel II presents regression results for having a government job on MIA components. The predicted value
of government job obtained in Panel I is used in Panel II regressions. The estimates are computed using
a bootstrap method with 1,000 replications.
Controls for household level analysis include average education of all working aged household members
(i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its square, average age of all working aged household
members (i.e., who are between the ages of 18–65 years) and its square, gender of household head, ef-
fective household size, adult dependency ratio, child dependency ratio, city dummy variable for Kolkata
(considering Mumbai as a base dummy).
Source: Estimates are based on authors’ calculations using the survey data.
